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Within the realm of politics, there are two forces which have considerable influence upon
the social dynamics of a society because they comprise the fundamental desires of human
nature and influence the common aspirations that a society might possess. They are the
components of Man's inner striving which presuppose all political systems and societal
constructs. The first of these, generally defined as the Utopian impulse, pertains to the
forward-looking or visionary component of a culture. It is the element of a society's common
will that sets forth the image of a desired future which motivates its social and political
structures to produce corresponding speculative projections in real and practical terms.
Without such objectives, the progress of a culture may falter and cultural atrophy sets in which
leads to an overall decline involving the quality of life of its members. If this trend continues
unabated, cultural stagnation sets in giving rise to social unrest, apathy, and disillusionment.
Closely related to this, is another intrinsic drive contained within human nature which
compels Mankind to forge its social constructs in reference to the narrative devised by the
Utopian consciousness into a practical political discourse which presupposes social and political
action. It is this alliance between Utopian speculation and the existing hierarchies of power
which provides the basic attributes needed to bring about benevolent transformations within the
institutional structure of a particular society. Consequently, coupled with these potential
benefits are certain dangers involving the emergence of repressive forces and alienated states of
Being, which can also be product of the interaction between power and Utopia. If the political
visions of a society are overly fantastic to the point of being a mythical structure with not even
a remote possibility of attainment, the converse of the enrichments of the lives of a society's
inhabitants occurs and the vision produces disillusionment, cynicism, and oppression within its
domain.
With the ongoing formation of a global economic and political structure, the rise in the
practice of total war, and the decline in the influence of traditionally powerful ideologies, a
reassessment of the dynamics of modern societal goals is required in order to clarify the needs
of contemporary Man in relation to the modern State. The departure point for such an analysis
should be the fundamental ground of why societies and governments are formed. The
perpetual interaction of the attributes of power and Utopia plays an integral part in this process
and thus, must be analysed in reference to this ground. As the old political ideologies redefine
themselves and modern regimes search for new identities and symbols which can aid in the
maintenance of their shroud of legitimacy, clarification of certain aspects of the Utopian
impulse and how such notions are applied to develop strategies that can transform and guide
existing power structures is imperative. Such a study may prove beneficial in regards to
providing a ground for speculation on the potential constitution of political institutions which
can strike the best possible balance between these forces allowing for the production of
altruistic institutions while avoiding possibly malignant ones.
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Introduction:
The Connection ofPower and Utopia
Within modern times, the images of the ideal community produced by the Utopian
endeavour have come under repeated attacks which describe them, not as shining archetypes
depicting the potential of Mankind, but as examples of the human capacity for folly and
tyranny.1 Though attacks are understandable given some of the horrific events that have
occurred under the pretext of the construction of a better world, a swing to the extreme of the
opposing view is equally as dangerous. There is a certain possibility that such events will
emerge, but it is a questionable stance to assert that all enterprises deemed Utopian are
camouflaged avenues to either slavery or destruction. As has been shown repeatedly
throughout history, there is a certain danger of tyranny or abuse with any method of social or
political theory, but this risk does not outweigh the potential benefits. For within this same
history, Utopian speculation has served to inform men of possible social structures that are
conducive to the fulfilment of their potential and can continue in this role if practised with
though the tradition of anti-utopianism re-emerged within the modern era with the criticism of Marx
and Engels, the tradition itself can be traced to the advent of the earliest Greek Utopias. A prominent
example is Aristotle's critique of Plato's ideal commonwealth. For a well argued example of this type of
critique put forth within this century; see Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. I: Plato.
5th edition. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
temperance. To achieve this, the majority of the misconceptions surrounding this methodology
must be dispelled and its inherent function clarified. Only after this process, will it be possible
to assess the true role and relationship to the forces that formulate human societies. Thus, the
task of this exploration is to uncover the intrinsic nature and potential of Utopia as well as its
connection to the reality of the social realm.
In undertaking this, it is imperative to understand the cause of many of the misconceptions
surrounding such endeavours. In many classical Utopian texts, such as Plato's Republic, one is
struck immediately by the rigidity of its organisation. The patterning of its institutions,
especially those pertaining to the structuring of its class system, the indoctrination prevalent
within the educational system, and the administration of its laws, seem to point to an
intentional undermining of the attributes involving individual freedom in favour of the
demands of a unified communal structure. Admittedly, some of the descriptions contained
within this account seem to contradict our modern democratic ideals, but before it is cast aside
as totalitarian and thereby condemning the tradition of thought which emulates its form2, it is
important to understand the underlying intent behind such a project.
According to Plato's description, the commonwealth was to be a singular and self-sufficient
entity containing as many varied economic activities as the allotted space and resources would
allow without creating conditions ripe for social friction. To create and perpetuate a sense of
unity3, the regulation of the size of the city as well as the limitation of access to outside
influences was to be closely monitored by the ruling elite. The rigidity of its institutions was
also evident in the configuration of its class structures. These structures were to contain three
class distinctions correlating to a preconceived division of labour that would supposedly create
the most stable and harmonious of social environments. To maintain this stability, no
movement between these classes was admissible except under extraordinary conditions and
2As Theodore Olson points out on page 157 of his text; Millenialism, Utopianism, and Progress.
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), Plato was putting forth an argument for justice, and not a
depiction of a society encompassing a naive belief in reason as was prevalent in the later Utopias of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He did, however, influence the formulation of this genre because
of the extensive borrowing from this text by the later generations of Utopians. Because of this, it shares
several characteristics with these ensuing texts. The main similarity being the use of this method
criticising existing social structures by proposing an alternative social order comprehensible only to those
who contain the capacity to discern the transcendental qualities and nature of Man's existence.
3Plato, The Republic. 2nd edition, trans. Desmond Lee. (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974) Pg.
190 (424c). The correct size and characteristics of the city must be determined by the ruling class in its
interpretation of a foreordained standard of unity. This is exemplified in Socrates' statement to
Adeimantis: 'The state should, I think,' I replied, 'be allowed to grow so long as growth is compatible
with unity, but no further.'
ii
with the consent of the governing elite.4 The individuals comprising this elite legislative class
were to be known as the Guardians and would be selected from the slightly lower warrior
class designated as the Auxiliaries. This second class was responsible for undertaking the
duties involved in the policing and defence of the city.5 The remainder of the inhabitants
would comprise the lowest class taking part in the commercial, agricultural, and manufacturing
activities of the commonwealth. The maintenance of this structure was to be controlled by a
system of demotion and promotion also overseen by the Guardians,6
The various restrictive procedures within Plato's ideal community set about to fulfil a
singular aim: the promotion of what the author considered a harmonious life. Plato felt such
harmony and unity could exist within structures that were essentially stable, therefore, its laws
and customs were designed to limit the potential for social discord within the community as a
whole. To achieve this measure, the diversity of its inhabitants was purposely restricted
because it was felt that such vicissitude was the underlying factor of social unrest.7 Given this
priority, the regulation of the potential for strife within the community was proposed to take
place in three main areas.8
Firstly, within the economic realm, the removal of the possibility for the accumulation of
excess wealth or the sinking into a condition of extreme poverty was to be eliminated through a
forced equalisation process involving financial and material resources. This measure was
designed to limit moral corruption stemming from excessive deprivation or jealously from an
excessive materialism.9 A second area heavily regulated entailed the education of the
commonwealth's inhabitants. This system sought to resist the potential for discontentment by
limiting the prospects for innovative measures being created by its citizens. This was intended
regulate the power of the intellectual and artistic circles of the society. Thus, within its
curriculum, no new methodologies, theories or even recreational games were allowed at any
4Ibid., Pg. 206 (434c). 'Interference by the three classes with each other's jobs, and interchange of
jobs between them, therefore, does the greatest harm to our state, and we are entirely justified in calling
it the worst of evils.' This statement seems to rest on Plato's assumption that a 'just' state finds its
proper foundation on each individual doing the occupation best suited to his or her nature.
5For Plato's explanation of the selection of the guardians, see: Pg. 177-178 (412b-415d); for the
description of the qualities of these 'philosopher kings', Pg. 276-280 (484-487); and their education,
Pg. 326-354 (521c-541b). For a description of the auxiliary class, their duties, and living standards, see
Pg. 182-187 (415e-421c). The third class, comprised of merchants, professionals, and craftsmen is not
described in length anywhere in the text. Of note though, is the fact that the members of this segment of
the society were allowed to acquire a certain amount of material wealth, unlike the 'Auxiliaries' and the
'Guardians'.
6Ibid., Pg. 236-243 (457c-461e) and Pg. 246-252 (462-466d).
7Ibid., Pg. 187-188 (421d-422a).
8Adi Ophir, Plato's Invisible Cities: Power in the Republic. (London: Routledge, 1991) Pg. 90.
9Plato, Pg. 187-188 (421d-422a).
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time throughout an individual's education. Strict adherence to traditional concepts and ideas
approved by the ruling elite was to be stressed, with individual thought or expression highly
restricted.10 Finally, within the legal system, the legislative body was to be elevated to the
status of a quasi-religion.11 By raising it to such a status, the possible emergence of political
unrest amongst the members of the ruling class from the reinterpretation of the written laws
was severely limited, thereby controlling the potential for unrest amongst the general
population as well. This status was maintained through the ritualization of the activities of the
governing class, who were to make sure any attempts at political variation had a severely
limited chance of succeeding.
With the stringent regulation of these three realms, Plato's ideal state aspires to eliminate
the uncertainty intrinsic to human endeavours of this nature. This characteristic of
unpredictability arises from both the perpetual change contained within the surrounding world
as well as the seemingly more irrational side of the psyche as embodied by human emotions.
This project of reason seeks to discipline this more emotive side of human nature in order to
regulate most of the conditions relating to this element of transcendental uncertainty. It is the
depiction of a just society based on the notion of temperance, and it is this characteristic which
connects it to other projects within the genre of utopianism. Thus, it addresses a perpetually
recurrent theme within the tradition of Utopian thought; speculation upon the most equitable
division of power and resources within a communal structure. Accordingly, its answer rests on
the premise that a harmonious state of existence can be maintained through the attribute of
social stability. However, in reality such a state ignores a basic characteristic of existence, the
constant fluctuation and transformation of the human condition due to its inherent temporality,
and this central drawback, is found within a majority of the texts considered Utopian.
I. The Dual Nature ofMan
The static perfection portrayed in The Republic illustrates an essential desire characteristic
to Man: the need to overcome the element of hazard endemic to its existence. This is
seemingly the central focus to the project, so much so that it excludes any possibility of a
social diversity which could allow for the cultivation of various means of individual
10Ibid., Pg. 191-192 (424a-425a).
11 Ibid., Pg. 238 (458c) and Pg. 181-182 (414c-415d) These statements describe Plato's conception of
the 'Magnificent Myth' or what is commonly referred to as the 'Noble Lie.' This creation of a social
tradition with mystical connotations sought to breed an unquestioning faith amongst the populace. In this
way, a secular form of divine will was to be produced that legitimised the actions of the ruling class.
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expression. Therefore, it succumbs to the tendency to over-emphasise the importance of this
attribute to the detriment of another equally significant requirement of human nature: the need
for creative expression embodied in the spirit of innovation.12 This impulse finds its ground in
the fundamental striving to define ones' existence in a uniquely creative manner. Though
stability and security are both desirable and beneficial within social and political constructs,
too much of these attributes can lead to a sterile one-dimensional existence.13
As a consequence of this, two recurrent faults within traditional Utopian texts have fired the
arguments of the anti-utopians. In regards to the first, Man's nature is essentially dualistic,
comprised of one drive centred on innovation, change, and creative self-expression, and
another, which desires security and stability within his inner subjective nature as well as the
external environment.14 The former impulse is driven by the persistent need to overcome the
conditions of the present through creative action directed towards the realisation of his
potential contained within the future, while the second seeks to manipulate its immediate
surroundings in order to facilitate a sense of control and security. Consequently, the preceding
drive is concerned with the instigation of change, with the following seeking to control and
maintain the conditions of the present. Thus, many traditional Utopian enterprises focus solely
on this desire for stability, at the expense of Man's need for creative expression.
12Bertrand Russell. Authority and the Individual. (London: Unwin Paperbacks Ltd., 1977) Pg. 68-69.
Russell asserts that some of the qualities necessary to a community are essentially static, while others are
of a more fluid and changing character. The elements important for the stability of the community are
better controlled by a centralised governing structure like the one illustrated in Plato's text, while others
which are of a more dynamic nature should be left to the initiative of certain individuals or groups. He
correctly observes that; "A healthy and progressive society requires both a central control and individual
and group initiative: without control there is anarchy, and without initiative there is stagnation." The
rigidity of the social structures depicted in The Republic seem too centralised to allow such a equilibrium
to occur.
13Russell, Pg. 70. "Security, though undoubtedly a good thing, may be sought excessively and become
a fetish. A secure life is not necessarily a happy life; it may be rendered dismal by boredom and
monotony." Such a statement highlights what many anti-utopians such as A. Huxely in Brave New
World (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1965) have traditionally criticised. Conformity can bring a
certain stability, but too much tends to stifle the necessary human trait of individual self expression (as
embodied by the character of the savage in Huxely's novel). Eventually, this will stagnate life within the
community as a whole. Plato's commonwealth epitomises this mistake. It doesn't negate the validity of
the Utopian enterprise as many critics claim, but it does highlight the potential danger involved if such
endeavours are conceived in too rigorous a fashion.
14Ibid., Pg. 11-23. The author asserts that there are two instincts predominant within the psychological
make-up of humans which have been present since the primary evolutionary stages of the species. One
instinct is competitive and stems from the need to express ones uniqueness. It is embodied in our
passions and activities in regards to art, sports, and heroic actions. If not properly channelled this
instinct can potentially lead to violence or if ignored completely, apathy. The second is based on co¬
operation and is the crucial element in Man's ability to construct and maintain social relations. The
satisfaction of both of these elements is imperative for human nature to be completely fulfilled.
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A second mistake commonly found within the texts of Utopian authors pertains to the
failure to realise that the Utopian endeavour is essentially a speculative act concerning the
distribution of power within the social sphere. Consequently, the concept of Utopia is
therefore closely linked to power, making it easily manipulated by the interests in a position to
exercise it. Generally, it is not the author of a Utopia which has cynical intentions, but the
political contingents seeking to implement its proposals. This factor points to another
connection between power and Utopia, given that the latter is dependent on the praxis of power
for the implementation of its visions. Without this, the Utopian endeavour must remain a
sideline fantasy instead of a mechanism of change within the social structure. Therefore, it is
through this connection that the vision of the Utopian can acquire an influence over the
formation of social and political institutions, but this same link also allows such conceptions to
be cynically manipulated in order to usurp individual autonomy.
Hence, it is the interplay between these two characteristics intrinsic to Man's nature that
have a direct influence on the configuration of his social and political structures. To fully
comprehend the potential capacity of the Utopian endeavour in influencing such formations,
Man's proclivity to envision an idealised future (the Utopian impulse) must be evaluated in
relation to the implicit desire to dominate the constituent components comprising his
surroundings (the impulse to power). It is the interaction which drives the cyclical process of
social transformation relating to the ascent or descent of cultures. This relationship is
indicative of the human capacity to inhabit a realm between the reality of the objective world
and the mental images produced by the faculty of the imagination which informs his actions.
For the constitution of a free society, neither characteristic must supersede the other in
importance, nor can either be fully understood in isolation.
This interrelation of the forces contains the capacity to effect the human condition
implicitly at every level, from the metaphysical to the cultural. As Fred Polak illustrates in his
description of the forces involved in the process of cultural renewal: "Man's dualism is thus
the indispensable prerequisite to the movements in time, and to the dynamics of historical
change."15 Given this, social changes that result in key cultural alterations or historical
upheavals are directly related to the formulation of the ideals and values depicting the future as
the human will desires it to be. They influence humanity's attempts at a purposeful
intervention that seeks to influence the configuration of its surroundings and become manifest
in the form of transitive changes to Man's social institutions.
15Fred Polak, The linage ofThe Future. (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973)
Pg. 2.
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Consequently, contrary to many prevalent beliefs, the theories of a social visionary, such as
the Utopian, can therefore acquire a position of influence on an existing power structure as an
impetus for significant events of social transformation. Similarly, the actions undertaken by
such a structure in the implementation of these ideals simultaneously projects, sustains, and
reinforces their value conceptions within a society. Therefore, to understand the social
dynamics of Mankind's civilisations, the attributes of power and Utopia must be studied within
their mutual context, which involves the formative process of the social structures that define
the human condition.
II. The Paradoxical Potential ofThis Duality
If these forces maintain a relationship of equally balanced influence beneficial changes can
be instigated within a culture, but if it becomes disproportionate, potentially disruptive cultural
devices can be unleashed causing social violence and unrest. A central problem with the value
conceptualisations produced by the visionary is that there is no control over the magnitude of
the changes brought about by them or the method in which they are implemented. This factor
allows certain political factions to utilise such visions to mask their drive for the acquisition of
power until they reach a dominant position or for a group seeking to maintain such a position.
In the event that a predominant ruling party of an existing social condition appropriates such
imagery as a means to an end based solely on its own interests, such imagery betrays the very
ideals it claims to represent. It serves only to disguise the machinations of power instead of
producing values seeking to influence existing social structures benevolently. When utilised in
this manner, horrific events such as war, revolution, and systematic violence can be
legitimised under the veil of necessary action towards the manifestation of a social and political
ideal.
Such potential necessitates an understanding of the interaction of the forces underlying
power and Utopia, if a recurrence of some of the tragic events contained within the history of
human civilisation is to be avoided.16 With the advent of modern technology, it is no longer
16Two of the most infamous events of this nature have been within the twentieth century, largely due to
the spread of the utilisation of political propaganda facilitated by the proliferation of the mass media.
Such methods allow political groups and figures an avenue towards capitalising on the implicit desires
contained within the communal psyche of a population. A good example of such actions was embodied
in the policies of the National Socialist Party in Germany before and during World War II which
manipulated the population into undertaking actions of wide-spread social violence and war while
simultaneously producing campaigns of propaganda describing the benefits brought about by its rule (See
chapter VI of this text). Similarly, in the Soviet Union, under Stalin's government, images of the
virtuous equality of the 'workers state' were projected to the mass population, while his tyrannical regime
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possible to ignore even the most seemingly far-fetched of visions, because the rapid change
which accompanies it makes prediction concerning the future increasingly difficult. In light of
these factors, this study will endeavour to understand the implications surrounding the
interaction of power and Utopia in order to ascertain a better comprehension of potential
circumstances it can generate. Through an analysis emphasising the necessity and importance
of the connection of these forces to the formation and subsequent transformation of the
ideological superstructure of a society, the causal circumstances surrounding many modern
social maladies could be ascertained. Similarly, such knowledge can aid in the propagation
and implementation of visions which can have positive effects on the social edifices of men.
Given this, the overriding question to be addressed will be: What is the intrinsic connection
between the forces underlying the concepts of power and Utopia, and how does this interaction
affect the human condition?
In approaching this question, the exploration of many of the implications surrounding it
will be undertaken in three sections. Within the first, an exploration of the complex issues
surrounding the definition and clarification of the fundamental nature of each concept will be
undertaken. This will provide the groundwork for the creation of working definitions that will
inform subsequent analysis concerning the effects that such a relationship can have on the
internal machinations of a society. In the case of Utopia, traditionally contentious issues
concerning the validity, meaning and characteristics of its endeavour will be examined to
uncover its potential as a method of social and political criticism. Similarly, the concept of
power will be investigated in an effort to discover its essential attributes relating to the notion
of capacity, its manifestation as a social phenomenon, and its implicit associations with
violence, authority, and coercion.
Following from this, the second section of the study will outline the issues involved in the
interrelationship of these concepts and their effect upon the varying facets defining the Man's
existence. This procedure will attempt to uncover its potential impact on the formation and
machinations of the political and cultural structures of human societies, its influence on our
perceptions of the past, as well as the role it has in defining the unique characteristics of the
individuals comprising these structures. The final section will set out to clarify certain central
philosophical issues such as the arguments for freewill and determinism, the role of ideals in
defining existence, and the intrinsic relationship between the freedom of expression and the
discipline demanded by the community in relation to the concepts of power and Utopia. It is at
systematically killed, tortured, and imprisoned, countless thousands of individuals during its reign of
terror.
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this point that the question serving as the driving force behind this study can be singularly
addressed. Through an understanding of the influence of the interaction of these forces, the
construction of abstract social and political paradigms can be undertaken which are open to
utilisation as informative tools of criticism. In this way, the potential of this interaction of
forces may then be capitalised upon, while averting some of its potentially negative aspects.
Towards this end, our study will now embark upon an analysis of the issues surrounding the
Utopian endeavour.
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Book !: The EssentialCharacteristics ofPower and Utopia.
Chapter I:
On Utopia
The concept of "Utopia" has been a prevalent force in the civilising process of Man since
the birth of western civilisation within the culture of the ancient Greeks.1 Traditionally, such
descriptions focus on an attempt to visualise a society that is benevolent by nature and
corresponds to a situation ideally suited to the cultivation of its inhabitants' material and
spiritual needs. In a majority of the cases, such speculation expounds a doctrine of perfection,
where Mankind can overcome the vices and hardships of its present context in order to reach a
higher plateau of existence, either within the future or in some other geographic location. Its
discourse emphasises certain qualities within human nature closely connected to its dreams and
desires, and it is these qualities which serve as the foundation for its perpetual appeal.2
'Frank and Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979)
Pg. I. As the authors point out, there has been a Utopian "propensity" within cultures as diverse as the
savage Guarani tribe in Brazil and the cargo-cults of Asia and Africa, to the highly civilised societies of
the Japanese, the Hindus, and the Arabs. However, the influx of such conceptions has been unparalleled
within the tradition ofWestern thought.
2See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber ofHumanity. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) Pg. 20.
Berlin asserts that Utopias are satirical devices designed to criticise those in power or those willingly
succumbing to the elite's edicts and machinations. He claims that there are several consistent elements
contained within this tradition. Such speculative devices usually envision a society in a state of pure
harmony, where all are at peace. Further, all inhabitants are free from the burden of physical danger,
Ironically, it is this same striving for perfection, that is one of the central points generating
much of the criticism directed towards it. Given the obscurity of the essential characteristics
of human nature, many intellectual circles perceive Utopian literature as depicting
circumstances which are closed, impractical, or merely fanciful. Such critics claim these
imaginative descriptions merely propagate myths, and therefore contain no more significance
within the reality of Man's existence than a piece of literary fiction. This position is a
crystallisation of a number of disciplines or attitudes within political philosophy, social theory,
and other intellectual traditions, and commonly denoted as anti-utopianism. This strain of
criticism has been prevalent for as long as there has been speculation concerning the conditions
of an ideal commonwealth.3 Much of this negativity emerges as a result of the ambivalent
manner in which a majority of Utopias are presented. This is due largely to the fact that the
Utopian message can be found within a wide variety of literary methods or descriptions, and it
is this multi-discliplinary approach which makes its true intentions difficult to ascertain.
What is generally considered the literary genre of Utopian thought was formalised by Sir
Thomas More in 1516 with his presentation of the word "utopia" which utilised the expression
in its title.4 More drew this word from the Latin root topia, which can have several meanings
ranging from, 'nowhere' (outopia), to 'somewhere good' (eutopia).5 This 'no place', was
considered by More to be imaginary in geographic terms, but nonetheless existed within the
realm of possibility. He purposely maintained the ambivalent and fantastic nature with a
literary structure resembling a fable as well as utilising differing devices with subversive
meanings such as naming the narrator HythlodayiAnother Greek term meaning 'distributor of,
or expert in nonsense'.6) These devices had a dramatic effect in regards to capturing the
imagination of the reader and provided an excellent platform for covertly criticising the
contemporary social context. However, this inadvertently aided in propagating the conception
that utopia was concerned with merely illustrating fantasies and not a serious form of political
speculation or criticism.7
envy, frustration, material needs, insecurity, or injustice of any kind. Moreover, due to this fact and as
was shown in the case of Plato's Republic, they tend to be intellectually inert because after reaching such
a state of perfection, the necessity for change or innovation is eliminated. Therefore, utopia is
traditionally conceived as a situation where all human needs and desires are perpetually fulfilled.
3For a classic example; see Aristotle, The Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
4See Sir Thomas More, Utopia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
6More, Pg. xi.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., Pg. 112 - 113. Here, More discusses the advantages of such devices in a letter to his friend,
Peter Giles.
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Coupled with this, is the perception that the measures depicted by the Utopia can contain
the possibility of influencing great changes within a society, but such changes would not bring
the paradise generally envisioned. This position charges that most of the Utopian assumptions
concerning human nature rest on narrow a priori conceptions of the "good", and contain
underlying authoritarian tones that are essentially antagonistic to the values of societies where
the rights of the individual are considered paramount.8 An attempt to carry out these proposals
would inevitably lead to tyrannical state apparatus whose holistic approach incorporating
radical social change repressive and potentially violent actions.
There are several arguments whose points of departure rest on this view, but whose
agendas are radically different.9 Arguably, the most prominent of these critiques is presented
by Karl Popper.10 In his argument against the a priori rationale of Utopian engineering,
Popper contrasts this method with a piece-meal approach to social reform he claims to be more
sympathetic to a liberal society. This trial and error procedure of observation and refinement,
is asserted to the true techniques of science in regards to social reform, contrary to the Utopian
social engineers' claims that it is their methods that are scientifically based. To Popper, the
Utopian method serves as a disguise the individual attempting to play the role of a Deity
utilising a knowledge that is both imperfect and incomplete.11 It has an illicit agenda which
seeks to indoctrinate its inhabitants by imposing a personalised view of the "common good" on
a community which is instigated through the "wiping clean"12 of the existing slate. By
claiming to know the essential traits of human nature and the proposals that have the potential
to mould a society which corresponds to them, this technique actually ignores each individual's
need for self-expression. And by ignoring this requirement, the Utopian social reformer
ignores the warning contained within the phrase, "one man's dream is another man's
nightmare."13
8Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor, The Politics of Utopia: A Study in Theory and Practice. (London:
Hutchinson, 1982) Pg. 93.
9Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 92.
10See Karl Popper, Vol. I, Pg. 157-169. For examples of other similar arguments within this tradition,
See: J. L. Talmon. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. (Praeger, 1960) Pg. 2-7. Talmon stresses
the need for pluralistic institutional experimentation. Also, F. Hayek. 'The Principles of a Liberal Social
Order' in Ideologies ofPolitics. Ed. by A. Crespigny and J. Cronin. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1975), for an explication on the possibility of acquiring truly free and spontaneous societal parameters in
the form of a Catallaxy. This view is based on theories first expounded by John Locke and later refined
by Adam Smith in his theory of the "invisible hand" process.
1'Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 94.
12For a classic example of this form of reasoning and one directly relating to Popper's attack, see Plato;
Pg. 263-264 (501a-502a).
13Margaret Mead, "Towards More Vivid Utopias", in Utopia. George Kateb. (New York: Atherton
Press, 1971) Pg. 44.
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Through the example of Popper's argument14, one can see that within this group of writers,
there is an inherent distrust of any individual seeking to bring about changes within a society
that are beyond their immediate concerns or those holding theoretical positions whose primary
intention is the undertaking of radical social actions that are guided by a singular rationale.
The main thrust of this position seems to be directed against viewing society as an artefact
which can be shaped through theoretical speculation treating it as an organic whole. Any
attempt to undertake such an action is doomed to failure because it is founded on a closed and
static mentality. In certain circumstances, such accusations may have been valid criticisms,
but can it be legitimately claimed that this is always the case with any form of Utopian
speculation? Does such activity necessarily lead to the loss of individual freedom and the
creation of tyrannical regimes? If utopianism were viewed from a different perspective, could
it not bring a different result from the one the Liberal tradition claims as inevitable?
Admittedly, it is not difficult to envision why such concerns arise, and there are several
pivotal events where a depiction of an ideal society has been utilised to facilitate some twisted
vision of reality.15 However, these rather limited cases do not seem to provide sufficient
grounds for the complete disqualification of the Utopian endeavour. As is the case with most
forms of human action, utopianism might best described as a double-edged sword. Certain
Utopian visions, if carried out dogmatically could cause a great deal of harm to the very
societies they hope to benefit. The converse might be possible if such measures were
incorporated in a less extensive or radical manner. If Utopian proposals are seen to be
stringent guidelines for the total reconstruction of a society 'over-night', then the criticism of
the anti-utopians will always be well founded. If, however, such measures are considered
differently, for example as a device intended to raise the social and political awareness of a
society, then definite benefits could be derived from its discourse. If this were to be the case,
it would be imprudent to ignore its conjectures prematurely16.
In this role, the Utopian mentality could contain the ability to rejuvenate certain values long
dormant within the communal psyche of a society. By seeking to focus on a limited range of
clearly depicted ideals, there could be an immense gain in the clarification of issues pertaining
14For an in-depth analysis of the tradition of Anti-utopian thought; See George Kateb, Utopia and its
Enemies. (London: Collier-Macmillan group, 1963).
15Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 93. Goodwin notes that several writers within this tradition were directly
affected by the activities of the Nazis and therefore tended to exaggerate the virtues of liberalism. Others
holding alternative political views, as was the case with the anarchist writer, Marie Louise Berneri in the
introduction of her book, Journey Through Utopia (London: Freedom Press, 1982) Pgs. 1-9., criticised
from the standpoint of specific political agendas.
16Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 20.
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to the attainment of such values. This obsession with certain specific values which is so
heavily criticised by the liberal theorists is the very trait which allows the Utopian to spurn
populist trends in an effort to reinforce certain values even if it risks conflicting with the
ideologies comprising the political conditions of the present.17 Akin to this, and perhaps of a
greater importance, is the fact that the Utopian has the capacity to introduce completely new
value conceptions with the potential to transform these ideologies. Such a dialogue may start
as a minor reaction to some social irritant in intensity and resolution until it incites actions
which have extreme ramifications throughout society.18 It is these abilities that allow the
Utopian method to uncover certain issues that may have been overlooked by the predominant
discourse at the time attracting the attention of the battling ideologies contained within its
social structure.
Given this potential, a sympathetic view towards the project of Utopia is proposed in order
to explore its capacity as a methodology for informing the social imagination in regards to the
possible future configurations of its institutional structures. To better understand the
parameters involved in such a proposition, one must explore several attributes of utopianism
that would permit the connection between social theory and practice to be made explicitly, thus
avoiding many of the hidden agendas prevalent in other forms of political theory and praxis.19
Utopia has the inherent capacity in gaining a beneficial distance in which to overcome the
compromised situations befalling most other political philosophies to produce paradigms that
can serve as valuable tools for the analysis of its surrounding social and political context.
Vital to the clarification of these powers of analysis, is the examination of its ability to
simultaneously anticipate future possibilities through criticism directed towards its surrounding
conditions. It is this aspect which allows the dismantling of certain defence mechanisms, to
offer a more vivid depiction of the internal relations of a society as well as projecting its
possible future organisation.20
Therefore, the censure directed towards its methods, in regards to its being either a literary
device producing compensatory fantasies or a guise for concealing totalitarian intentions, must
be overcome. To counter such reproaches, this chapter will set out to explore the notion of
possibility surrounding many of Utopia's predominant proposals, its range of possible
manifestations, and a possible methodology for its practical application within the sphere of
social and political thought. By exploring such parameters, it may be possible to understand
17H. J. N. Horsburgh, "The Relevance of the Utopian" in Ethics, Volume LXVII, 1956-57. Pg. 136.
18Horsburgh, Pg. 137.
19Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 9.
20Horsburgh, P. 135, Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 26-27.
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the essential nature of Utopian thought in reference to its positive attributes. Such an
exploration will coincide with the spirit of the statement made by Bertolt Brecht in defence of
his radio theory: "If you deem all of this Utopian, I beg you to reflect on the reason which
renders it Utopian."21
Utopian Thought and the Notion ofPossibility
In addressing the first issue, it is imperative to explore the various issues surrounding the
notion of possibility. Most critics holding that Utopia is pure fantasy, see its method as
proposing social policies and situations which are impossible to attain and thus it would be
imprudent to expend any effort in attempting to bring them into practice. This view originates
from two predominant misconceptions; one concerning the contingent and transient nature of
possibility, while the other stems from the ambivalence and confusion surrounding most
Utopian discourse due to the multi-disciplinary approach of portraying its subject matter.
Regarding the first conception, it is imperative to examine the conditions generally implied
when something is described as being either possible or impossible. In terms of its common
conception, the attribute of possibility, is judged by a rather rigid and dogmatic criteria.
According to its broad definition, something or some situation is said to be possible if it is
'capable of existing or happening; that may be managed, achieved, etc.'22 The converse of
this, impossible, describes a circumstance or element which is 'not possible; that cannot occur,
exist, or be done'.23 At a fundamental level, there is a direct connection between these words
resting on the fact that they are opposite in meaning. In our everyday use, if something is said
to be impossible, it can't be possible, and vice versa.
However, as is generally the case with subtle and complex issues, things which seem to
imply a straight-forward state of affairs, are rarely as simple as they first appear, with this
situation being no exception. Closely intertwined with our ideas possibility are the concepts of
practical and impractical.24 Within our common use of the terms, the latter concepts seem to
2'From a translated statement found in Darko Suvin, "Locus, Horizon, and Orientation: The Concept of
Possible Worlds as a Key to Utopian Studies", Utopia E Modernita. Vol. I., Ed by Giuseppa Saccarro
Del Buffa & Arthur O. Lewis. (Roma: Gangemi Editore, 1989) Pg. 64. For the original statement, see
Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. XVIII. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973) Pg. 30.
22R.E. Allen, ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary ofCurrent English. 8th edition. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1990) Pg. 930.
23Allen, Pg. 593.
24 Ibid., Pg. 935. According to its definition, a practical measure is more inclined to action than
speculation, or is designed mainly to fulfil a specific function. In connection with the notion of
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become confused with, or assimilated into the discourse concerning the idea of possibility.
The notion of practicality is actually only loosely related and brings qualitative factors into the
formula that only serve to obscure the central issues. In reality, all their meanings are
dependent on several factors and change periodically in relation to transformations in tense and
temporal circumstance. To ascertain the relative validity of the argument that most Utopian
proposals are impractical, or impossible to attain, it is important to comprehend the transient
forms such ideas can embody as well as the contingent nature of the factors upon which they
are dependent.
I. The Varying Notions ofPossibility.
Generally a state-of-affairs can become manifest in one of several forms or possibilities. In
regards to this, there are three categories of possibility which describe such potential; logical,
empirical, and technical. In the first, a situation or event is determined to be logically
possible, if the proposition behind the materialisation of its inherent conditions is not self-
contradictory. If such a proposition is found to be the opposite, then it is naturally assumed to
be logically impossible.25 One of the classical examples used to describe the logic behind this
concept is the case of the 'square circle'26. Such a condition can never become manifest
because according to its definition, a circle is a shape which does not have four equal sides.
To describe it as such, implies that it has four sides which correlates to the definition of a
square. Hence, if we say that a circle has four sides, then it is not a circle, it is by definition a
square. Following from this then, the conception of such a shape is logically impossible
because the proposition of the existence of such a state is self-contradictory. Due to the
incoherence pertaining to its internal logic, it could not be possible even if the circumstances
surrounding its description were to change. For this proposition to become feasible, its
intrinsic structural logic must be transformed.
Coupled with this notion of logical possibility is a second category which describes similar
issues in the empirical sense.27 Regarding this sense of possibility, it could be the case that a
man could run the distance of a mile in under one minute utilising only his given muscular
possibility, when the term practical utilised, it tends to influence those involved into perceiving certain
propositions not directly realisable in the short term, as not possible at all. In reality, something can be
very possible to manifest, but due to the difficulty of such an undertaking, may not be very practical.
25John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. 2nd. edition. (London: Routledge and




strength. Though at present, this seems a bizarre and fantastic statement, it is not a logical
impossibility, but it could be deemed empirically so. Possibility in the empirical sense centres
on the concept that for a state-of-affairs to have the possibility of actually occurring, conditions
vital to its occurrence cannot contradict the laws governing the natural forces found within the
world. In light of this, it may be the case that a man could cover the distance of a mile in
under one minute, but it seems strange at the moment because such an event has never been
witnessed. Therefore, it is natural to assume that such an event couldn't take place. This
proposition is not self-contradictory as in the case of the 'square circle', so it is possible in the
logical sense. Given this, one can't assume that it is absolutely impossible even in the
empirical sense. This is largely due to the fact that though the laws of nature are constant,
humanity's perception and understanding of them is perpetually changing.
Consequently, there is a temporal aspect that must be addressed when gauging the
possibility of a situation being manifested. Mankind's perception of the natural laws of the
universe change as time passes and our technical capabilities develop further. Just a little over
a century ago, the prevalent perception was that it was impossible for man to journey to the
moon. This was due to the fact that the collective knowledge of the natural laws concerning
aerodynamics at the time was more limited than at present. During this period, if a person
proposed the scenario of a man climbing into a small metallic container and being rocketed to
the moon, this individual would have been considered foolish, impractical, or possibly insane.
In reality, such an event was possible because taking flight in does not actually contradict the
laws of nature. Hence, notions involving empirical possibility are not static and are
susceptible to transformation as Man's perception and knowledge of the inherent composition
of the world evolves.28
The final category of possibility also transforms from one historical circumstance to
another. It differs from the empirical notion of possibility because it the direct manipulation of
the laws of Nature to bring about circumstances which were not attainable in previous epochs.
Returning to the example of space travel, more than a century ago it was actually empirically
possible for Mankind to journey to the moon, but not actually technically so.29 This
circumstance arose because civilisation at the time did not contain the technology to achieve
such an event. It is extremely hard to speculate on such possibilities because Man's power for
inventiveness seems endless, and the temporal effect on the notion of possibility involves such




found in error at some later date. However, if a proposal is discovered to be logically
impossible, it is not possible in the other categories as well because no amount of technical
prowess or temporal passage can bring about such a proposal. A proposal of this nature must
be transformed from within its own internal logic30.
When analysing Utopian thought in reference to these notions of possibility, a further
category must be included. This category focuses on the relative potential for political
proposals to be manifested within the social structure of a society. For such a proposal to be
implemented, it must gain support amongst those who can weld the greatest influence upon
public opinion.31 To the political realist or pragmatist, if a policy proposal is to have any
serious chance of advancing through a society's political apparatus, it must contain measures
within its structure that will allow it to build the necessary advocacy for implementation. Any
proposal that does not address such conditions contains little chance of becoming policy and
thus, is considered barren of any real political potential.
For the 'realist', to gain the needed advocacy, a proposition must be acceptable to a large
majority of a society, or at least to the ruling body of an influential political party. If this
cannot be achieved or seems unattainable in the short term, then this individual will generally
claim that the proposal is unable to utilise the political process, ultimately meaning it has no
possibility of achieving its true aim. If this is the case, it is not a serious proposal, but merely
a political fantasy. Any attempt made in regards to suggesting its execution is an exercise in
futility. Therefore, the realist argument against what it terms as idealist or Utopian proposals
rests more on their inability to excite the status-quo of the power structure, rather than their
inherent merit or actual feasibility. By claiming such conditions disqualify these types of
proposals from serious consideration, the realist is arguing on the grounds that a proposal is a
political impossibility.
II. The Implications ofPossibility on the Utopian Endeavour.
In reviewing the four categories outlined above in regards to Utopian thought, the large
majority of theories found within this discipline seem to contain an internally coherent logic
30Ibid. The author emphasises this distinction in another way; If a concept is logically impossible, it
would be so in any universe, but if it is empirically so, then it might be the case that in some universe
other than the one where the proposition is made, it can occur. Also, when the assertion is made that
something is logically possible, it does not mean that it is going to or can happen. It means that if such
an occurrence was asserted to have happened or could take place, it would not be a self-contradictory
statement, though it may very well be a false.
31Horsburgh, Pg. 128.
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and can therefore be logically possible. In order to achieve the necessary distance from the
social circumstances it seeks to criticise, the organisation of a Utopia must have all of its
intrinsic components compatible in order to produce a congruent structure. Consequently, the
criticism of Utopia projecting conditions impossible to achieve seems to relate more to notions
of empirical rather than logical possibility. A majority of these critiques rest on assertions that
many Utopian propositions are actually contrary to the natural laws concerning human nature32.
In reality, many more are seemingly compatible with them, but since such circumstances have
never been observed before, they are taken as impossible to manifest.33 Thus, these
allegations rely on misconceptions that repress certain tendencies which could produce an
atmosphere conducive to social and political experimentation. Hence, many policies
attempting the transformation of existing conditions seem to be prematurely abandoned under
the false pretences of their political futility.
When examining the feasibility of certain notions contained within Utopian thought it would
be useful to construct a criteria utilising the concepts of possibility that could serve to separate
descriptions which are possible in the logical and empirical sense from those conceptions
which are truly fantasy or science fiction. Utopias containing mythical creatures or humans
with supernatural traits, could then be distinguished from those that are more serious attempts
at describing situations having the potential to instigate social and political change. Clear
insight into these conditions could help to clarity certain prevalent types of Utopian thought and
alleviate much of the contention surrounding the issue of its political importance by indicating
which Utopias are relevant politically and those which should be labelled fantasy.34
Upon making such distinctions, one could then proceed to the technical and political
criteria of possibility for a greater clarification of a propositions capacity to serve as valid form
of political theory. In light of such standards, the pragmatism of the anti-utopian's viewpoint
could be considered a valid criticism for any pronouncement concerning the efficacy of
purpose that an advocate of the Utopian methodology may attempt to make. However, when
considered from the opposing viewpoint, this apparent setback can become a positive force
32L. Kolakowski, 'The Death of Utopia Reconsidered' in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 4. ed.
by S. M. Mcmurrin. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) Pg. 238. See also Krishan
Kumar, Utopianism. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) Pg. 90. For an account of human
nature based on a concept of possessive individualism, see C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of
Possessive Individuahsm. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966).
33For examples and an in-depth discussion of Utopia's connection with history, see; Arthur E. Morgan,
Nowhere was Somewhere: HowHistory Malms Utopias and How Utopias Malm History. (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1946). See especially, the appendix; Pg. 187-212.
34Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 29.
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connected to the importance of vision and foresight within the formative process of a society or
community.
The 'dreamers' envisioning mankind's impending flight to the moon more than a hundred
years ago actually led the way for more practical minded men with a greater technological
aptitude to modify and refine the ideas underlying such inspiration. The outcome of this
activity was the creation of a mode of transportation that has allowed humanity to achieve
heights of technical achievement beyond the wildest imaginations of the time. It may have
taken a considerable amount of time to succeed in fulfilling such visions, but their attainment
has stimulated human civilisation to strive towards further advancement in regards to its
technical capacity.
The task of a visionary is an arduous one which demands the discarding of many of the
prevalent beliefs held within his or her lifetime. Such anticipation is imperative to the
advancement of civilisation, so the visions of innovators are moulded into the goals or
objectives that the technically prolific strive to materialise. There is an intrinsic notion of
temporal passage involved in this process which can afford the potential for some visions, once
seemingly impossible, to become manifest. With the notion of technical possibility, the
attribute of change must be taken into account when declaring an idea invalid in relation to
transformations in our understanding and manipulation of Nature.
If a Utopian proposal surmounts or overcomes all the conditions contained within the first
three notions of possibility, the fourth circumstance must then be addressed given its particular
capacity as a criterion towards discerning the true relevance of the Utopian method. The
political pragmatist's argument is seemingly based on a misguided notion that political
expediency is the sole standard of measure regarding social reform. The inaccuracy of such a
position is exhibited in two ways. Firstly, it is possible for a movement or proposal not
capable of acquiring the needed support in its own right, to influence or spawn other proposals
which could be successfully implemented by another group at a later time.35 Throughout
history there have been instances where certain groups have failed to win support for their
immediate social context or epoch, but their theories inspired later generations who sought to
overcome similar problems. The connection to the transformation of public opinion within the
political arena36 emphasises the risk involved in discarding certain ideas or proposals because
35Horsburgh, Pg. 130.
36Such common sayings as, "A day is an eternity in politics....", are indicative of the tempestuous nature
of the political sphere in its dependence on public opinion.
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of an immediate lack of support and highlights the important influence that the political fringe
can wield.37
Secondly, the political pragmatist's argument for advocacy as a determining factor in the
validity of a concept or idea is short-sighted because it overlooks the variegate time spans
needed to fulfil the various agendas within this sphere. Policies proposed by the ruling parties
at the epicentre of the arena (Those most directly influential in the political process.), have as
their central concern the maintenance of their powerbase. Such groups cannot afford to risk
objectives that might prove to be unpopular and are forced to adopt policies that can be
implemented in a relatively short span of time.38 This differs greatly from the time frame
involved for groups at the periphery of the political arena who have the luxury of holding
ideals that may not be completely acceptable to the greater population. As one moves from the
centre of the power structure to more radical positions at its fringes, the indulgence in
innovative agendas that propose more extensive and long-term changes becomes more
prevalent. Consequently, the luxury of time is not available for those groups which must deal
with the day to day pragmatics of governing.
After examining these various categories of possibility, the accusation of the unfeasibility
of a majority of Utopian endeavours seems not to be as potentially damaging as most critics
assert. Temporal spans, technological processes, and turbulent political conditions, make
speculation towards the practicality of such policies difficult. Given the complexity of the
issues surrounding the idea of possibility, many Utopian proposals that have been described as
fiction, may after the passage of time or a change in public opinion been considered feasible.
As a result, to relinquish certain innovative ideas because they differ from the conventional
wisdom of the time has a greater chance of creating detrimental effects than avoiding them.
True visionary proposals of great merit cannot be judged solely on their potential for
drawing support within the social context of their conception. If a vision can be proved
logically impossible, then there is a good case for its dismissal as fiction. If it is proved to be
empirically, technologically, or politically impossible, then serious analysis must go towards
determining what potential effects time and public opinion could have on such proposals before
their true potential can be accurately assessed. Within the context of the preceding discussion
one aspect seems apparent, the traditional grounds for criticism of the Utopian endeavour
37Refer to chapter 5 of this text regarding the notion of the geography and the temporal span of the
political arena. A good example of a fringe group which wields large amounts of influence within the
politics of many European and North American nations is the "green" movement which has gained
importance over the last several years.
38Horsburgh, Pg. 133.
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which rely on a narrow conception of possibility are seemingly in more cases than not, wide of
the mark. In light of these conclusions, it would seem that the critique of Utopia as projecting
impossible conditions and containing no potential bearing on the social or political realm is in
need of reassessment.
The Content, Form, and Functional Characteristics of Utopian Thought.
Another contributing factor to the perception surrounding the reputation of Utopian thought
as being a literary device of fantasy, is the ambivalent manner in which it describes its theories
and the wide range of literary vehicles used to illustrate them. This is due largely to Utopia's
traditional emergence in a variety of disciplines including, politics, art, architecture,
sociology, history, and philosophy.39 Historically, Utopian writers have utilised fictive devices
to shroud critical intentions in an effort to shield themselves from political persecution. Such
occurrences have compounded the problem of identifying the intrinsic object of its
investigation and the central issues involved in its approach. This has inevitably led to a wide
range of interpretations involving the intentions of such authors and has fuelled debates
concerning which aspects should be included within the boundaries of Utopian thought proper.
The arguments concerning such a topic are too extensive for the scope of this chapter, so
the discussion will be limited to more general issues which outline its more predominate topics
and can guide the discussion to the central notions contained within the impulse to, and the
actions involved in, envisioning ideal social configurations. It will be especially directed
towards those methods which could encapsulate ideas adept at indicating where certain
beneficial alterations to existing social and political structures might take place. In relation to
this aim, there seem to be three characteristics which various commentators utilise in an
attempt to forge a definition of Utopia encompassing all of its potential manifestations. The
notions of content, form, and function,40 appear to be consistent categories prevalent in
attempts to define the predominant components and purposes of this genre of thought. The
description of these categories should not be considered as rigid classifications expounding a
universal definition, but loose groupings that serve to clarify certain features relevant to
Utopia's potential utilisation as a constructive analytical tool.
39R. Levitas, The ConceptofUtopia. (New York: Phillip Allan, 1990) Pg. 156.
40Levitas. Pg. 161-172.
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The first of these categories, content, involves the assumption that a Utopia is a depiction of
a common 'good' illustrated in the form of a 'good society'. Such depictions usually vary
depending on the concerns of the individual or group that imagined them. Thus, differing
images can emerge from competing groups within a society or consistent images can arise from
groups or persons inhabiting completely different historical periods. This bestows the
characteristic of fluidity upon this notion similar to quick silver, thereby making it difficult to
contain theoretically. However, a majority of the ideals projected within the history of
western thought habitually seek to surmount the 'scarcity gap', or the disparate conditions
between the needs or desires of its inhabitants and the society's ability to supply them.41
This aspect is considered the most interesting by many commentators because it solicits
speculation on the potential of attaining such situations as well as the actual desirability of
doing so. Issues prevalent in such discourse are generally concerned with the perfectibility of
Mankind, the feasibility of the ideals, and the clarification of features or situations involved in
attempts at realising such idealisations. Order and perfection concerning the total structuring
of a society are therefore defining attributes in the classification of a Utopia in terms of its
content. The history of this endeavour is categorised by its approach towards solving the
problems involved in the collectivisation of individuals through a method of envisioning a
perfectly ordered and co-operative environment.42 Such visions tend to contain normative and
evaluative characteristics specifically stating what such a 'good society' should or ought to be,
instead of objectively speculating on the various potentials involved in its actual social and
political surroundings.
It is this steadfast attention to a singular conception, while ignoring other potential
attributes, which causes many critics to question the real intent behind such depictions. Issues
such as the wide-spread variation of theme within the traditional body of dialogue concerning
Utopia's 'content proper' and the actual feasibility of its proposals highlight the complicated
issues surrounding the quest for a universal definition which can incorporate all of its
traditional characteristics. This complexity tends to obscure any clarity that a definition of
such endeavours by their content could bring to the subject. So, instead of clarifying matters,
the notion of content tends to propagate the view that Utopian conditions relates only to the
imagination.
Supporters of this method of classification often point out that our notions of the possible
are socially conditioned, and due to the prevalence of such depictions within the tradition of
41J.C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) Pg. 19.
Cited in Levitas, Pg. 161.
42Davis, Pg. 39., Levitas, Pg. 164.
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western thought, the theories contained within Utopia must be, at least in part, realistic. This
position is based on the notion that humanity's perception changes and evolves in regards to its
understanding of reality, so its influence must be constantly re-evaluated and the characteristic
of content within Utopian thought is considered the essential interpretative element having the
capacity to achieve this. Actually, though evaluation of this endeavour in terms of its content
is helpful in addressing certain issues within particular historical contexts, it tends only to add
to the latent ambivalence surrounding Utopia due to its inability to discern core issues from
interesting peripheral considerations. It may be advantageous in speculating upon the nature of
particular questions within specific historical contexts, but it tends to fall short in clarifying
certain transcendental issues underlying the Utopian endeavour. Such specificity makes this
classification more viable as a tool for uncovering the genealogy of Utopia instead of its social
relevance or transcendental potential.43
A second category commonly utilised by Utopian scholars focuses on Utopia proper in terms
of its being a particular form. By this, Utopia is considered the description of a 'good society'
that utilises a specific literary genre. Within this discourse, More's Utopia is often held up as
the paramount paradigm. Seen in this light, Utopian texts are considered literary vehicles
synonymous with the intention or structure of a novel, or in some cases actually considered
novels in themselves.44 Therefore, Utopian literature gives a depiction of an ideal society
functioning entirely within a fictional context. This perception rests on the notion that Utopia
describes its theories implicitly through their literary image instead of explicitly by decree.
However, the fact remains that the intention of Utopia is not to produce a work of art, but to
produce a piece of poignant social criticism.
This characteristic prohibits Utopian texts from being placed within the same category as
those texts considered literature and is the central attribute overlooked in the attempt to
procure a definition based on this criteria. Any serious attempt to encapsulate the multitude of
characteristics related to Utopia in terms of their relation to traditional literary devices is a
hollow endeavour, because a large portion of work generally considered Utopian doesn't meet
such a stringent criteria.45 There are large expanses of time within the history of the western
world that failed to produce Utopias meeting such rigid requirements, and to speculate that
such periods contained no Utopian activity is seemingly a serious miscalculation.
43Levitas, Pg. 5.
44K. Kumar, Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987) Pg. 25.
"Here it is made clear what is not apparent in the earlier Utopias: that the Utopia is closer to the novel than
to any other literary genre; is in fact a novel, though not necessarily of the kind that we have come to
identify too exclusively with its nineteenth-century form and focus."
45Kumar, Pg. 25.
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Views incorporating such stringent attitudes are of little use in discovering the possible
social ramifications of utopianism because they fail to take into consideration how attitudes can
change from one historical context to the next, while the problems the ideals of Utopia seek to
address are transcendent. Therefore, this criteria aids in the perpetuation of the traditional
misinterpretation surrounding the possibility of manifesting the attributes of these ideal
configurations, and limits the potential benefits which might be brought by such endeavours.
The final method of categorising Utopia departs from traditional lines of analysing Utopian
thought by considering its potential46 as a means to enable a society to set out certain
speculative goals. Within this context, Utopia is not considered an ideal form, literary or
otherwise, which may contain the possibility of becoming manifest, but as an impulse to create
speculative objectives which could aid in the alleviation of predominant social ills. This view
places specific emphasis upon Utopia's capacity of fulfilling an important function within the
dynamic relations of human societies. By clarifying certain desires amongst the community at
large while simultaneously specifying the potential means which might bring them about, the
Utopian method contains the capacity to become a highly constructive tool of social criticism.
Its objectives may not be completely realisable immediately, but they can provide a platform in
which to raise questions regarding the legitimacy of existing social practices. Theories
involving the functional aspect of Utopia generally focus on issues raised by theories
concerning social change and progress, either in relation to factors that can instigate or hinder
such transformations.
A description of Utopia based on it functional characteristics is given by Zygmunt Bauman,
in his exploration of Socialism as the living Utopia of the modern era.47 Within this text,
several assertions place emphasis on the potential function of Utopia.48 In the first place,
Utopia is considered an image of a better future which is yet to be fulfilled and requires a
concerted effort to manifest the conditions it proposes. In the second, it projects a future that
is desirable though not one which will necessarily become evident, but which should be
materialised. Regarding the third, its imagery is critical of the existing structures of a society
through the representation of a system fundamentally different from the present one. And
finally, it is an image involving a certain danger because such a future will not come into
existence without concerted effort. This criteria specifies that Utopia is a social program
46Levitas, Pg. 168-172.
47Ibid., Pg. 168.
48Z. Bauman, Socialism: The Active Utopia. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976) Pg. 17.
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implicit in the institutional structures of human society which is the foundation of hope
amongst the inhabitants of all its classes.49
This last concept is more suited to the pursuit of discovering important elements needed to
formulate a critical Utopian methodology useful within the realm of social and political
philosophy than the preceding notions of form or content. There are several reasons which
serve to merit such a claim. In the first instance, the functional notion of Utopia hinges on the
idea that change or the progression of civilisation is an inherent characteristic of mankind and
that most changes must be envisioned prior to the mobilisation of the forces for the
achievement of such progress50. Its claim rests on the notion of reinforcing the ability to
achieve such changes by contemplating the likelihood of certain effects, before action is taken.
This coincides with many abstract political theories which also speculate on the changes
needed to overcome social ills and the definition of specific political intentions aimed at
overcoming them.
In the second instance, for the definition of such goals to take place, a critique of existing
societal structures and conditions must take place in order for an informed speculative process
to emerge with the ability to uncover social and political shortcomings. And in the last,
attempts to define Utopia by its social function generally endeavour to relate conditions found
within the Utopian impulse to characteristics correlating to basic traits of human nature or
aspects found inherently within the human condition. This is not necessarily a claim that the
Utopian has discovered the fundamental qualities of human nature and can now set out to
construct the perfect societal structure to enhance such traits, but recognises that an essential
feature of the human condition is the need for change and progress. Thus, Utopian speculation
concerning the latent potential of existing conditions, could harness this transcendental
impulse, and channel it towards overcoming what existing conditions might lack.
Through an exploration of the descriptions concerning the essential characteristics of
Utopia, it is possible to begin to comprehend the enormous complexity surrounding much of
the dialogue concerning its essential nature. In delving into the descriptive categories of form,
content, and function, the shortcomings of the view that Utopia is merely a fictive literary
device becomes all too apparent. In some cases, the form a Utopia may take is similar to that
of a literary novel, but it nevertheless remains intrinsically linked to social and political
concerns. Many critics of Utopia mistake its packaging for its singularly most important trait
49Levitas, Pg. 171.
50See Popper, Pg. 159. One of the main components of Popper's argument against Utopia rests on what
he conceives as the rational fallacy apparent in asserting that one can accurately forecast the effects of
changes within the complex nature of Man's social structures. See also the chapter 7 of this text.
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instead of its underlying concerns. Many authors within this tradition sought to specifically
criticise their particular social contexts by depicting circumstances describing better conditions
in an effort to provide subversive platforms for questioning the political status quo of the day.
With this first criticism seemingly dispatched, our exploration will now turn to the second,
which lays claim to a latent tendency towards tyranny within this discourse.
Utopianism andCritical Political Theory
To begin this criticism, the attributes involved in this form of thought in regards to its
capacity as an trenchant tool of social and political analysis, must be laid bare and assessed.
The Utopian method, utilises hypothetical models as a means for the evaluation and testing of
differing criteria which concerns both the present and possible future social configurations
simultaneously. Because of its similarity to other procedures of social analysis, it would seem
as though most political theoreticians would be open to its proposals. However, generally, this
is not the case within the realm of political theory because its foundations rest on an orthodox
empiricism which tends to relegate "imaginative proposals" to the periphery of discipline.
This consignment is based on the conception that the products of the imagination are non-
verifiable in the empirical sense and therefore less reliable. It is this tenuous assumption
asserting that imaginative representations cannot convey the truth of reality which a political
abstraction in the classic sense of the term is said to have, that is the basis for the separation of
the Utopian methodology from the realm of political thought proper.51
Despite this claim of superiority in relaying a truthful and realistic account of possible
social conditions, the more traditional methods of abstract political theory are lacking in the
capacity needed for an explanation of present social realities which can transcend the surface
facts in order to explore the intrinsic root causes of problems embedded within it. Also, many
of the methods within this tradition are of a static and ahistorical character, which deprives
them of the attributes allowing a connection between their theoretical proposals for future
circumstances to the relevant existing context. This also prohibits the comparison of such
constructs to other alternative theoretical realities, thus making such methods less able to serve
as an impetus of change or as a criteria for value judgements concerning a society's present
social reality. Likewise, given the fact that their parameters are abstracted to the point of
being several times removed from any recognisable feature of reality, political theories of this
5Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 20-21.
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type are at risk of becoming purely normative and evaluative exercises with only a limited
relevance to their contemporary political context.52 The projection of such abstractions does
contain the potential to inform the political philosopher of possible inconsistencies in the
internal logic of the conceptual paradigm itself, but due to the removal of any parameters that
remotely resemble circumstances contained within reality, opportunities are missed for the
development of possible scenarios which can evaluate potential areas of conflict between the
ideals of differing social classes or groups.53 Such limitations could be effectively bridged by
many of the attributes of the Utopian method and it is this potential which will now be
investigated.
I. The Essential Parameters ofA Utopian Methodology ofSocial and Political Analysis.
In their text, The Politics of Utopia, Barbara Goodwin and Keith Taylor assert that
utopianism should be considered a viable form of political thought given its unique qualities
not open to the theorist of the 'realist' tradition in political theory. Their claim is founded
upon certain functional aspects of utopianism which have the ability to offset the setbacks that
most abstract hypothetical methods of social criticism encounter.54 Many problems typical to
such methods are embodied in a prominent philosophy such as Marxism. The first of these, is
concerned with the depiction of a future condition that is unnecessarily obscure and does not
provide sufficient detail to allow it to be a truly constructive theory. A second, is the temporal
distance that the potential future is positioned is too great a distance from the present to be
considered a potent catalyst for change. Moreover, a further limitation can occur when such a
doctrine deems progress or change inevitable, thereby causing the sense of urgency to be
dissipated. This can inadvertently lead to the prevailing perception that the importance of
critical analysis in capitalising on the latent potential within the existing institutions of a
society for the instigation of necessary social changes is less than many theorists habitually
claim.55
Consequently, many inherent qualities of the Utopian method could be instrumental in
overcoming these types of problems. One such aspect centres around the fact that in a
52Ibid., Pg. 21.
53Ibid., Pg. 22.
54For a succinct and insightful discussion on the differing methods involved in social and political
thought, see: Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 22-28. For a good example of the use of the abstract
hypothetical within the 'realist' tradition of political theory that is directly related to the notion of Utopia;
See R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
55Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 26.
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majority of cases, the future or alternative conditions proposed within these texts are connected
or grounded within the existing social structures surrounding its conception. Such measures
enable many of the ideas described within its discourse to be recognisable as directly linked to
certain conditions within its present circumstance, thereby lending a greater chance of
implementation for its proposals. As some critics of Utopia claim, such proposals could entail
an immediate and forceful break from the current course of the progression of an existing
social structure, but such critiques rely on a conception of history depicting it as an infinite
continuum in which any radical deviation from its plotted course would lead to catastrophic
consequences. Such premises implicitly bestow a sense of destiny and are highly controversial
theories themselves. If one were to conceive of history in a different manner, say, as a series
of random events where mankind can attain a limited amount of influence, then the Utopian
endeavour seems as feasible as any theory advocating the inevitability of historical progress.
The crucial point is that the Utopian method projects a program which allows for the feeling of
hopeful anticipation towards the improvement of future conditions by describing several
possible alternatives which seem to be within Man's capacity to undertake.56
Thus, the second and most promising attribute that such a method contains is an intrinsic
optimism which discourages the underlying fatalism found within other methodologies. This,
coupled with the Utopian's ability to project his or her proposals clearly and creatively, allows
many ideal constructs the potential to serve as powerful tools tor critical analysis. Such
constructs can supersede existing social prejudices in order to provide the necessary distance
for an objective perspective on concurrent realities. This approach tries to portray consistent
ideals relating to certain desires and traits found within human nature and relates the potential
such attributes at several varying levels simultaneously to those existing within the present
context. Given this, and the prevailing myth that more traditionally accepted methods of
political theory are more effective in projecting reliable proposals, it would seem prudent to
remain open to the conception of Utopia as a viable alternative means of constructive political
criticism.
To provide the foundations for the justification of such a proposal, an analysis must be
undertaken which focuses on its possible critical powers as well as its possible weaknesses. To
comprehend what form these characteristics can take, one must understand several
prerequisites important in considering its effectiveness as a tool of social analysis. Three
important stipulations must be met before a theory can be considered truly effective within this
context. Firstly, society must be conceived as an artefact with the possibility of being
56Ibid.
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purposely effected by the actions of Man. Secondly, an underlying belief that progress57 in
terms of the improvement of the conditions of the present is possible. And finally, a
constructive analytical methodology must be free from the fatalism which habitually annuls any
purposeful attempts at meaningful change. This last aspect includes any religious deference
claiming the present state of affairs exists at the behest of some form of Deity and therefore
accepted as destiny.58 Thus, for a theoretical methodology to be considered simultaneously
analytical and constructive there must be a fundamental conviction that change is possible,
desirable, and within man's capacity to instigate.
The category of Utopian thought, with the exception of particular types, such as
Cockayneian or millennial Utopias, seems to meet the criteria specified above and could
provide constructive insights into future possibilities. Its ability to criticise the present and
then utilise these criticisms as a platform for the projection of possible alternative futures,
makes it more effective in some ways than more traditionally accepted social theory. A
necessary criterion for the judgement of the feasibility of its proposals could draw strictly from
experiences gained from observing the interaction of actual persons and institutions contained
within real social structures. Such standards could aid in the assessment of the valid potential
of such endeavours and rule out the extreme and fanatical views of millenarianism or science
fiction. Theories of this kind have a tendency to obscure and trivialise the potential importance
that certain forms of utopianism can take in regards to political criticism. So to be an effective
critical device, Utopia must be grounded within actual realities and describe existent human
capabilities.
The insights gained from this would allow Utopias to bridge the divide between purely
critical techniques and constructive speculation, thus allowing for the production of theoretical
constructs which can depict institutions or cultural patterns superior to those already in
existence. With the utilisation of this constructive mode of criticism, the Utopian works by
example, projecting a descriptive image of a societal pattern which promises unequalled
prosperity or more advanced forms of social justice. It works from the negative of its
criticisms and moves towards the more positive aspect of proposing remedies meant to guide
any attempts at social reform. Even if implementation is not possible within the near future,
the debate surrounding Utopian depictions usually involves such a large and varied cross-
57The notion of progress is a highly complex and contentious issue. For an enlightened discussion on
this matter, see J. Plamenatz, Man & Society: Hegel, Marx, and Engels, and the Idea ofProgress. Vol.
Ill, 2nd edition. (London: Longman group, 1992) Pg. 300-326. For a discussion on its direct relation
to Utopia, see T. Olsen, Pg. 229-235, also Pg. 265-267.
58Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 23-24.
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section of society, it is a crucial element in a democratic process of deciding fair and just
practices.
Therefore, one of Utopia's essential powers is the fact that although it is not actually located
within this world, it contains references which connect it inextricably to our reality. Its
singular focus analyses its subject through one of a multitude of potential frames of reference
within the world. Hence, through the vehicle of metaphor, which is both critical and
constructive, the conceptual gap is bridged allowing for a subjective theoretical world to be
analysed for its potential within the reality of an objective one.59 The components of these
metaphorical representations of ideal worlds are not specified in an isolated or incremental
manner, but attempt to formulate an innovative simultaneous world with intricate and
interlocking components. In short, an alternative possible world.60 Seen in this light, far from
being merely literary vehicles of fantasy or totalitarian dreams, Utopian 'possible world
constructs' could serve as paradigms for analysis and speculation which can confront both
problems and possibilities that are similar to those in a real social or political reality, but
actually located at a guarded distance within the realm of the imagination.
II. The Method of "Possible Worlds Speculation".
The focus of a justification of Utopian thought as a form of possible worlds theory must
entail a study of the feasibility of such mental constructs in discouraging the belief of the
'necessity' or inevitability of existing social patterns. Such an exploration must uncover
Utopia's ability to legitimately emphasise "the contingency of the existent"61 as well as its
capacity to deliver the necessary distance needed for attaining a reasonably objective
perspective. The theoretical methodology of possible worlds speculation is often utilised by
philosophers to discover the essential nature of objects through the construction of a simulated
paradigm. This model utilises counterfactual elements which measure the importance of certain
fundamental components found within an existing object or circumstance. When employed in
the analysis of social configurations or historical events, the political philosopher can establish
certain constants involved within human reality, and conjecture upon the possible outcome if
59A. Tzonis, "Counterfacts, Counternorms, and Transworld Mental Lines" in Utopia E Modernita. Vol.
I. ed. Giuseppa Saccarro Del Buffa & Arthur O. Lewis. (Roma: Gangemi Editore, 1989) Pg. 71.
60Suvin, Pg. 58-59 The term 'world' in the context of this type of theory means that the parameters of
the speculative paradigm borrows its social, political, and cultural structures from the surrounding
context of its conception. See also: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception. (Paris,
nrf, 1945) Pg. 225.
61Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 213.
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specific events were altered within it. This allows speculation on the causal effects of certain
changes on a societal structure in order to formulate a theoretical basis towards the possible
alteration of a real structure.
There are two methods of constructing such a world62; the first is by the formulation of a
parallel world which contains all the constant conditions of our objective reality copied exactly
except for a few components which are purposely changed to evaluate their effects. The
second is a branching world, which analyses how history may have developed had certain
events not occurred. By removing such events and speculating upon the results, a historian
can measure their effects on the course of history. Traditionally, most Utopian thinkers seem
to rely on a methodology similar to the former, because within their texts there is generally a
conceptual break or separation from the immediate historical circumstances. However, not all
Utopians distance their work from the historical aspect of a situation, for there are numerous
instances where a utilisation of the temporal dimension is undertaken to allow certain theories
to move seamlessly between notions of past, present, and future, in an effort to instigate and
test desired results. Both techniques are capable of achieving a certain distance from reality
and therefore provide the sufficient measure of objectivity necessary for them to be considered
equally legitimate procedures of analysis.
In the consideration of Utopia as this form of thought experiment, certain concerns must be
investigated in an effort to build a criterion outlining an acceptable distance from the historical
or social configuration being studied. There is a certain amount of controversy within
philosophical circles pertaining to the allowable distance counterfactual elements can attain
before they loose their effectiveness. If characters from science fiction novels containing
superhuman qualities are included within a possible world formula as counterfactual elements,
then the credibility of such a thought experiment is seriously undermined as a theoretical
device providing revealing information concerning the intrinsic parameters of the human
condition.
To overcome such a potent liability, John Elster indicates the need for a kind of mediating
device which he describes as the dynamic criteria of legitimacy.63 He asserts that this standard
could regulate the acceptable distance of a possible world paradigm from the conditions of
actual political realities. By this, when discussing historical counterfactuals involved in the
'branching world' method, the further back one goes in history in the removal of a
counterfactual element, the more distant the possibility that such a world could exist. Relating
62J. Elster, Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds. (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons,
1978) Pgs. 57-58. Op. cit., Goodwin and Taylor, Pg. 210-214.
63For a full and detailed explanation of the exact formula for this criterion; see Elster, Pg. 191.
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to the one at present, and therefore the greater its distance from the reality it seeks to analyse.
Similarly, in terms of a 'parallel world' experiment, the more constants that are changed and
the extent of their variation, is directly proportional to their distance. Though this assertion
could aid in the delineation of acceptable possible worlds in relation to their being valid
speculative exercises, it fails to overcome the problem that all criteria envisioning possible or
necessary conditions for human existence is debatable. Therefore, any possible world analysis
deemed to have achieved the acceptable distance necessary to be considered valid would be
free from controversy.
This contention uncovers some of the problems involved in the possibility of having a
simultaneous world being different in only one or a few aspects. According to some
metaphysical views concerning the composition of the world, even a remotely accurate
representation of this world would be impossible because its varying components are so
completely intermeshed a single change of the smallest circumstance would bring about
ramifications impossible to accurately measure. Many proponents of the possible worlds
theory have rejected such views on the grounds that they are too rigid or pessimistic, for if
such notions were true, there could be no changes within this the world without changing it
beyond human recognition.
Although this view concerning the intrinsic interrelation of the elements of this world is
valid to a certain extent, there are elements which seem to be perceivable as consistent within
the span of a human life. Given this, change should be regarded in light of factors claiming
that if a variation within the world occurs, not all of the elements contained within it change,
but the relationship of the altered element to all other components within the world changes.
Thus, it is conceivable that for the creation of a possible world, one could imagine the prospect
of identifying and fixing certain prevalent constants in any given world, mutating one or
several of them, and evaluating their potential ramifications.
This view is closely related to Saul Kripke's assertion that a possible world should be
considered a skeletal world where certain constant factors, (rigid designators64) are conceived
as fixed situations and used as poignant indicators for discerning the elements having the
potential to become manifest if certain circumstances were to change within the reality of the
present world. In lieu of such possibility, it would seem acceptable for the Utopian to project
an image of an alternative reality containing several changes to the institutional structure of a
64Saul Kripke's explicit definition for the term 'rigid designator', is "a term that designates the same
object in all conceivable possible worlds." (Pg. 488) For an extended discussion of this term as well as
his justification of its usage, see; "Identity and Necessity", in Philosophy as it is. (Middlesex: Penguin
Books Ltd., 1979) Pg. 488-496.
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society without having to assume that these transformations would completely change the
intrinsic behaviour of its inhabitants or the characteristics of their social interaction. There is a
likelihood that some variation would occur which was not foreseen, but this does not rule out
entirely the validity of such an exercise. At the very least, it could be considered feasible for a
social or political theorist to project changes by this practice because its implications can be
understandable to a large audience in a wide-range of disciplines. This potential instigation of
a discourse amongst the various groups of a society is one of the greatest benefits such thought
experiments could bestow, no matter how accurate or relevant the parameters of their model
worlds might be.
III. Utopia as "Possible Worlds Speculation".
In reference to these factors, it seems feasible for Utopias meeting a certain criteria to be
considered as valid methods of possible worlds speculation. Such methods can describe a
skeletal framework of conditions relating to an existing society and thus contain the possibility
of a reasonable amount of accuracy concerning the ramifications if certain changes are
described. Such mental experiments could be viewed as counterfactual exercises attempting to
measure the indispensable character of certain social institutions defining the human condition.
The utilisation of such a methodology for the construction of a simulated paradigm could
exclude or remove certain non-essential properties of modern society thereby enabling a
theorist to uncover certain primary properties or situations foundationally imperative to the
building of a just society. This notion of counterfactual speculation could also aid in the
discovery of the root causes of various social ills which could be eliminated or altered in an
attempt to construct societal institutions free from such ills. Hence, Utopian thought
experiments of this nature are seemingly a reasonable and useful tool, yet this method does not
escape criticism utilising issues involving the potential for such a world to be only proximately
located to this world and therefore only remotely possible.
Questions surrounding the legitimacy of such an approach are taken up by Elster in his
discussion of the role of Utopia regarding the notion of possible worlds.65 Within this
discussion his main point of contention is focused on Utopia's claim of being capable of
achieving in one transformative step, what should ultimately take two or even several steps.
65Elster, Pg. 57.
He asserts that this claim is presumably false on two counts.66 The first, is explained through
the utilisation of an analogy involving a hill walker. In this example, as the climber ascends
the hill, his ultimate goal is to reach the crest. According to the phenomenological theories of
Husserl,67 the climber is in possession of intentions that are simultaneously ultimate and
immediate. At any given point in his ascent, the climber has an extensive awareness of all the
elements within his immediate perceptive field. Though many elements are hidden from sight,
they are nonetheless contained within their general sphere. This general awareness, however,
is only in the empty formal sense because conceptions of such events are not based on actual
perceptions in the present, but on logical mental interpretations relying on information
gathered from past encounters with similar conditions.
As the ascent continues, the climber is continuously displaced to another perceptual field,
where a new series of objects appear that influence and reshape his perceptions concerning the
terrain as well as the choices made concerning the path taken to the summit. In reference to
the potential of Utopian thought as a possible worlds theory, as a society reached each new
plateau in its process of social transformation, a new range of possibilities or difficulties would
be encountered making the alternative world envisioned at the commencement of the process
impossible due to the effects of these unforeseen circumstances. Such an attempt at reform
would surely have to be abandoned during an intermediate step, therefore making the ultimate
intention impossible to achieve.68
In response to this criticism, the hill climbing analogy can also be useful in illustrating a
point about the relation of perception and intention. Elster is correct in his assumption that at
each stage of the climb a new set of perceptual information would be acquired as well as
alternative opportunities in reaching the apex of the hill. However, what does not necessarily
change, is the intention or desire to reach the summit, which remains the ultimate goal within
the climber's horizon of possibilities. Though the terrain might change and unexpected
conditions crop up, the serious and determined walker would improvise before abandoning his
goal altogether. If Elster's criticism is indicating cases where Utopian theorists expected their
prescriptive reforms to be carried out to the last letter, then his critique is well founded.
Throughout history, rigid and fanatical attempts at transforming human societies have
generally failed and were abandoned. If however, as is the case with a great many Utopias, the
66Elster, Ibid. This point of contention is also related to Popper's argument against the belief that if
action is based on a rational plan it can be undertaken with a reasonable chance for success because its
effects can be logically predicted. (See chapter 7 of this text).
67Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans, by W. R. Boyce
Gibson. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931) Pg. 103-105, 119 - 128. op. cit. Elster, Pg. 57.
68Elster, Pg. 58.
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methods for achieving the proposals described could be modified as unforeseen situations
arose, then the criticism falls wide of the mark. To propose that any form of Utopian proposals
could be realisable would have to incur a certain measure of intrinsic flexibility. This would
be a necessary condition for its successful integration into any existing social and political
contours.
In conclusion, much of the criticism of the Utopian endeavour stems from a persistent
confusion surrounding the goals it seeks to achieve. Such an endeavour can assume many
forms ranging from the portrayal of a simultaneous critical paradigm to a theoretical plan
directly related to a specific type of social reform. If Utopian thought in relation to a 'possible
worlds' theory is viewed as a conscious-raising exercise impregnated with possibilities for the
transformation of an existing social and political realm, then the notion that it is somehow
lacking because it is several times removed from a certain view of reality loses much of its
potency. Seen in relation to its potential for analogous criticism, the possible worlds
methodology could provide a systematic purpose and foundation for Utopian thought within the
realm of social and political philosophy. Therefore, the traditional misconception that Utopian
thought is concerned solely with the production of static blueprints of societal perfection
should be superseded by the perception of its being a thought process utilised for discovering,
analysing, and speculating upon the latent potential contained within existing social structures.
If applied in this spirit, its traditionally negative reputation could be shed in favour of its being
perceived as a powerful philosophical tool of analysis.
A Working Definition of Utopia
Within the preceding discussion on the topic of Utopia, two predominant misinterpretations
have been addressed underlying its traditional perception. These negative attitudes rest on
mistaken assumptions that the Utopian method is merely a compensatory device of producing
imaginative fictions or the manifestation of an intellectual tendency towards dogma seeking to
manifest absolutist political schemes. This investigation has taken the position that such
accusations are not necessarily the only outcomes possible if such speculation is undertaken.
Our proposal has been that the Utopian endeavour is an method of experimental conjecture
which produces theoretical paradigms involving potential alternative futures in an effort to gain
critical insights into possible goals or objectives.
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Seen in this light, the abstract conceptions of utopianism are not just wishful mental
constructs conceived within the vacuum of the human imagination, but idealisations grounded
within the context of the existing reality which can serve as requisite elements for the
investigation of certain theoretical premises poised to unleash forces aimed at social
reconstruction. Similarly, they can also provide conceptual avenues to evidence concerning
the integrity of the ideological premises underlying contemporary social and political
configurations.69 In so doing, the Utopian impulse draws on the latent potential for change
contained within the social sphere of the present to indicate possible political transformations
before their explicit emergence as socially disruptive devices within the fabric of a society. It
is for this reason that the 'premature truths' which Utopia encapsulates, habitually incite those
individuals enmeshed within the dominant social and political order to criticise its main tenets
as merely illusory ideas because such notions can threaten the intellectual foundations
embodied in a system which has greatly benefited them.70
Given this, the main assumption of our definition rests on the notion that Utopia must be
conceived less in terms of being a state, and more in terms of its being a constructive critical
process.11 The central apparatus of this process consists of the projection of theoretical
constructs which contain the capacity to simultaneously criticise and inform the ideological
configurations which regulate and reinforce the customs or beliefs organising our daily
existence. Such a process is a necessary component for the social imagination of man as he
strives to surpass the given of the present in route to the potential of the future horizon. For it
is the future which can offer the greatest freedom and power in that it is the only sphere in
which one can truly take action. These acts, however, are not without risk or danger given
that their outcome is intrinsically uncertain. This uncertainty is inherent to the realm of the
future because factual knowledge based on empirical investigation is impossible to ascertain
69Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. (London:
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD., 1940) Pg. 182.
70Mannheim, Pg. 183. The author follows an assertion by Lamartine that "Utopias are often only
premature truths". Thus, a Utopia is describing, at least in a partial manner, conditions of an ascending
order, while the critics of such an exercise usually belong to the representative order of an epoch that has
passed or its strength is waning.
71Suvin, Pg. 55. The author follows Fredric Jameson's interpretation of Louis Marin's text in
conceiving the Utopian discourse as a form of process imbuing a creative power akin to the Greek term,
energeia verses a created product or ergon. Utopian representations are considered; "Those collective
representations of contemporary society which inform our ideologies just as they order our experience of
daily life". For further explanation of this conception, see; Fredric Jameson, "Of Islands and Trenches"
in Diacritics (June 1977) Pg. 2-21. See also, Louis Marin, Utopics: Spatial Play. (United States:
Humanities Press Inc., 1984).
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within it.72 The fear of this risk must be overcome, because it is within the future that the
praxis of the present contains its greatest potential. The conceptualisations propagated by the
faculty of the imagination can provide the theoretical foundation for our activities within the
future horizon. Thus, it is within man's capacity to envision the future that the impulse for
Utopia resides.
At the level of the imagination, the quest for Utopia embodies the transcendental component
of the psyche which serves as the "methodological organ for the new".73 It is the intrinsic
human trait which is linked to our ability to hope for, or desire a better future and its faculty of
visualisation serves as the imperative first step in the process of realisation. Hence, it is not
the complete manifestation of such visions which is crucial to the essential Being of mankind,
but the process of striving and the purpose that it bestows which is the cardinal element of the
Utopian impulse. It is on this basis that our assertion rests, that Utopia, and the impulse which
underlies it, must be considered a perpetually open process and never a finished or completed
state.
At the level of socialisation, this perpetual drive towards the projection of the "new",
places the Utopian impulse in a dialectical relationship to the existing social hierarchy. The
unfulfilled ideals or desires existing dormant within the intrinsic structure of this hierarchy
serve as critical material for the dismantling of the negative aspects of the existing social order
while visions are simultaneously constituted that lead the way towards the development of new
configurations that overcome them.74 This conception is, however, of Utopian thought proper
in its most beneficial role as the theoretical toil to the overriding tendency of the dominant
ideology within each epoch towards closure. It is imperative not to underestimate or
misinterpret the intrinsic link between these forces. Though Utopia and ideology may be
diametrically opposed, they are still contained within the same general structure of social and
political representation. Through this connection, it is possible for Utopian desires to be
enslaved by the dominant ideology and channelled in such a way as to become merely
72Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture. Trans, by Nikita Laiy. (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1967) Pg. 3-5. de Jouvenel points out that the Latin terms describing the past, and the future
present are asymmetrical in their emphasis; ' past events or situations are facta and future ones
iiitura.' These terms rest on notions described by verbs such as facere and esse, meaning; 'to do or
make' and 'to be' respectively. The author describes a similar opposition between the terms, perfectum
and infectum, with the former referring to a completed act or event (a fact) while the latter refers to
something that can become a fact only if such an event occurs (a conditional). Thus, to labour in regards
to changing the past is to labour in vain because the task is already completed. Given this, the only
potential fruit for our labour would rest somewhere in the future tense.
73Ernst Bloch, The Principle ofHope Vol. I. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) Pg. 157. See also
chapter 4 of this text.
74Mannheim, P. 179.
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motivational devices inciting dogmatic co-operation.75 In this event, Utopia loses its critical
power and becomes the metaphoric 'bone' thrown to a dog for behaving in a way desired by its
master.
The discipline demanded by the dominant ideology is an equally necessary component to
our social existence and the functioning of a society, but its structure must not be allowed to
exist unchecked or the customs which are the embodiment of its inherent premises for
existence will, inadvertently or otherwise, inhibit an individual's ability to live creatively. The
thought experiments intrinsic to the Utopian impulse must serve as critical monitors of the
configurations that exist, yet contain potential to become better, to develop more fully in a
benevolent manner.76 This should not be instantaneous, but a constant and perpetual process.
Therefore, it is imperative for this process not to provide static measures in the form of
empirical data, but orientations towards the potential realities resting on the verge of the future
horizon, driven by desire and interpretable only by the imagination. It is in this form that such
an inclination is connected to and inherently becomes, a power, which effects all the varying
levels of human existence and potential.
75Tom Moylan, Demand The Impossible. (London: Methuen, 1986) Pg. 19. Moylan follows
Mannheim's definition of ideology as the 'complex of ideas' influencing activity towards the maintenance
of the status quo or the dominant ruling structure. He also agrees that the assertion made by Mannheim
that the proper role of Utopia should be to challenge this, but disagrees with him concerning the notion
that a Utopia fails if it doesn't eventually succeed in becoming manifest. By emphasising the capacity of
the dominant ideology to utilise the Utopian impulse for its own purposes he uncovers the fragile position
that Utopia inhabits between co-operation with or subversion of, the predominant social and political
structure. See chapter 5 of this text.
76Francis and Barbara Golffing, "An Essay on Utopian Possibility" in Utopia, ed. George Kateb. (New




Intrinsically connected to the impulse towards Utopia is a similar drive which serves as the
impetus that evokes men to take action towards the fulfilment of their desires. This drive is
progressively more complex than those of other animals who merely seek to satisfy the
primitive needs of survival and reproduction. Men strive towards meeting more than these
demands, they seek to expand their influence on, and command over, the elements comprising
their immediate surroundings. Such desires are insatiable because as each obstacle is
overcome, the human imagination redirects its focus towards another.1 With each successive
surpassing of an obstacle feelings of confidence and security grow which are addictive, causing
the cycle to perpetuate. The existence of this incessant impulse produces the necessity of
morality, government, and compromise, owing to the periodic social instability and sporadic
violence arising in its wake. This impulse is the drive for power, and coupled with the Utopian
imagination comprises a fundamental force in the formation and make-up of mankind's social
and political configurations.2
'Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis. (London: Routledge, 1995) Pg. 7-8.
2Russell, Pg. 9-10. Russell asserts that power is the fundamental concept of social science akin to the
way in which energy is the primary concept to the discipline of physics. Power, like energy, has a
variety of manifestations such as wealth, coercive force, and control of public opinion. To single out any
The term, power is a derivative of the French verb, pouvoir, and can be traced to the Latin
potentia, meaning 'ability or potential'. The common Roman usage of the word described the
capacity or ability to affect another person or thing. Though seemingly a simple concept, its
essential nature is highly contested and utilised in a multitude of varying interpretations. This
disparity, along with power's intrinsic relation to concepts such as authority, coercion, and
violence, sparks great debate concerning its role in the formation and functioning of the social
sphere.3 Coupled with the notion of capacity, such associations begin to indicate another
aspect attributable to power, domination. Accordingly, this investigation will seek to uncover
these simultaneous implications of power within the context of its exercise within the social
sphere.
It is this attribute of simultaneity which will serve to guide this investigation of the essential
nature of power. Thus, from a departure point depicting power as essentially, 'one agent or
agency affecting the attitudes and/or actions of another',4 an examination into Steven Lukes's
view of its intrinsic multi-dimensionality will provide an introduction into the difficulties
encountered in uncovering its complex and subtle nature. Though his definition5, does not
lead to a incontestable clarity on the subject, it does provide an insightful explication into
several of the central views concerning this subject within the disciplines of sociology and
political theory.
one of these as the overriding concept to which all others are secondaiy will give a partial and incomplete
account of its true nature. Power must be described in terms of its passing from one of its potential
forms to another continually, and it is the laws governing these transformations rather than a description
resting on any one state which must be ascertained for the proper understanding of this notion and its
relevance to the social sphere.
3T. Ball, "Power" in The Blackwel! Encyclopaedia ofPolitical Thought. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1987) Pg. 397.
4Ibid. Ball asserts that at a minimum, most analysts agree that this definition is adequate for outlining
some form of common ground as a departure point for the critical dialogue concerning the subject.
5Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1974) Pg. 9. With this
assertion, the author claims that the concept of power is to be included in a theoretical category outlined
by W. B. Gallie in an article entitled 'Essentially Contested Concepts' in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 56 (1955-6) Pg. 167-98. In Gallie's view, for a concept to be 'essentially contested' it must be
appraisive in that it is related to some form of valued idea. It must be of an internally complex character
and in the initial sense, variously describable, due to its intrinsically open disposition readily modifiable
in light of its changing circumstances. And finally, all parties involved respectfully recognise the stance




In the text, Power, A Radical View, Lukes gives an account of three main currents of
thought concerning power. These perspectives are described as the One-, Two-, and Three
Dimensional views. In the One-Dimensional view, power is conceived as a behavioural issue
involving the decision process undertaken in regards to situations where an explicit friction
between certain subjective groups or individual interests is present.6 Modern social theorists
ascribing to this position, such as Robert Dahl7, generally follow Hobbes's assertion that the
idea of power intrinsically rests on the relationship between cause and effect.
The interests of the acting agent attempting to effect or cause subsequent actions by another
agent is inherently linked to the former's desire to manifest some preconceived end. In other
words, the first agent exercises his power by intentionally manipulating the second agent in
order to manifest his conception of a "good". To Hobbes, the achievement of such an end
represents the satisfaction of a desire. Power is conceived as the ability to manipulate ones'
immediate surroundings as the means towards satisfying ones' needs and desires. This
incessant drive towards the satisfaction of such desires is described as; "....a general
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of Power after power that ceaseth
onely in Death."8
Consequently, given that man inhabits a world of limited resources and harbours an infinite
multitude of desires, inevitably differences of interest arise acting as the impetus for perpetual
conflicts. The agent or group that successfully influences the situation in favour of their
interests are described as having exercised power over others trying to manifest different
concerns. It is the overt actions of the former, that materialise their interests or cause certain
events to unfold.9 Power, according to this first view, is intrinsic to the conflicts involving
human interests and relates directly to certain behaviour. Given this dependence on human
6Lukes, Pg. 15.
7See Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power" in Behavioural Science, 2 (1957) Pg. 201-205. Dahl
asserts that intuitively power can be defined as 'A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do
something that B would not otherwise do.' op. cit., Lukes, Pg. 13-14.
8Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1914) Pg. 49. See also, Iain
Hampsher-Monk, A History of Modern Political Thought: Ma jor Political Thinkers horn Hobbes to
Marx. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992) Pg. 23-24. "Power is not confined simply to physical
force: it includes any attribute which enables a man to affect the world to what he deems his advantage."
9Ball, Pg. 397-398. Hobbes asserts that; "Power and cause are the same thing. Correspondent to cause
and effect; nay, those and these are the same things Wherefore the power of the agent and the
efficient cause are the same thing."
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action, its effects must therefore be observable. As a result, without conflict, and the
behaviour surrounding it, the exercise of power will not arise.
The Two-Dimensional View, accepts this initial premise, but attempts to advance this theory
by seeking to describe a second, more 'hidden face' of power. Hence, this view is asserting
that it contains overt manifestations as well as covert ones. Its proponents indicate evidence
supporting the contention that coupled with the notion of power being exercised when one
agent seeks to effect anothers actions, it is also exercised when an agent or group creates or
reinforces certain social structures or institutions that implicitly favour their interests. If
successful, it becomes difficult for the latter agent or group to introduce any issues that might
influence the situation to the disadvantage of the former group's interests.10 This implicit
domination of the political agenda gives those controlling certain governing apparatuses the
ability to manipulate the prevailing perceptions of the group to avoid certain conflicts
detrimental to their interests. In this way, any potential threats can be undermined by
portraying the issues that the subordinate group seeks to address as irrelevant or by shifting
them to areas where its superiority is more secure.
Whereas the pluralist conception of power rested solely on the process of overt decision¬
making and the observable conflicts which can arise from such actions, the Two-Dimensional
view asserts that a process of non decision-making must also be incorporated into any theory
concerning power. In making a decision, a course of action is chosen from several
alternatives, while a non-decision involves foregoing a course of action resulting in the
repression of any potential for contesting the beliefs or interests of the actively decisive
agent.11 This departure from conceiving the exercise of power as an act of decision-making in
a situation of conflict is significant because it indicates that power can be exercised more
efficiently when no explicit challenges are made. This uncovers the significance of controlling
the potential for action by manipulating when and where the possibility of a conflict of
interests can arise through the utilisation of existing apparatuses of coercion implicit to the
dominant ideology of the governing structure.
Lukes admits that the incorporation of the notion of agenda control and the suppression of
potential by this view of power is a marked advance over the pluralist view, but he claims that
it still hasn't addressed the three crucial issues necessary in providing a complete conceptual
analysis of power12. In the first of these, he asserts that there is still too much reliance on the
10Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty. Theory and Practice. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970) Pg. 7. Op. cit.; Lukes, Pg. 16.
11Bachrach and Baratz, Pg. 39 & 44. Lukes, Pg. 18.
12Lukes, Pg. 21-23.
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analysis of overt behaviour for its critical basis. The individualist methodology of conceiving
power as the realisation of human will conceived in theoretical isolation is still present and
overlooks the fact that the human condition is intrinsically embedded within a collective
system. To comprehend the concept of power correctly then, the extent of the influence of
such systems and 'the mobilisation of bias' implicit within them must be included. As Marxist
theory asserts, actual men make the decisions which define history, but the circumstances and
resources for which these decisions are based is passed from generation to generation through
a systematic ideological lineage.
In regards to the second inadequacy,13 the persistence of the notion that conflict is the only
reliable monitor of the exercise of power must be challenged. It may be true that some agents
exercise power over others by affecting their actions contrary to their original intention in an
overtly coercive manner, however this can be accomplished more effectively by influencing the
very nature of their desires. The inherent dilemma with the insistence that power emerges
wholly within the context of conflict, is that it commits this notion to the role of being the
necessary element in any conception of power. Such a commitment inevitably excludes many
important manifestations which do not involve observable conflict such as controlling public
opinion and the indoctrination of the population as a whole through 'education'. Manipulation
through the socialisation process of a society can instil values and beliefs which alleviate the
chances for conflict to arise. In addition, it is an appearance of stability which bestows upon
any dominant ideological system the legitimacy it needs to maintain its position.
The final component of Lukes's critique of the 'Two-Dimensional' view contends that the
power of the non-decision process exists solely within the context of grievances whose entry
into the political process is obstructed. Any analysis ignoring this process is sorely lacking in
providing a comprehensive picture of all the possible attributes of power.14 If the desires or
beliefs of those enmeshed within the dominant value system have no perceived hardships
placed on them, then it is contested that their interests are not impaired by the exercise of
power. To contemplate grievance as the sole indication that power is being exercised is to
make a similar mistake to that of the pluralist's contention of the necessity of observable
conflict. Seemingly the most effective way to exercise power over subjugate persons is avoid
the possibility that grievances will arise by formulating systems which implicitly influence
essential perceptions informing an individual's cognition of its interests. In this way, no




configurations due to the perceived absence of an alternative, or the wide-spread perception
that a system is divinely inspired or benevolent. In such a circumstance, the first agent
controls the second by instilling mistaken beliefs connected with the real interests of the latter.
Thus, to control the potential interests of a person is to exercise complete power over that
person, because gaining influence over the possible occurrence of interests allows the ability to
manipulate certain important possibilities before they become explicit.
From this critique, Lukes presents his Three-Dimensional view of power which seeks to
balance the attributes of individualism concerning power with certain theories found in
Marxism such as the notion of 'false consciousness'15. This theory seeks to move past the
behaviourist focus involved in the preceding views in order to consolidate their features with
the latent conflict existing within the discrepancy of interests between those in power and those
it attempts to ostracise from the political process.16 The latter group may not consciously
realise that its interests are being pushed aside because the system of exclusion is presented in
a way completely acceptable to them.
In regards to the present study, what is interesting about this last view is that Lukes is
trying to rectify two theoretical inclinations, one more subjective, owing to its intrinsic
relation to individual intentions, while the other is more objective, because it focuses on the
social superstructures of man's societies. Both of these concepts are involved within a larger
philosophical discourse concerning the essential nature of power. The latter argument asserts
power cannot be described as an entity in itself, but merely as a characteristic emergent within
the dynamics of the relations between varying individuals or groups. By this conception it
would be possible to verify the totality of its relevant characteristics by empirically observing
its effects within the dynamics of social relations.
The former conception holds that there is a unity of characteristics comprising an essence to
power and it is this core affect that embodies the central driving force underlying the dynamic
relationship between the world and man's inner nature.17 Though most theories of power may
15Ball, Pg. 399.
16Lukes, Pg. 24-25.
17See, P. Morriss, Power, A Philosophical Analysis. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987)
Chapter 2. Morriss discusses a view concerning the implicit differences in the terms; power and
influence. The author asserts that because the Latin usage of the term power means "to be able", while
influence, meaning "to flow in", they are completely different terms. In the context of Morriss's
argument, power is involved in the notion of capacity which makes it effectual, while influence is a term
describing an affectual force. This attempt at discerning the nature of power through an analysis of
linguistic terms seems to be too narrowly conceived. Influence is a form of affect, therefore it must be
conceived as being a form of power. To influence anothers actions seems to be an act of exercising some
form of power over them, though in a implicit manner.
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not fall perfectly into one category, in order to clarity much of the obscurity surrounding the
subject, these categories can serve as points of reference. To comprehend the significance of
these differing accounts, this investigation will first explore the effectual 'relational' concept of
power followed by an examination of the implications of the more affectual or 'metaphysical'
idea of power.
The Concept ofPoweras Relational Effect.
Within discourse surrounding this view, there are various interpretations, but one of the
most interesting explications is by Norbert Elias, which attempts to establish a sociological
ontology through the analysis of the dialectic between power and freedom. Elias asserts that
the traditional depiction of the relation between these notions has been mistaken in that
freedom is considered the fundamental existent of the human condition while power is the
innate characteristic of social structures, institutions, or certain individuals striving to crush or
control this intrinsic element. To Elias, this relationship should be reconsidered in lieu of
conceiving its attributes in a more diametrically opposed relation. Thus, power and freedom
are considered purely on the basis of their being social attributes which evoke certain
empirically observable effects. This conception historically contexturalises these notions by
linking them intrinsically to the conditions of their surrounding social structures and
institutions. Michel Foucault also utilises a similar premise in his theory of power exploring
both its negative and positive attributes. These productive/restrictive qualities serve as the
foundational postulates for considering the notion of power as a relational concept.
/. Power and Freedom
A key component of Elias's conception of power is based on the premise that it is a
manifestation inherent to, and found only within, relationships involving individuals, groups,
or social institutions. It must therefore never be considered as a thing comprising its own set
of unique characteristics.18 Power is to be considered a unity because it contains similar traits
that are found within all human relationships, but does not mean that an entity identifiable as
18See Ian Burkitt, "Overcoming Metaphysics: Elias and Foucault on Power and Freedom" in Philosophy
of the Social Sciences, March 1993, Pg. 51. EUas states that "power is not an amulet possessed by one
person and not another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships-of all human relationships."
Op. cit. Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? (London: Hutchinson, 1978) Pg. 74.
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power can be isolated from its surrounding context. What Elias is seeking to describe is a
unity of characteristics and not an essence. According to this view, power is an innate
component contained within the dynamics of the configurations and structures involved in
human relationships. These social patterns comprise a series of interdependent collectives
consisting of various intricate balances of power at a number of levels. This depiction is
similar to the Marxian notion of a historically determinate superstructure. Within this context,
power relations are seen to be diametric 'balances' of power, where one group or individual
never possesses 'absolute power', because each contains a certain amount of control over
others, regardless of their position within the social structure. Therefore, the higher the ratio
of power gained, the greater the capacity for a group or individual to guide the activities of
others.19
According to this, everyone enmeshed in a social superstructure contains a degree of power
affording some resistance towards the activities of others as well as allowing the capacity to
embark on their own activities. It is this characteristic of human relations which underlies
Elias's claim that metaphysical conceptions positioning power and freedom in perpetual
opposition must be jettisoned for views based on empirical investigation into the prevalent
relational forms of power.20 Such investigation must consider the attribute of power
essentially interconnected with freedom given that both traits are interlocked within the
framework of dependency constituting a society.
Hence, given the notion that power cannot be taken as a metaphysical absolute, freedom
cannot be conceived in this manner either. No one is free in the pure sense of the word, nor
are they completely immune to the effects of the actions of others. Freedom is considered a
form of power relating to the notion of capacity allowing an individual or group to control its
actions in relation to the resistance of other forces. By this conception, power emerges as a
positive and negative force. It is productive in light of its linkage to the actualisation of
identity, as well as limiting in its relation to dominance and coercion. Consequently, power
and freedom are intrinsically related within the social framework constituting a historical
event, for they are inherently effectual characteristics contained within its specific
circumstance. Therefore, since such characteristics are said to be inextricably linked and are
empirically observable events, notions which conceive them as unified entities with




II. Empowerment and Domination
Like Elias, Michel Foucault also asserts that power is a form of relation and not a 'thing'
which can exist independently or outside the circumstance in which it emerges. It is
considered a force that is the embodiment of behaviour which does not act directly on the
person of others, but only on their actions.21 Given this, the exercise of power is depicted as a
framework of actions that constrains or promotes other actions. From this, power is both
productive, given its ability to induce certain individual actions, and restrictive, because it can
hinder others within a social configuration as well. No individual or group is considered to
have complete autonomy in the relational structure, thus the traditional view linked to the
notion that true power is linked solely to sovereignty is deemed inadequate:
"
By Power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to
violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of
domination exerted by one group over the other The analysis, made in terms of
power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the State, or the form of the law, or the
overall unity of domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal
forms which power takes."22
Foucault sees the forms of power manifested within relations over subjects containing the
freedom to make choices within a fluctuating field of possible alternatives. These choices
influence the realisation of an individual's personal and social identity. If the actions of
intrinsically free individuals are not involved, there is no power, for the network of social
inter-relations are non-existent. This type of activity is intrinsic to any real social structure
because the actions of those inhabiting it cannot be undertaken without effecting the potential
conduct of others, or in turn, having their practices transformed. All societies are founded on
such relations, for if it was attempted to conceive of a society without them, at best, it could
only be a remote abstraction of the actual social configurations.23 Therefore, to Foucault,
power does not exist in terms of its being an institution, structure, or attribute of personal
strength, but exists as a multifaceted and fluid configuration of relational actions. So, to this
point, Elias and Foucault seem to agree concerning the idea of power being an intrinsic
2'Michel Foucault, "The Subject and the Power" in Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and
Hermeneutics. By H. J. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow. (Brighton: Harvester Press Ltd. 1982) Pg. 220.
Op. cit., Burkitt, Pg. 55.
22R. Dreyfus, "On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault" in Michel
Foucault: Philosopher. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.) Pg. 81. See also, Michel Foucault,
The History ofSexuality I: An Introduction, (New York: Vintage, 1980) Pg. 92.
23Dreyfus, Pg. 82. See also M. Foucault, "The Subject and the Power", Pg. 220-221.
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product of relations embedded within the intricate framework of social patterns, but when
compared further these theories quickly diverge.
Elias feels power and freedom are not positioned in a polar opposition, but intrinsically
interconnected to form a kind of dialectical equilibrium of interdependence. Foucault,
however, perceives the relation of power and freedom containing a differing dynamic:
"Power is exercised only over subjects, and only in so far as they are free. By this we
mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which
several ways of behaving, several reactions, and diverse comportments may be realised.
(T)o 'conduct is at the same time to 'lead' others and a way of behaving within more
or less open field of possibilities. The exercise of power consists in guiding the
possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically, power is less
a confrontation between two adversaries or linking of one to the other than a question of
government To govern, in this sense is to structure the possible field of action of
others."24
Foucault deviates from Elias's argument by insisting that freedom is a prerequisite for the
exercise of power. By this, power is exercised over subjects which are essentially free and
rests on the assumption that it is a coercive force having the ability to produce both positive
and negative effects depending on ones' position within the collective. Power seems connected
primarily with the act of governing. Both it and freedom are related to intention and embody
the confrontation of desires contained within the social arena. Accordingly, if power is
intrinsically connected to governing, then freedom is seen as the resistance to the actions of the
government by those it seeks to control.25 So, the governed express their essential freedom
through a resistance to the ruling elite in order to enlarge their range of possibilities. The
government, in turn, seeks to control this resistance by constricting the field of potential
actions. With this, the exercise of power by the government is in direct competition with the
freedom of action fundamental to the those it governs.
Such a conception differs greatly from the one promoted by Elias which visualises power,
not in terms of its being a coercive force, but as "the opposition of choice."26 It is seen as a
correlative phenomenon manifesting itself when the potential for autonomous acts increases.
By removing the coercive element from the concept of power relations, a 'figural' process of
logic emerges that foregoes the notion of a conscious design behind the exercise of power.
This tacit logic of events is similar to Adam Smith's conception of the "invisible hand"




theory27 which describes random, yet loosely connected social events appearing to he
orchestrated by some implicit strategy, but for the most part purely coincidental.
The major difference between these views rests on their varying emphasis concerning the
nature of a relationship. According to Elias, power is seen to exist within a complex of
intricately balanced social relations relating to the concept of a symmetrical pair relationship,28
This type of relation is exemplified by certain individuals or groups appealing to or repulsing
others where they are bound by either loyalty or dissension. Though each force is in polar
opposition, there exists a reciprocal dialogue between the constituent components in which all
parties utilise simultaneously sanctions or rewards in an effort to shift the balance of power in
favour of their interests. This, according to Elias's description, is the typical model for a
relation, typifying his conception of the connection between freedom and power. Each agent
shares the ability to exercise some power over others to a certain degree. This type of
relationship can also be adversarial if antagonists of equal strength become intertwined in a
protracted struggle for outright superiority. If each are relatively evenly matched in their
abilities and strengths, a stalemate ensues, for each contain the initiative for action, but to
actually embark upon a campaign of confrontation might lead to the destruction of all involved.
Foucault's account of power rests on an implicit paradigm described as an asymmetrical
pair relationship.29 According to this depiction, relationships within a society are conceived
as being purely oppositional where opponents struggle for control over a certain field of
possibilities containing advantages such social positions, wealth, or information. As noted
above, such relations can remain symmetrical if the strengths afforded to agents or collectives
are evenly matched. If, however, this equilibrium changes and one individual or group gains
an advantageous position over the others, the parameters and dynamics of the situation change
dramatically. If this solidifies, a hierarchical structure commences to form where the
characteristics of power are distributed in a 'top-down' fashion throughout the social structure.
In such cases, the typical model for the interaction of individuals or groups are in the form of
27See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth ofNations. Vol. I. ed. by
Edwin Cannan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982) Pg. 421. Smith describes this theory; "...As every
individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic
industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his
own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectual than he really intends to promote
it."
28Richard A. Schermerhorn, Society and Power. (New York: Random House, 1961) Pg. 2-4.
29Schermerhorn, Pg. 4-12.
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those in super-ordinate positions (leaders), regulating the potential actions of others in a
subordinate positions (followers).
In such a circumstance, the notion of authority emerges as the key component to any
practices involved in the exercise of power. The subordinate will obey a figure in a position of
authority for several reasons30. Firstly, where the objectification of social norms and values
requires straightforward obedience. Secondly, where there is a perception by the subordinate
that the figure has a certain expertise which bestows a greater capacity for undertaking actions
within the immediate context. Thirdly, an institutional structure grants authority or legitimacy
to a figure through social demarcations such as titles or through the perception that it contains
a superior capacity in the use of coercive measures such as violence. And finally, obedience to
a dominant figure is ingrained within the subordinate due to tendencies reinforced by habit,
norms, or tradition.
The first three reasons illustrated demand submission by evoking pressure or a sense of
urgency on the subordinate agents involved. The fourth reason exemplifies a relationship of
total control, which is generally violently coercive and lacks the legitimacy of a principle or
title. The last reason entails a certain amount of emotional detachment and indifference.
Enduring habits and customs allow the subordinate to obey without emotional involvement or
intellectual conflict because commands are generally given in an incremental fashion of
frequent and slight adjustments allowing for their facile assimilation at an almost subliminal
level. In this way, the potential for moral crisis or ideological confrontation is removed
allowing for the functioning of complex administrative structures that bury the notion of
responsibility within a distributive network of duties and rituals. This 'distribution of
responsibility' is an essential characteristic involved in the functioning of many modern social
and political structures.
Both Elias and Foucault discuss important issues concerning the effects of power on the
societal configurations of man. Elias asserts that the ultimate configuration emerging from
these symmetrical interchanges is a system of interdependence which binds the lives of those
involved in an intrinsic manner. Constraint within such a system surfaces from the very nature
of the mutual reliance of all the individuals and groups involved. Thus, power and freedom
are descriptive terms for the conditions involved within the circumstances effected by the
'figural processes' of Man's social activities.
Foucault, on the other hand, places the notion of power in opposition to freedom, for when
there is an exercise of former, the latter is usurped. Since power is stated to be exercised over
30Ibid., Pg. 6.
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freedom, the dynamics of this relationship is asymmetrical. Though Foucault's emphasis on
power as governing is not without merit, the claim that this is its predominant characteristic
places too great an importance on its relation to dominance at the expense of its connection to
the notion of capacity. Though there is a contention that both positive and negative effects can
come about with the exercise of power, it is still largely conceived as a negative force of
coercion and dominance.
Moreover, both authors are seemingly correct in their assumption that some characteristics
generally attributable to power surface within specific contexts as effects which are
experiential, but the question still remaining is whether or not such depictions portray all the
intrinsic qualities involved in the essential nature of power? Can there be an a ffectual aspect to
power which is beyond the empirical faculties of humans? The theories of Foucault and Elias
were postulated largely from investigations into mankind's social interactions leaving open the
possibility that certain connections might have been overlooked pertaining to the possibility of
an attribute of power residing within its intrinsic being. It could be this aspect which
constitutes the transcendental component constituting a fundamental existent power's essential
nature.
An indication that there may be such a consistency surfaces when one begins to move past
the effects manifested by overt exercises of power that formulate and reinforce social
configurations and seeks a broader perspective. The surface appearance of power's effects
may transfigure from circumstance to circumstance, but the rationale and intentions behind
them seemingly remain consistent. The needs of, and reasons behind, the exercise of power
have remained constant since humans began to congregate and form societies for protection.
The implicit problems surrounding the notion of power are as prevalent in texts such as The
Republic, as they are within the discourse of modern times. Even with the rapid advancement
of the human technological capabilities, certain attributes of Man's nature has remained
constant, seemingly unconnected to such advances. The verification of this implicit attribute of
power is not easily discernible through direct experience, and it is the potential discovery of its
fundamental characteristics which invites conjecture upon its affectual aspects.
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The Affectual Nature ofPower
Akin to the paradigm of power within Hobbes's 'state of nature',31 is the conception of
power as explicated in the texts of Friedrich Nietzsche. His idea of power, is based on the
premise that it is a fundamental attribute of the 'will'. This concept of 'will' is conceived as
the perpetual striving towards the satisfaction of desires underlying all human emotions and
sentiments.32 Therefore, the will is seen to be "an insatiable desire to manifest power; or the
application and exercise of power as a creative instinct, etc."33 Accordingly, power and will
are inextricably bound together as the Will to Power, which is considered the fundamental
ontological ground for the essential inner nature of the human animal in its impulse to
overcome the resistance of the objective world.
Moreover, this concept not only describes an essential component of the human condition,
but is considered by Nietzsche to be the fundamental driving component inherent within the
ultimate reality of the world, both in the literal and metaphorical sense. It is the essential
underlying force in the perpetual process of self-affirmation of all life contained within the
world. Within this reality, life is seen to be a perpetual struggle to overcome the obstacles an
entity encounters. If such difficulties are not overcome, they will cause such a being to cease
to exist. For in this world there are the conquerors and the vanquished, with the concept of
self identity emerging when this impulse overcomes or gains mastery over itself and others.
However, the will to power does not refer to the concept of self-preservation, but to the
avaricious inner-most striving to extend ones' sphere of influence. It references the incessant
need for growth towards a greater complexity that continually increases a Being's capacity to
command its surroundings. It is the tacit and vital creative instinct which serves as the root
force contained within the principles of the empirical sciences, though not readily discernible
within the realms of their methodologies of description. This element correlating to power is
actually partially concealed from our empirical capabilities, but innate to all movements,
31See Hobbes, Pg. 64-65. "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is
Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than
what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such a condition, there is
no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the earth, no
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no
Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of
the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts, no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall
feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
32Robert Litke, "Violence and Power" in International Social Science Journal, February 1992, Pg.
196. As Litke points out, in the Leviathan Hobbes considers power to be in essence, "the ability to
satisfy ones desires."
33Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will To Power. (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1910) Pg. 110.
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appearances, and laws of nature contained within the world. Thus, all such processes must be
understood in connection with this inner will or phenomenon.
So, according to Nietzsche, the traditional view of Nature is falsely portrayed as being the
embodiment of a some harmonious state. In his conception of the world, life contained within
its parameters consists of an infinite series of individualistic conflicts and struggles between
entities or beings unified under the common characteristic of willing, or in other words, a
universal will. This all-encompassing will is, " every combination of forces, defending
itself against the stronger and coming down unmercifully upon the weaker."34 Thus, the Will
to Power is the eternal willing, striving, or struggle between conflicting entities forming the
infinite combinations that constitute the world:
"The will to Power can manifest itself only against obstacles; it therefore goes in search
of what resists it—This is the primitive tendency of the protoplasm when it extends its
pseuschopodia and feels about it. The act of appropriation and assimilation is, above all,
the result of a desire to overpower, a process of forming, of additional building and
rebuilding, until at last the subjected creature has become completely a part of the
superior creatures sphere of power, and has increased the latter—If this process of
incorporation does not succeed, then the whole organism falls to pieces; and the
separation occurs as the result of the will to power: in order to prevent the escape of that
which is to be subjected, the will to power falls into two wills."35
It is through this struggle or conflict where all life forms discover the essential nature of
their Being. It is here that the Will To Power discloses itself as the propelling force behind the
act of Becoming. An act entrenched within each singular individual will and constituting in the
end, an ultimate universal will of self-affirmation. It is "the original form of affect,"36 which
is the foundation for all other forms of affect. When Nietzsche speaks of this will it is never
taken as being an effect, in terms of a singular event or exercise, but always as a reference to a
manifestation occurring within the complex configuration of numerous effects. This leaves
open the possibility of it transcending the empirical capabilities of men and their abilities to
fully comprehend it.
To understand the intricate nature of this concept, it is imperative to understand Nietzsche's
thoughts concerning the notion of will or willing. According to his description, the 'will' and
the 'will to power' are essentially the same force or process, for they are a form of 'self-
willing'. Therefore, when he speaks of 'will', it is not in the traditional sense of its being an
34Nietzsche, Pg. 130.
35Ibid., P. 131.
36Martin Heidegger, The Will to Power as Art. Vol. 1. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1981) Pg.
45.
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aptitude or strength located within the soul, but is a complex notion relating to several
descriptions simultaneously including affect, passion, or command and unified within this
singular term. The will then, is essentially a reaching out, a striving to extend or project
oneself beyond its present state. Willing is always directed towards an object, it is a striving
towards something. There cannot be pure willing or a pure wilfi1, for included intrinsically in
the notion of will is the object of its striving (See chapter 4). Willing in the form of a
projection or mastery beyond an entity that wills is the inherent force which brings such an
entity to power.
Willing reaches out beyond itself.... Will is intrinsicallypower, it is mastery over.... The will
to power doesn 't have a meaning per se.38 Consequently, if someone is confused or uncertain
as to what is desired, no act of will is involved, therefore no will. Since the will is
intrinsically connected to its object, it is impossible to conceive of one without the other.
Power can never be an object of the will, because it is a characteristic of the will's striving
towards its immediate object, not an ultimate goal. In essence then, every act of will is a
willing towards increasing the sphere of influence of an entity. With such an increase of
influence, comes the amelioration of an entity's inherent capacity. Consequently, out of such
willing comes a sort of command, both in terms of the fundamental existent of being and its
surroundings. This continual act of striving towards expansion is the essential nature of the
will to power.
By this conception, one seemingly cannot over-emphasise the impact that such a notion has
upon the very essence of Man's being. It is through this action of willing, this eternal drive to
enlarge our sphere of influence towards the satisfaction of desire, which reveals itself in the
surge of pleasurable emotion involved in its achievement. This feeling emerges as the self-
affirming process revealing the essential nature of Being as Becoming. These assumptions led
Nietzsche to base his theory on the notion of a perpetual conflict in regards to humanity's
37Nietzsche claims that Schopenhauer's concept of will is erroneous because he conceives the will as a
thing-in-itself. Thus, the object to which the will is directed is outside or separate from it. "....every
particular act of will on the part of a knowing individual (which itself is only phenomenon of the will as a
thing-in-itself) necessarily has a motive, without which the act can never take place. But just as the
material cause contains merely the determination that at such a time, in such a place, and in such a
matter, a manifestation of this or that natural force must take place, so also the motive determines the act
of will of a circumstance of a knowing being, at such a time, in such a place, and in such and such
circumstances, as something quite individual; it by no means determines that being wills in general and
wills in this way. That is the expression of his intelligible character, which, as the will itself, the thing-
in-itself, is groundless, for it lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason." See Arthur




instincts towards freedom. Like Hobbes, he claims that it is out of this collision of drives
towards the satisfaction of individual desires that forges the nature of social relations. Hence,
those social structures are merely manifestations of this attempt at regulation, for the will gains
its freedom through the self-realisation process of expressing its power and reaching its
unbridled potential. Consequently, the overt conflict and violence amongst men are just the
outward expressions of this inner will. For; Life is only a means to something: it is the
expression ofthe forms ofgrowth in power?9
Therefore, the will to power is seemingly beyond our capacity to experience the totality of
its effects because it rests within the inner nature of men and is largely out of reach of human
perception. This transcendental existent is too intrinsic to the human condition for us to fully
comprehend, too involved in our very nature for the detachment needed to discern the total
extent of its characteristics and manifestations. Though, Nietzsche disagrees with
Schopenhauer on several points concerning the will's relation to its object, nevertheless, they
seem to be describing a force with metaphysical connotations:
"The unity of that will here alluded to, which is beyond the phenomenon, and in which
we have recognised as the inner being of the phenomenal world, is a metaphysical unity.
Consequently, knowledge of it is transcendent, that is to say, it does not rest on the
functions of the intellect, and is therefore not to be really grasped by them. The result is
that this unity opens to the consideration or abyss whose depth no longer grants an
entirely clear and systematic insight, but only isolated glances that enables us to recognise
this unity in this or that relation of things, now in the subjective, now in the objective."40
Such a conception diverges greatly from the more sociologically based conceptions of power
supposedly discernible by empirical means. Nietzsche's exposition of power seeks to take our
understanding of it beyond its overt manifestations within the social sphere towards uncovering
its essential nature as the ontological existent of Being.
Power, Metaphysics, andExperiential Relations.
On the surface, the claim made by Nietzsche, that there is a component to power which
exists beyond its phenomenal appearance, is divergent from the views of Foucault and Elias.
The relational account denies that power contains any transcendental notion, instead depicting
its exercises as effects contained within the institutional structures of society. With this
39Nietzsche, Pg. 175.
40Schopenhauer, see Vol. II, Pg. 323.
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assertion, the question concerning power rests simultaneously on the issues surrounding the
notion of the capacity of a group or individual to take autonomous action. It is a question
entailing an investigative technique which places non-scientific philosophical investigation to
one side and endeavours to rest its initial premises on events readily discernible to empirical
analysis. What is called for here then, is a scientifically-based methodology describing the
structural paradigm of social interdependence. The effects of this interdependence are said to
be experiential, therefore observable. Power is not a hidden existent located within human
nature or on the essential level of all existing beings, it refers to the systematic distribution or
restriction of the freedom to carry out autonomous acts.
In reality, this assertion rests on a superficial reading of certain philosophical
methodologies, especially in regards to enquiries concerning notions of ontology and
metaphysics. Whereas the relational view seeks to describe the nature of power from the
observation of particular practices or events, the theory of the will to power, is seeking to
uncover the intrinsic connection between such manifestations and their relation to our essential
existence revealed to us by experience. Though it may not be possible for mankind to move
completely beyond experience, there are other paths towards the discovery of such
characteristics contained within the world. As Schopenhauer asserts, the experiential whole of
the world can be envisioned as being in the form of a "cryptograph", and it is the task of
philosophy to unravel its mysteries. The validity of this decoding process can be confirmed by
the associations and continuity that appears at various instances in our everyday experience:
"Accordingly, philosophy, is nothing but the correct and universal understanding of
experience itself, the true interpretation of its meaning and content. This is the
metaphysical, in other words, that which is merely clothed in the phenomenon and veiled
in its forms, that which is related to the phenomenon as the thought or idea is to the
words."41
Consequently, the essential nature of Being does not have the potential to sever itself from
experience and it is the task of a philosophical method to attempt to interpret experience, not
from the nature of the particular, but from the standpoint of the universal. As Man's capacity
for knowledge concerning the particular expands, so too does the demand for an explanation of
the connections relating such experiences. Contrary to the declaration made by Elias and
Foucault, a more refined method of empirical observation of particular events involving the
exercise of power will only demand an exposition of the fundamental linkage and causes
behind such occurrences. As in the case of history, the unfolding of a particular event may be
41Schopenhauer, Vol. II, Pg. 183-184.
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discerned by the study of evidence that providence has left, but it takes an act of speculation to
relate the ramifications of each particular event to others in order to measure its effects on the
overall course of history. As our knowledge concerning particular events becomes
increasingly more refined and encyclopaedic, the complexity of the elements effecting the
human condition become all the more incomprehensible and in ways mysterious, thereby
increasing the need for an understanding of the systematic connections constituting the world.
Given this, the inference made by certain critics42 that Nietzsche's conception of power
rests on some grand strategy based on a 'metaphysics of conflict' is a interpretation that is
rather suspect in regards to the endeavour of metaphysics. Usually when describing a strategy,
one is indicating that there is an overall intention or plan directed towards some pre¬
determined goal. With the concept of the will to power, there seems to be no such overall
systematic goal per se, but only a series of singular entities pursuing their own individual
goals. Each individual entity is striving to acquire more and more influence over its immediate
field of possibilities and it is these efforts of extension on the 'micro' scale which have the
potential to develop power configurations through an implicit process affecting the
characteristics of the world on the macro scale. This idea is similar to Adam Smith's concept
of the process of the invisible hand. Elias's relational account stems from a very similar
premise, thus leading one to believe that such theories are implicitly connected. The
interpretation of the endeavour of metaphysics surrounding this assertion is somewhat
superficial and seemingly portrays its goals in a tainted light. In an attempt to overcome this
discrepancy, it is the assertion of this study that the relational method and the 'metaphysical'
conception of power only differ by degree and not in essence, for they are both seeking to
discern the characteristics of the same subject.
A Conjecture on the EssentialNature ofPower
The discussion concerning power to this point has encountered two recurrent themes
contained within the various positions involving this subject. The first asserts that power is an
affectual existent of Being within the world, while the second claims it to be an effectual
characteristic emergent within the social apparatuses of men. Though these theoretical
divisions seem openly apparent when one first encounters several of the methodologies
42See Burkitt, Pg. 57.
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investigating the subject, they are speaking of elements essentially contained under the same
theoretical 'umbrella'.
These divisions within this discourse stem from several persistent problems43 arising within
attempts to provide a clear and coherent explanation. The overriding obstacle in this matter is
the multitude of variance surrounding the actual clarification of the constituent components
encapsulated under the term, power. As a result, there are several subsidiary problems
attributable to this primary dilemma. The first concerns the intrinsic confusion surrounding
the different interpretations of the term, what is entailed when a group or individual is said to
obtain or have it, and the ramifications involved in its exercise. Further, there is the related
difficulty emerging from the complexity of the circumstances involved surrounding the
emergence of any features pertaining to an essential referent of power. This complexity blurs
the boundaries between the external and internal issues implicated and conceals certain aspects
of power thereby making them indiscernible even when it appears that all the necessary
information can be ascertained through empirical means. These obstacles aid in obscuring the
notion of power and the specification of the important components that could constitute that
possible definition.
Underlying these impediments are two reasons that reinforce and perpetuate these
difficulties in ascertaining the true nature of power.44 Firstly, there is not a singularly
identifiable component which adequately describes the multi-faceted nature of power. Despite
claims made to the contrary by advocates of the relational view of power, evidence gained
through empirical observation does not contain the ability to prove or disprove assertions that
power contains an aspect akin to a transcendental phenomenon. Also, it cannot prove
definitively that the extent of the parameters of the concept lies in the notion of human
relations and the actions taken corresponding to them. Secondly, this obscurity also stems
from the fact that power plays a central role within the philosophical discourse concerning the
human condition and the fundamental logic behind the emergence of our social, political, and
cultural configurations. The primary impetus of the relational account of power addresses the
former reason by discussing the overt effects and exercise of power, while the metaphysical
account attempts to tackle the latter by trying to discern the nature of power as the ultimate
foundational affect or cause, to which all other affects are derived.
From this, two views emerge that signify the two main issues addressed in most theoretical
approaches attempting to decipher the mysteries encompassing the concept of power. In




reality, though they are addressing different aspects of power, most ultimately claim to
speaking of the only truly relevant aspect of power. However,, what is being addressed by one
view can be termed the means, while the other is more concerned with the impetus of power.
Proponents of the view that power resides within the relations and apparatuses of the
socialising forces incorporated into human civilisations are interested in the means which
manifest the apparatuses of power. Such theories are not concerned strictly with the notion of
how power is manifested, but what social relations and apparatuses serve as a means for its
exercise.45 In theories such as Foucault's, power is said to be exercised over subjects or
agents (as opposed to things), that are essentially free. This notion equates directly to
implications concerning coercion and domination. Here, the interest lies in the complete social
structure of actions in relation to the regulation and constriction of the field of possible actions
contained within the social realm. Hence, power is exercised when certain agents manipulate
this structure to gain control over the actions of other agents. By this view, dominance and its
effects are the more important components in correctly describing the concept of power, thus,
inadvertently downplaying the issue of capacity.
Nietzsche's view depicts power as the manifestation of capacity, i.e., the potential for self-
realisation. With the notion of the will to power, Nietzsche is describing a universal capacity
of Being to undertake a process of the dynamic affirmation of life. Although he stands accused
by his critics of proposing a theory praising the virtues of war and domination, the will to
power, when isolated from Nietzsche's other work, seems to speak more in terms of the inner
capacity to overcome the resistance of the external environment. It is the ability to transcend
the given conditions of the past and present by striving to capitalise to the fullest extent
possible the latent potential contained within the intrinsic parameters of this Being. Therefore,
the argument for the will to power is describing the impetus of power, or in other words, the
fundamental root of all reasons behind actions undertaken by the various life forms contained
within the world. By this, power's fundamental referent indicates an entity's capacity to
realise its ability to live in a unique manner. It is this notion that the contention of its being
'the universal affect of life'46 sets out to illustrate.
Such positions inherently reside within the Marxist and Liberal traditions of thought. By
insisting that the intention behind an action relating to an 'inner nature' is an irrelevant concept
because the characteristics of the agent are determined by the forces comprising the socio-
45Dreyfus and Rabinow Pg. 216-217. See also J. G. Merquior, Foucault. (London: Fontana Press,
1991) Pg. 109.
46White, Pg. 485. The author equates the concept of affect with notions such as determining, producing,
causing, or inffuencing.
historical context of its existence, the relational argument for power utilises the historical
determinism prevalent in Marxist thought. The inmost characteristics of an agent are
inevitably determined by the cultural structure in which it is enmeshed, so its actions are
determined ultimately by the cultural structure, and it is the analysis of these structures which
should take precedent. This stance indicates an emphasis being placed on the socialising
process of the societal superstructure which encompasses the notion of power, not the agent.
Within the liberal tradition of thought, the 'self' is conceived as being intrinsically free and
ultimately responsible for its own actions, over and above the external causes of its
environment. This notion of an intrinsic element of autonomy plays the key role in
determining the definition of power. The 'inner nature' of an agent correlating to the notion of
a 'will' is self-contained and separate from psychological desires and social norms. The will in
its essential state is isolated and free to determine its destiny, but such an endowment also
carries with it a burden of responsibility. An individual contains the innate freedom and power
to take actions that further its interests and inadvertently increase the capacity for autonomous
action. By resting power on the notion of capacity, faculties such as the human imagination
begin to emerge as a fundamental component of power relating to the part it plays in our
actions.
Both of these theories seem to be accurate in their basic assumptions relating to power, but
somewhat misguided in their claims of exclusivity.47 Power is simultaneously involved in the
capacity for self-expression and the dominance involved in the limitation of the field of
possibilities for action, either by others or by cultural apparatuses.48 Consequently, a
dialectical aspect emerges between these two prevailing aspects of power. To claim either
supersedes the other is to fail to give an adequate description of the essential nature of power.
Therefore, the total phenomenon of power cannot be described solely on either metaphysical or
empirical grounds, but only through a combination of both. The relationship of power and
freedom must be seen to reside in individual agents containing a matrix of individual
capabilities (capacity), that comprise the essential attributes embedded within an overall
47Lukes, Essays. Pg. 29.
48See Felix Oppenheim, Political Concepts: A Reconstruction. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd.,
1981) Pg. 29. The author distinguishes between two types of power relations relating to the two types
identified here. The first is a two term relation of power correlating to ability, or within the context of
this argument capacity. This is illustrated by the formula; 'P has power to do X'. The second
designation is a three term relation of social power which equates to the notion of domination. This
aspect is described as; 'P has power over R's doing X'. Also, see John Locke, An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) Pg. 136. Locke
discerns between two types of power, one active and one passive. The former implies the 'ability to
make', the latter, 'able to receive, any change'.
52
structure of potential opportunities and constraints (structure and dominance). No theory of
power can successfully describe its subject if it relies entirely on the intentions contained
within the inner nature of individual agents or likewise, purely on effects emergent within the
relations inherent to humanity's socio-historical structures. For the essential nature of power




With the definition of the fundamental characteristics of the concepts of power and Utopia,
certain aspects begin to surface concerning their potential in producing positive and negative
consequences. In short, the impulse underlying Utopia, contains the ability to envision
theoretical objectives which can instigate changes to the institutional structures of a society. It
undertakes such action through the provision of incentives in the form of images portraying a
community's potential. However, if pursued blindly or with malevolent intent, this same
impulse can serve as a vehicle to tyranny and social violence. In this guise, it becomes a
device of deceit, utilised to misinform rather than inform. Power also contains a similar
duality of potential in that it has the ability to produce situations of social harmony or discord
depending on the implicit intentions behind its exercise.
Due to the close proximity and relationship of the undercurrents of power and Utopia within
the workings of a society, there is the real possibility that the egoistic nature of power will
overtake and utilise the Utopian impulse cynically for the purposes of maintaining or increasing
its control. The Utopian imagery can succumb to this drive by becoming merely a means for
those seeking to manipulate the mass psyche. If this occurs, the Utopian paradigm betrays its
eternal ideals, and serves only to legitimise the theories and actions of the dominate ruling
ideology.
To avoid such pitfalls and to utilise the potential advantageous traits that a proper balance
of these forces could bring, it is imperative to understand the dynamics of the relationship
between the images projected by the social visionary and the praxis of existing power
structures. In regards to uncovering the positive attributes of this interrelation, several
enquiries must be made into its nature, extent, and possible effects on the social structures of
Man. The enquiry concerning this matter will focus on issues involving the positive and
negative influence that latent Utopian desires can have on a society and its inhabitants. A
second, will embark upon uncovering the positive and negative effects arising from the actions
undertaken by existing power structures and the potential of their interaction with these
idealised depictions. After exploring these issues, a final line of questioning will strive to
indicate certain potential connections between these forces and will guide the remainder of the
investigation.
In short, to commence such enquiries, a two-fold methodology emphasising, in the first
instance, the inherent duality of each of these concepts, and in the second, the dynamics of
their potential connections, will be utilised. These connections will explore the potential of
these forces in order to attempt to envisage a means of eliminating as many malevolent effects
as possible while maintaining the potential capacity for producing beneficent effects when these
forces interact. With such information, this study can then move towards examining the issues
influencing this interrelation and its contextual parameters within the varying levels of
existence constituting the human condition. Towards this end, we will begin by uncovering
the paradoxical nature of the Utopian impulse.
The Paradoxical Character of Utopia
As mentioned previously, there inhabits a spirit within the mental structures of Man that
perpetually beckons deep-rooted impulses desiring certain transformations to the existing
reality. These aspirations demand purposeful interventions directed towards the realm of the
future by perceptions grounded within the present. It is this ability of multi-temporal
habitation which allows Man to incorporate the knowledge of his ancestors into his labours
within the present in an effort to transform his future horizon. This innate multi-
dimensionality has enabled mankind as a species to project its intentions with a greater impact
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pertaining towards the transformation of its surroundings than any other species of animal to
date. With this composite mental structure; Man, the creature of the present attempts to
surpass the obstacles of this realm and venture into the unknown dimension of the future. No
other species contains such a refined ability for abstract thought and speculation, an
endowment which affords the opportunity for purposeful intervention with the goal of
changing the surrounding environment.1 Given this, Mankind's true reality is not only multi¬
dimensional in the spatial, but the temporal sense as well. For its nature is divided between
the given of the past, the perceptions of the present, and the potential of the future.
This complex mental structure has brought truly beneficial aspects to human existence and
has allowed the capacity for formidable achievements. However, it also produces an impulse
with the potential to enslave humanity with an incessant striving for change, regardless of the
cost. Because of this, imprudence can avail and disastrous events causing great hardship can
emerge serving only to disillusion individuals instead of enlightening them in regards to their
latent potential. To uncover the potential effects of the paradoxical2 character of this force it is
imperative to accentuate Utopia's intrinsically positive traits as well as the negative. In regards
to the positive, Utopia contains the capacity for conveying the notion of truth, indicating the
potential fecundity of a circumstance, and endows mankind with a certain power towards
changing a societies' perception of itself and its future possibilities. Contrary to this positive
nature, is its ability to damage the psyche of a society through its inherent deceittulness,
illustrating vacuous instead of real potential, and thus leaving a society paralysed and
disillusioned. Upon such an occurrence, Utopia becomes a purely cynical or flaccid social
force, impotent in regards to bringing about necessary social and political change.3
1 See John Locke, P. 89. Locke defines the notion of abstraction as; "...whereby ideas are taken from
particular beings and become representations of all of the same kind; and their names general names
applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas". He goes on to declare that this faculty
distinguishes Man from other species of animals. "If it may be doubted whether beasts compound and
enlarge their ideas that way to any degree, this I think, I may be positive in, that the power of abstracting
is not all in them, and that the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man
and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to."
2See R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes. 2nd. edition. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) P.
1. The author defines the notion of paradox as; "An apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by
apparently acceptable premises. Appearances have to deceive since the acceptable cannot lead by
acceptable steps to the unacceptable. So, generally, we have a choice: either the conclusion is not really
unacceptable, or else the starting point, or the reasoning, has some non-obvious flaw." In regards to the
notion of Utopia, many of its proposals seem straight-forwardly simple and therefore the consequences
entailed predictable. However, the issues it dwells upon are infinitely complex owing to their
involvement within the social sphere, thus, making prediction an altogether uncertain endeavour. When
discussing the notion of power, similar issues arise due to its simple appearance, but complex nature.
3Paul Tillich. "Critique and Justification of Utopia" in Utopias and Utopian Thought, ed. by Frank E.
Manuel. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company., 1966) Pg. 298 - 301. The description of the dual
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I. The Positive Attributes of the Utopian Impulse
The first of these positive attributes associated with the notion of Utopia is its innate
capacity to express certain truths. It achieves this by revealing certain attributes of Man's
essential nature. This process of revelation is undertaken with the disclosure of the
fundamental objectives inherent to its existence. By portraying the aspirations of humanity,
Utopia can depict the future as it could or oughf to be, in correlation to its innate desires.
These future images stem from perceptions located within the context of the present, which
transforms them through the faculty of the imagination into the specification of the idealised
characteristics of an alternative future. In this process, these images serve as signifiers of
reform contained within a society. Many of these possible changes could allow a multitude of
individuals to fulfil the potential of their existence by informing them as to the true
possibilities contained within its nature.
The definition of such images must occur simultaneously on two levels; the social and the
individual. The complete separation of these two realms of existence is impossible owing to
the incomprehensibility of one without the context of the other. Consequently, the essential
truth that a Utopia can describe is forfeited if its aspirations are directed towards a sense of
fulfilment on an individual level while failing to address the ramification of such a goal at the
social level. The converse situation is also true. For the essential fulfilment of human nature
must occur seamlessly throughout the various realms of its existence if such a state is to be
reached and perpetuated.
potential of Utopian thought follows a comparative description of the positive and negative effects
associated with Utopia.
3Ibid., Pg. 298-299.
4See Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies Volume I: Plato. Pg. 237, Note 18(1). Popper
attacks this notion as being one of the basic motives of 'scientific' ethics as expounded by moral
philosophers such as David Hume (See Hume's Enquiries, Concerning The Human Understanding and
Concerning The Principles ofMorals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893, Pg. 134-
8, 234-46). Popper claims that such notion rests on the fact that humans can act with intelligent foresight
and given the fact that men can ask what their aims ought to be, they should be able to determine how
they ought to act. He states that since this implies some form of "good" or the possibility of its
definition, any reliance on such terms for a notion of morality is actually a form of escape. He also
equates the Utopian socialist's belief in the powers of reason as a formidable basis for predicting
outcomes of social action as suffering from a similar case of naivete. As indicated below, the notion of a
"good" places an important role in the definition of the intention behind the exercise of power. This
notion is implicit in Hobbes's discussion of the subject and follows the Aristotelian tradition of asserting
that underlying all actions is an intention towards the attainment of some form of "good". (See Ball, Pg.
398, also Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 11.) Popper's criticism is more thoroughly addressed in chapter 7
of this text.
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Additionally, the Utopian impulse can bestow positive effects on a society relating to the
fecundity of its social consciousness. This aspect describes Utopia's implicit capacity for
uncovering prospects that would normally be overlooked by other societal factions or
individuals. If such prospects were lost or repressed, a valuable critical apparatus would be
lost, allowing a multitude of social ills to persevere though the knowledge and resources might
exist to solve them. The indication of the latent potential of certain social or political
institutions can serve to enlighten a society to specific values that might have been lost or
forgotten. In this role, Utopia serves as a conscious-raising device in regards to uncovering
these traits which can unlock a social structure's potential.
Finally, corresponding to these preceding notions is a further positive characteristic of
Utopian thought that can alter existing social conditions by endeavouring to transform the
perceptions of the present by events located in the past. It achieves this through the
mobilisation of certain latent desires grounded within the inner nature of individuals or the
dynamics of collectives constituting the social fabric of a society. This is the power of the
Utopian impulse, for the drive towards the materialisation of its ideal images serves to
perpetuate the necessary process of change. These images provide the ideological basis for
focusing the strengths of diverse groups contained within a society towards the manifestation
of communal goals
Moreover, these positive aspects underlie Utopia's capacity to instigate changes aimed
towards the future horizon within its surrounding context. This capacity can enable the
conquering of obstacles within the cultural given of the present by spawning a discontentment
that perpetually seeks the modification of these existing elements to manifest better conditions.
Coupled with these contextual signifiers is a further causal component that is grounded within
this transcendental restlessness that spurs Man towards the discovery of the true nature of his
existence. This discontentment reveals itself in the characteristic of hope and fixes its gaze
incessantly towards the future through the anticipation of events located on the verge of the
next temporal horizon. Thus, Utopia influences the human condition both externally and
internally, from the temporal context of each individual's lifetime to the entire continuum of
the existence of humanity.
The two-fold character of this influence can also fracture Man's nature and cause friction to
arise between the security stemming from the known contained within the present, and the
ardent creativity fired by the unknown of the future horizon. The conflict surfacing between
these passions demands a choice, with the Utopian impulse desiring the potential of the latter
despite its dangers. This choice to pursue the potential of the future is made at the outset by a
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small contingent of innovative spirits and can eventually spread to infect and motivate the
masses, mobilising them under the banner of a common cause. Paul Tillich sums up the
energetic nature of these advocates heralding the potential of the future in with his statement;
"The bearers of Utopia are those who have sufficient power of being to achieve
progress....those who are able to transform reality, and it is in them that the power of Utopia is
anchored."5
II. The Negative Aspects ofthe Utopian Impulse.
Coupled with the advantages that such a speculative faculty can furnish are several dangers.
These effects may not necessarily be connected to explicitly malevolent intentions, but such
practices can nevertheless have negative, if not disastrous consequences on the social realm. It
is this pernicious potential that has often been overlooked or misjudged by its proponents. To
understand fully the potential that the Utopian impulse contains in regards to transforming the
existing institutions and structures of a society, this darker side must be addressed as well.
Consequently, the Utopian impulse contains the ability to project misinterpretations
involving the potential of a given reality which deceives rather than informs. These
disingenuous depictions appear when a Utopia ignores two fundamental characteristics of
human nature; its perpetual estrangement and tinitucle.6 The former is a pre-condition of
Man's existence and describes the continual occurrence of circumstances where the actual state
of Being differs from its essence. When such events transpire and a Utopia overcompensates
for their appearance, it has forgotten that this alienation forbids humanity from attaining an
existence corresponding directly to its essential nature. Therefore, if a Utopia proposes that
such a state can exist absolutely, it projects a false truth based on a mistaken perception of the
nature of existence. In reality, the proposal that such a state of Being can be manifested where
this perpetual disaffection is transcended is an unlikely prospect.
By proposing this, the Utopian imagery is placed in a flagrant position of self-contradiction
because its fundamental presupposition that man can be led out of this condition of
estrangement, contradicts the reality of his potential. In other words, there is no real
possibility for the materialisation of a static state of perfection where man exists in complete
fulfilment, at peace with both his inner nature and the surrounding environment. The




onto the reality of Man's existence. Closer to the truth, is the fact that it is impossible to shed
this intrinsic element of estrangement completely because it breeds the very impulse which
leads mankind to speculate upon future possibilities. When a Utopia forgets this, it neglects
one of the defining characteristics of Man's finitude. By ignoring this characteristic and
claiming to contain the means to allow an escape from this condition, it serves only to spawn a
sense of disillusionment and reinforces the cynicism leading into a protracted state of social
apathy.
The emergence of such events leads to another negative aspect, the potential emptiness of
the Utopian impulse. This prospect stems from the capacity that Utopia can have for depicting
irrational dreams as being real possibilities. In doing this, it fails to perceive these images for
what they truly are; wishful fantasies. Such representations focus on compensating individuals
for the social ills placed upon them instead of enlightening them as to the differing possibilities
which could rectify these problems. If a Utopian falls prey to this depiction of meaningless
psychological atonement, the resulting product is deceptive instead of constructive, because it
is not portraying remotely feasible objectives. Such depictions are akin to fairy tales or
daydreams and are grounded within the reality of the real world only in the sense that their
imagery is brought on by a discontentment towards the conditions of the surrounding
environment. When in this mode, the Utopian impulse produces unhealthy and self-defeating
fantasies seemingly devoid of any true relevance, but presented in a guise making them seem
like realistic perspectives. It is within this context that the division between a 'visionary' and a
'dreamer' becomes most apparent. Such wishful thinking serves only to exasperate the
dissatisfaction with existing condition instead of proposing possibilities lessening its presence.
This aspect of exaggerated wishfulness must be overcome for the exercise of the Utopian
imagination to be brought down from the realm of pure fantasy to that of critical theory.
The third and final component pertaining to the negative potential of Utopia is its possible
emergence as a weakened or spent force. This final trait refers to the impotence7 of the
Utopian endeavour. Such an occurrence carries the capacity to neutralise any beneficial effects
or influence that a Utopian vision might have on existing social configurations. It stems from a
loss of creditability ensuing from repeated events where Utopia's wishfulness has produced
false hopes leading to a protracted social frustration. Over time these recurrent digressions
build into a burdening disillusionment which goes beyond the psychological to effect Man's
essential state of Being and is passed to subsequent generations. With each successive
generation the estrangement becomes more acute until the latent cynicism it breeds eventually
7Ibid., Pg. 300.
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destroys many of the positive cultural forces within a society. As a result, cultural stagnation
and a gradual social decline ensues. This pessimism is perpetuated as long as the Utopian
promises within the culture are considered as ultimate goals or ends. An inherent trait of
utopianism is its contingent nature, and it is this trait that sustains the dynamic qualities of
Utopia's transitive disposition. Ignorance of this inherent characteristic produces the false
belief that the depiction of the static state of perfection portrayed by many Utopias is not only
attainable, but can be maintained indefinitely. This drive towards a static absolute ultimately
fails to bring any positive changes to a community and only succeeds in generating this
destructive cynicism.
When faced with these negative elements, it is a natural response to recoil from the notion
of Utopian speculation, but to do so is to risk losing its potentially positive influences. In
reality, however, a society cannot choose to endeavour towards such risks because ultimately,
they are the only options available. A culture must create its own aspirations through such a
process, or be forced to accept the ones fabricated by other cultures. The moment a society
foregoes its desire to experiment with life for a perceived state of certainty and security, its
vitality is lost and a social atrophy soon besets it.8
Subsequently, the potential of a Utopian movement is its ability to demand an unconditional
faith towards the realisation of certain social objectives. The drive towards the realisation of
such goals can bestow an additional richness to the human dimension which cannot be
replaced. It is this striving towards the realisation of intrinsic desires and needs which strikes
at the very core of the social structures that simultaneously order and enrich the human
condition. If such drives are removed, so is a large portion of humanity's raison d'etre.
Without the sense of hope driving the Utopian impulse, the chance that many of Mankind's
greatest aspirations will be manifested is greatly diminished, leaving its intrinsic existence
barren and unfulfilled. Such aspirations are at the heart of the creation of the social and
political structures of humanity and the danger of losing them is a risk that most societies can
ill afford to take.
The Uncertainty ofPower
Power carries a similar potential in producing both positive and negative effects on the
conditions falling within its sphere of influence or control. Such occurrences are similar in
8Ibid., Pg. 302.
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structure, but differ in effect to the ones surrounding the attributes of Utopia. Both power and
Utopia are related in that they are driven by underlying intentions seeking to satisfy various
desires conceived in the form of a "good". However, the ones closely related to the concept of
Utopia seem to be inspired by a more altruistically-based motives, while the those behind
power are more egotistical in nature.9 The true spirit of the endeavour towards the
manifestation of Utopia rests on aims which seek to bring about conditions asserted to be
"common goods", such as societal configurations alleviating scarcity or other pressures
provoking conflict. Its production of certain evils are generally unintentional by-products
arising from oversights associated with over-zealousness.
The drive for power focuses more on the satisfaction of individual or groups desires and
tends to be more ego-centric in nature. Its intended goals are often conceived purely in
reference to the interests of those exercising power. If this drive is taken to the extreme, the
cost in natural, human, or financial resources, becomes irrelevant to the task at hand: the
increase of an individual or group's domination. Nevertheless, though these drives contain
tendencies that can produce instances of great tragedy and loss of life, they can also deliver
beneficial effects to a society as well. Further, power is an intrinsic element necessary to the
very existence of the communal structures at every level of human existence. Thus, it is an
imperative element contained within the notion of co-operation that serves as the foundation of
Man's social interactions. It is this puzzling notion of power serving a kind of necessary, but
potentially pernicious organising element, that this section will set out to uncover.
In the first instance, it is necessary to uncover a primary causal characteristic relevant to
the exploration of its paradoxical nature. This feature relates to the fact that though it may
appear altruistic at varying times, power is a purely egoistic force. If the objectives and goals
of the predominate power structure coincide with the real interests of the majority of the
population, they do so only coincidentally. It is incapable of harbouring wholly altruistic
motives and if left unchecked, will pursue its own ambitions regardless of the cost. Because of
this jealous nature, it utilises surrounding resources to undermine other social forces or groups
it perceives as threatening its influence. Such maintenance requires a great amount of energy
and resources, thus forcing such a structure to focus primarily on the problems and perceived
threats of the present, or at best, the immediate future. These limitations produce a lack of
vision concerning the future and the intrinsic values it harbours. Eventually, if such a state
persists, a power structure falls into a marked decline. Its natural inclination to offset such
9Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power: The Natural History ofits Growth. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
1993) Pg. 136-137.
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events is to resort to a methodology of terror and violence in order to maintain its hold on a
society. At this point, a governmental structure has lost all capacity for bringing beneficial
effects and therefore its legitimate claim to rule.
Such occurrences begin to indicate the dual possibility surrounding the exercise and
structures concerned with power. By this, it materialises in one of two distinct forms.
Concerning the first, it is a social necessity because it imposes order and creates harmony,
allowing for the betterment of men's lives through communal co-operation.10 Without power,
there could be no social configurations, because the order established by its presence allows
men the ability to co-operate, a trait essential to the successful completion of complex tasks
found within a social and political structure. In regards to the second, power can be a social
menace, not a manifestation of reason, but a kind of organism with a mind of its own. By
nature, it utilises pre-existing human structures and manipulates them to achieve its own
purposes.11 When its purposes and objectives begin to outweigh all other considerations, the
effects of its exercise begin to have a negative impact on all involved except for those
instigating its activity. Its machinations are directed towards gaining control for the sake of
fulfilling the desires of the ruling elite regardless of those held by its subjects. Thus, similar
to the potential surrounding Utopian speculation, the use of power involves certain potential
attributes as well as dangers, nevertheless it is a necessary component for the functioning of a
community.
I. The Positive Attributes ofPower
In relation to its being a necessary element in the constitution of social and political
configurations, the notion of power affects the social structures comprising the human
condition in two ways. In the first instance, its most overt expression comes from its
manifestation in the form of authority with this trait serving as the foundation to which all
civilisation is based. Without it, the highly intricate nature of the social configurations of
humanity would scarcely have developed to the integral complexity that they have reached in
the present day. There can be no society of men without a certain tempering of the most
extreme manifestations of human passion. Such temperance can only come about through
10B. deJouvenel, Pg. 313.
11 Ibid., Pg. 314.
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discipline, and authority is the overt expression of a governing body's attempts to temper such
traits.12
The aspect of authority is seen to be pluralistic and mediated by various social forces and
interests embodied within the structural institutions of the family, professional guild, church,
and political groups, of a society13. In its primary function, authority reinforces the values
held in high esteem by the members of a society, as well as providing a basis for their
expression in the form of institutions that enforce prevalent moral views. Through the
containment of certain individual desires and idiosyncrasies, a framework of rewards and
punitive measures develops designating acceptable norms and practices. The predominant
manifestations of this system surfaces as laws, rules, cultural norms, and common peer
pressures relating to each level of social interaction.
Power then, in its most overt presentation as authority, is indistinguishable from the
essential fabric of a societal configuration. It not only emerges through the procedures of the
state or the written passages of law, but is contained within all cultural facets of a community
and finds its fundamental basis on the values legitimising its existence. Without this relation to
the intrinsic moral beliefs of the social sphere, authority loses this factor of legitimacy and
must resort to ruling with violence or force, thus foregoing any chance of real freedom
emerging within its jurisdiction. To truly claim such legitimacy, it must be placed within and
adapt to, the context defined by the norms and values of groups of secondary authority like the
family or education and religious institutions. The tension created by this reflexive action
between the State and the influence of such secondary groups is the essential ground for any
claim to legitimacy that a ruling structure might have as well as the most effective defence
against its potential abuse.
Stemming from this first positive element is a second, which focuses on the reciprocal
nature of the relationship between the emergence of the identity of the individual and the
opportunities and resistance presented by its surrounding environment. A member of a
community discovers its self-identity through a process of resistance to the restraints enforced
by the authority figures regulating a specific social context. Prior to the appearance of this
resistance, a individual must perceive its self-identity as bound to others inhabiting the same
conditions of collective existence. The structures that define this existence are larger and more
12Robert Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition. (London: Heimann Educational Books Ltd., 1970) Pg.
150-162. Within the text, Nisbet describes the French social theorist Emile Durkeim's assertion that this
necessary process of social discipline is in actuality; 'authority in action.' See also, Emile Durkeim.
Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology ofEducation, trans. Everett
K. Wilson & Herman Schnurer. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1950) Pg. 31.
13Nisbet, P. 153.
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permanent than that of the individual, having existed prior to it, and will seemingly remain
after its disappearance. Upon such a revelation, the objectives of an individual move from a
purely introverted state to one where its existence gathers significance in relation to the
existence of the community as a whole. Through the realisation of this sense of belonging to
an entity that is both larger and more enduring than itself, an individual's existence is injected
with renewed meaning that transforms its social orientation. Within the context of this
discovery, the fundamentally human sentiment of solidarity with the community emerges.
The point being emphasised here is essential, because Man as an inhabitant of the social
realm is incapable of aligning his individual aims and objectives with the higher aims or values
of a complex social entity if this sense of belonging is absent. For men to willingly submit to
the control of an authority, this sense of belonging to an entity on a higher plane of existence
and the feeling of security it evokes is imperative. So, to relieve all social pressures is to
abandon the individual to a state of isolation which is both immobilising and demoralising.
Therefore, the structures of society develop the individual psyche and sense of self identity to a
far greater extent than could ever be achieved within a state of isolation. An individual may
forego certain freedoms relating to the demands of a social structure, but in doing so, the
quality of his or her life will be far richer and more varied than if it inhabited a condition of
solitude. Thus, an intrinsic part of the definition of the human identity arises from the
interaction with others in a collective which exhibits signs of a distinct permanence and
security. It is within the context of this identification that a loyalty emerges enabling the
individual to sacrifice its own needs for those of the community as a whole.14
II. The Negative Potential ofPower
Related to these positive attributes are several aspects that can lead to repressive and
tyrannical circumstances. Durkiem aptly describes the dual nature of power by his statement;
"Whilst society thus feeds and enriches the individual nature, it tends, on the other hand, to
subject that nature to itself and for the same reason."15 This excerpt clearly illustrates the
possible consequences if a dominant power structure is left unchecked. Left purely to its own
ends, power will become despotic instead of delivering any beneficial effects to a society. A
powerful entity such as a State apparatus innately contains the tendency towards the oppression
14Ibid., Pg. 160.
15Ibid. See also, Emile Durkeim, Professional Ethics and Civil Morals. Trans. Cornelia Brookfield.
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957) Pg. 60.
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of individuals it rules, i.e., those it sought to nurture in the first instance. In order to avoid the
manifestation of such traits, the secondary forms of authority including the church, guild, or
family, must serve as ideological toils to the exercise of power of the state apparatuses. They
must arrest this highly ambitious side of power if a social harmony is to be maintained.
However, power innately seeks its own growth and focuses solely on its immediate interests by
removing or at least undermining these other authoritative groups in its persistent efforts to
gain full control over the individuals and institutions of a society.
If this balance begins to heavily favour the interests of one faction, widespread instances of
repression may begin to appear and a general decline in the personal freedom of individuals
commences to emerge. The higher aims or goals of the state become separate from the needs
or desires of those individuals under its jurisdiction. Thus, they lose the freedom to resist its
actions and can become lost in the vastness of its apparatuses which do not have the ability to
replace the 'sense of community' needed for the flourishing of the individual spirit. If an
extensive governing body becomes highly successful at undermining the control of these
secondary authorities it impairs its own vitality because the disillusionment and intellectual
uniformity produced by such actions erodes its position and strength. A social atrophy sets in,
and the vitality of the overall culture begins a downward cycle of decline ending in the
stagnation of the creative spirit of the community.
When the reputation of an authority becomes entrenched in this cycle of decline it begins to
lose its legitimacy. The further this decline progresses and the more attempts made to project
itself as legitimate, the more it relies on its image of strength to maintain support. In reality,
however, this entity becomes purely a hollow shell of imagery clinging to a dwindling base
advocacy. As this becomes more and more apparent, it suffers a dramatic loss of faith
amongst its subjects as the principles that serve as the foundations of its rule begin to crumble
until it becomes a weak illegitimate manifestation relying on hollow rituals and tradition for its
survival. It is at this point that one of two events will emerge, either this waning authority will
be overthrown by a more consolidated power or it will seek to maintain its control by resorting
to campaigns of violence, oppression, and terror. With the implementation of such measures,
the indispensable affinity between the state and the individual is destroyed and its restoration
usually only comes about with the utilisation of revolutionary measures. Such procedures do
not necessarily end the reign of terror of the preceding regime, because traditionally an
inadequate power is replaced by a more efficacious one that only continues or even amplifies
the actions of its predecessor.
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To avoid such consequences, it is critical for an existing power structure to have numerous
spheres of influence distributed evenly throughout the various levels of a society. In this way,
the ambitious nature of each authority can be placed in check by a subsequent collective of
equal strength. It is imperative that a certain amount of friction in the form of social resistance
is maintained between these differing types of authority to offset the repressive drive for
control intrinsic to the very nature of social interaction. Such singular drives for control must
be aligned with creative drives for change to provide the basis for a lasting cultural ascendancy
and social harmony within a society. The endeavour to achieve this must focus on creating and
maintaining a flexible equilibrium between the dynamic forces of the existing power structure
seeking to instil discipline, and the creative spirit of innovation expressed by certain
individuals or groups within a society seeking change. To begin to comprehend how the
relationship between the forms of creative innovation embodied within the Utopian spirit and
the disciplining force of power serve to influence events within the social and political realm, it
is imperative to lay bare several significant parameters of their interaction and explore some of
the consequences emerging from this interrelation.
Prospective Connections Between Power and Utopia
As has been shown within the discussion in the preceding sections the forces surrounding
power and Utopia have the ability to bring about both positive and negative effects within the
social and political sphere of a society. Such effects are not easily predictable due to the
highly complex and transitive nature of each of these drives. This condition of unpredictability
is further heightened by the fact that these forms are fundamentally intertwined within a
relationship of reciprocal influence. Owing to this intrinsic complexity, the true parameters of
interaction of these forces are difficult to grasp with any definite clarity. However, though
taxing, some inroads can be made into ascertaining the nature of many of the possible avenues
and implications concerning this interaction. An imperative first step to uncovering pertinent
material concerning such issues is to set forth the question which will serve to guide this
exploration. Therefore, our central question will be: What are the hierarchically important
characteristics of this relationship and how do they interact to influence the essential practices
and events intrinsic to the human condition?
This study thus far has found that contrary to its traditional conception, Utopia must not be
considered a state, but a process of criticism illustrating alternate futures or locations. Such a
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process draws intuitively on the latent desires harboured within the inner nature of persons
comprising a particular social and political structure. If such images are cultivated
conscientiously, they become more than just manifestations of wishful yearnings or fantasies
contained within the faculty of the human imagination, but become speculative explorations
indicating possible social configurations founded on measures designed to overcome the
insufficiencies of the present. Such theoretical paradigms have the capacity to direct Man's
attention towards the possibility contained within the future horizon and serves as an impetus
for the innate creative passion underlying the drive for social and political innovation.
Whereas the Utopian enterprise is more speculative and inhabits the temporal environs of
the future horizon, power, on the other hand, is steadfastly fixated on the events and conditions
of the present. Its locus is founded upon the sequence of events unfolding within this temporal
circumstance and the emergence of certain consequences relating to the friction between
varying groups or individuals. Due to this, there is a certain emphasis on praxis contained
within the nature of power which is in direct contrast to the theoretical loftiness of the Utopian
endeavour.
Power, in its relation to capacity, is aligned with the notion of expending energy in order
to overcome or surpass both internal and external resistance. Therefore, where Utopia centres
on the indication of possibilities, power relates to the striving and actions that could bring such
objectives into existence. These tendencies towards praxis are also prevalent in regards to the
other facet of the impulse to power, that of domination. The manipulation of other individuals
or collectives for the satisfaction of egoistic tendencies can impede power's ability to look
beyond the urgency of its immediate interests. To preserve control, the status quo must be
maintained, so those governing will rarely take the initiative in altruistic or potentially
unpopular actions unless forced into a position where this is imperative. It is this tendency
towards the stifling of all initiative that must be kept in check or power's aggressive nature
will enslave the very individuals who initially supported it.
It is the potential of producing negative effects by each of these forces in isolation that
might be overcome by a balanced interaction between them, one tempering the proclivity
towards an extreme exhibited by the other. As a result, the possibility of oppressive governing
actions leading to a social stagnation can be offset by Utopia's ability to serve as a penetrating
tool of criticism and impetus for social reformation. Likewise, the praxis-oriented outlook
associated with power can temper Utopia's tendency towards becoming too removed from
actual conditions that can render its proposals irrelevant as constructive social critiques. With
each of these forces, if left to their own devices, individual lives and social structures can be
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damaged or potentially destroyed. Therefore, by contrasting these respective strengths it can
be possible to overcome the weaknesses intrinsic to each force. In order to achieve such
measures, it is crucial to understand how the dynamic forces underlying power and Utopia
interact at the various levels of defining Man's existence.
To discover how this interaction influences the human condition, it is imperative to move
beyond the definition of these concepts towards investigating their relationship on numerous
levels including the metaphysical, socio-political, and historical. To this point, the concepts
have been analysed separately, for the purpose of clarifying the essential characteristics of each
singular concept. As will become more apparent in the subsequent phase, these drives are
actually intricately connected components unified within the fluid temporality involved in the
process of civilisation. They are implicit complementary elements comprising the often
turbulent force of dynamic social change and innovation. An exploration into this integral
relationship can lead to crucial insights into both existing and potential social configurations as
well as methods in which disparate individual desires are forged into unified movements with
singularly directed aims or purposes. Towards this end, our investigation will focus on the
implications of this interrelation within the context of the interaction of Man's inner subjective
nature and the external reality of the World.
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Book II: The Interaction ofPower and Utopia Within The Human Condition.
Chapter IV:
Friedrich Nietzsche andErnst Bloch:
Power, Utopia, and The Metaphysics ofExistence
The primary theme which arose within the first part of this text pertained to the possibility
of the cultivation of the latent potential of a society through the dynamic interaction of the
forces underlying power and Utopia. For a society to reach to its full potential these must be in
an equilibrium which aligns the strengths of each force in a complementary and constructive
manner. When this occurs, this relationship can project future images that directs social
actions which can deliver beneficial reforms to an existing social context. In this integral
relationship, the Utopian component projects certain ideas in the form of objectives that can
provide the ideals and values that serve to guide a society's social and political practices. The
forces underlying the concept of power use such images to align the political mechanisms
needed to create and implement certain programs that can bring such ideals to fruition. In this
way, the fluid interaction of these forces can perpetuate a continuous cycle of progressive
renewal.1
1 Ernst Bloch, "Karl Marx, Death, and The Apocalypse" in Man on His Own: Essays in the Philosophy of
Religion, trans. E. B. Ashton. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). Pg. 36. The conditions of
this "strength against strength" relationship introduced in chapter 3 and which will be explored more fully
in this section is described by Bloch in an essay on Marx. In this text, he states that; "Dominance, or
Though such a process contains the possibility of producing a great many beneficial effects,
if this equilibrium is lost, these same elements have the capacity to generate events with
extremely negative consequences. Owing to the inherent complexity of this relationship and its
paradoxical character, it contains the innate ability to instigate changes that can have both
beneficial and detrimental effects upon the structures of a society. Therefore, it is these same
forces which can bring necessary social reform that can also evoke such events as war,
revolution, or oppression. Under such conditions, promises of a 'golden age' can and do
habitually fail to materialise because the intentions underlying these images are contrary to the
spirit of the values that are supposedly upheld.
Underlying this interaction at the social level, is the integral connection between man's
inner subjective nature and the objective reality of the world. When exploring how power and
Utopia interact on the social level, several questions immediately surface pertaining to the
influence and effects that such a relationship has upon the inner nature of the individual. How
does this interaction affect the intrinsic parameters of its existence? Does it have an effect
upon Man's subjective interpretation of the objective world reality or the intrinsic temporality
contained within the essential nature of his Being? If so, how does this influence the
traditional conceptions of the individual within the metaphysical, political, and cultural
spheres? By addressing these questions, many of the implications surrounding the assertion of
this study that this association is a central basis for the formulation of political ideologies as
well as the subsequent social configurations arising from them, begin to surface serving to
reinforce this claim. Therefore, the task of this chapter will be to uncover the essential
qualities of the involvement that these forces within the intrinsic Being of the individual and its
actions within the reality of the world.
In an effort to clarify many of the primary issues surrounding these questions, the theories
of Friedrich Nietzsche and Ernst Bloch will be critically compared. Through this exploration,
the extent to which these forces influence human existence within the varying moral, political,
and metaphysical levels will be brought to light. While on the surface, the political views and
philosophies of these two thinkers appear radically different and a comparison between them
power in itself, is evil; but it takes power to counter it. The categorical imperative must carry a gun
wherever and for so long as power can be crushed by no other means; and wherever and for so long as
anything diabolical maintains its violent resistance to the (undiscovered) amulet of purity." This seems to
be a workable assumption, but one which seems not to go far enough. In answering the age old
question; "who will then guard the guardians?", the answer seems to point to the very element of power
that was in the first instance conquered. Therefore, resistance must be reciprocal, fluid in nature, and
perpetual for a truly healthy society to exist.
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might appear to be a strange endeavour, upon closer examination many connections and similar
issues begin to arise. Nietzsche's project sought to radically reassess the role of metaphysics
by overcoming what he considered an artificial dualism perpetuated within many traditional
theoretical frameworks that have caused modern man to turn away from the true nature of
reality.2 This dualism arises from the absolute nature of the moral ideals of good and evil
which aid in the perpetuation of a fallacious perception of the world as being founded on static
moral absolutes. With the formulation of theories such as The Overman, The Eternal
Recurrence of the Same, and The Will to Power, Nietzsche sought to overcome the resentment
of man towards the authentic nature of reality through a systematic implementation of the
Transvaluation of Values. This system set out to describe the necessity for the continual
interrogation of the conventional wisdom of the values, moral structures, and beliefs of men.
In relation to this proposition, Nietzsche was also concerned with two primary issues in
regards to the social and political dynamics of human society; the persistent friction between
the notions of culture and politics and the integral justification of economic activities through
the polemical opposition of the forces behind the events intrinsic to social exploitation and
domination. Such theoretical interests lead him to envisage a radical social hierarchy in the
form of an artistic aristocracy where the uniquely talented are allowed to ascend above the
'multitude', forming an elite class that could perpetuate the ascension of a culture.3 To
Nietzsche, it was the creation of culture, not social justice that should be considered the main
concern of social and political configurations.
Ernst Bloch, while also attempting to develop a metaphysical system based on certain
existential attributes, took a different approach in that he sought to rectify the problem of the
spiritual emptiness endemic to the materialism found in traditional Marxist theories. Though
he believed firmly in the major tenets of this thought, and asserted that the theoretical core of
this philosophy was the potential liberator of the human race, he nevertheless sought
inspiration for its spiritual revision from an extensive range of sources found within the
varying disciplines of philosophy, literature, religion, mythology, and Utopian thought.
Through the transformation of the major themes discovered within this multi-disciplinary
approach, he developed a metaphysical system akin to many of those formulated within the
2Ofelia Schutte. Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks. (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press., 1984) Pg. 38.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude To A Philosophy of The Future, trans. Helen
Zimmern. (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1909) Pg. 223. See also Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction
to Nietzsche as Political Thinker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1994) Pg. 4.
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discipline of process thought.4 The end result of this endeavour emerged as a Utopian fusion of
revolutionary Messianism that created a philosophy of perpetual renewal reliant on the
mythical language of the human imagination as manifested in many religious and literary texts.
It was through this synthesis of seemingly disparate concepts and language that he created a
dialectical methodology aligned with traditions found within Marxism, but which extended its
boundaries to incorporate a sense of spirituality grounded within the human trait of perpetual
yearning.5
Given these quite distinct differences in the political and philosophical positions of each of
these thinkers, the pertinent question remains as to why such a comparison should be made and
what critical insights are to be gained if it is attempted? Through their respective studies into
the essential nature of man, reality, and their interaction, each has touched upon the
interrelation of the elements of power and Utopia which presuppose the parameters of specific
social and political ideologies. It is the insights into these aspects that will serve to reveal
some of the crucial aspects of this fundamental interrelationship in regards to Man's interaction
with reality.
Though each thinker formulated their theories from differing philosophical starting points;
Nietzsche from a theory stipulating the essential nature of reality as power while Bloch carried
out his explorations from a distinctly Utopian perspective, their studies on the essence of the
authentic metaphysical organisation of reality and Man's place within it contain an important
conceptual overlap. This similarity begins to indicate that these forces are intricately
connected within the dynamic process of change intrinsic to the fundamental reality of the
world. Thus, within these parallels, is the conceptual ground for the formulation of the
theoretical assertion that the subjectivity of Man's inner nature and the objective Being of the
world are influenced by impulses related to the notions of power and Utopia. Therefore, the
connection of these forces serve as the impetus for the constitution of human social, political,
and cultural configurations. Hence, it is through the comparison of the utopian-based theories
4A major advocate of this philosophical outlook was the British scientist/philosopher A. N. Whitehead.
Roughly speaking, according to his view, reality was seen to be comprised of entities which are basically
individual processes of self-creation intertwined within a procedure of selection and reformation of the
material intrinsic to their context. When this process of self-actualisation is complete, the entity then
becomes 'background material' for the next generation undergoing their process of self-actualisation. See
A. Flew, ed. A Dictionary ofPhilosophy. (London: Macmillan Press, 1983) Pg. 374. See also, A. N.
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. (New York: The Macmillan Press, 1929)
5Wayne Hudson, The Marxist Philosophy ofErnst Bloch. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982)
Pg. 6-8.
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of Bloch and the power-based theories of Nietzsche, that the full extent of the relationship of
these two forces pertaining to the essential level of Man's temporal existence can be outlined.
Initially, to begin this procedure, it is imperative to explore several of the similarities
contained within the respective philosophical methods of these writers. The first of these,
concerns the corresponding attempts by both Nietzsche and Bloch to fuse questions of
existence, history, and culture, within a theoretical context that is simultaneously political and
metaphysical. To both philosophers, questions involving the essential condition of Man's
existence cannot be separated from questions concerning the composition of his social and
political surroundings.6 As a result, both theorists consider the formulation of Man's
subjective nature to be reliant on external as well as internal influences.
A similar intention is to be found underlying their respective arguments asserting that the
metaphysical reality of the world and humanity's existence within it is not static, but
essentially fluid. A central line of thought contained within both arguments is that all the
parameters of the objective world reality are involved in an eternal process of renewal or
'flux'7. The notion of this reality being locked in a continuous cycle of change underlies such
a conception, thus rendering any static moral, social, or metaphysical designations intended to
provide an intrinsic sense of security lacking in authenticity. According to this conception,
humanity, as well as all the other entities within the world interact in a dynamic manner to
simultaneously affirm and define the nature of the subjective inner 'self in relation to the outer
objective world. And finally, each philosopher contends that the fulfilment of Man's potential
requires his ascendancy to a primary creative role in the transformation of the surrounding
reality, and that such a position is an essential part of discovering the intrinsic character of this
reality. Confirmation of the true state of reality and humanity's role within it, must therefore
be measured in relation to the creative endeavours of mankind's attempts to transform it.
To ascertain the implications of this relationship and the inherent roles that the implicit
drives for power and Utopia play in the definition of the subjective nature of the individual, it
is imperative to uncover their influence within the system of thought expressed by each
6Hudson, Pg. 8. Also see Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 5.
7See Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, ed. G. S. Kirk. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1954) Pg. 369-380. Heraclitus is credited with first describing this notion of "flux" within the fragment
of his text commonly referred to as the river-analogy. "Upon those who step into the same rivers
different and again different waters flow." Pg. 367. Here, he is referring to the preservation of the
identity of the river despite the continuous transformation of its constituent elements. This is due in large
part to the systematic regularity and equilibrium involved in the intrinsic process of its change being
analogous to metaphysical changes within the world. Pg. 366. (See also notes 65 & 66)
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philosopher. Accordingly, the necessary first step is to outline and discuss the major
components of each of their systems. This will give a clear indication of the primary
intentions and overall content involved in each theoretical endeavour. It will then be possible
to specify certain closely connected components underlying power and Utopia within the
context of the definition of Man's inner nature and its relation to the outer parameters of the
world.
Nietzsche: The Positive Attributes ofNihilism
The body of work produced by Nietzsche is quite varied and fragmentary, but a thread of
theoretical intention is expressly manifested in the form of several consistent themes
throughout the whole of his work. A primary theoretical endeavour within his method was to
explore ways of overcoming the inherent dualism contained within many of the traditional
categories of philosophy. Due to this undertaking, the primary focus of a majority of his
arguments was the adamant challenge issued towards the positivist assertion that the reality of
the external world can be entered only through the accumulation of data gathered by the human
faculties of perception. To Nietzsche, such a view carried a tendency to produce a series of
categorical dualities which were actually explicative conventions, but ultimately claimed to
provide an accurate picture of the foundations of reality. Such dualities are useful for the
communication of concepts, but fail to provide an accurate explanation of the fundamental
parameters of existence.
Accordingly, it is this notion of 'truth', depicted as an objective absolute waiting to be
discovered and analysed, which Nietzsche sought to take issue with within the context his
work. The view developed to counter this traditional conception was based on the idea that
truth is intrinsically indeterminate and must be connected with the unfolding temporal process
of the world. The act of valuation which man commonly refers to as 'truth' is only a necessary
event allowing for the growth and maintenance of the species. Given this, Nietzsche asserted
that a 'falsehood' bestowing some aspect on the human reality providing for the preservation of
the species is as valuable as the greatest of the truths, for to renounce it would be to negate
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life. So, the concept of 'untruth' is an equally essential aspect of the human condition as is an
absolute 'truth', for without it Mankind could not exist.8
Thus, within the context of the potential absence of 'truth', he was arguing for a
historically-contexturalised philosophical perspectivism that recognised human existence as
taking place within a world mediated and conditioned by concepts formulated by the subjective
nature of Man as he attempts to master his immediate surroundings. Consequently any
changes within this conceptual framework inadvertently transforms that reality in relation to
his understanding of it.9 So, any claim advocating a divinely-inspired or absolute truth causes
humanity to turn away from the authentic nature of its reality, and forego the necessary role it
must take as the creator of the conceptual paradigms that simultaneously determines and allows
it to master its reality.10 By dissolving the dependence ofWestern civilisation on the fictitious
meanings perpetuated by the notion of eternal truths, Nietzsche felt the opportunity could then
arise for a radical transformation of the underlying basis of Man's knowledge and his
interpretation of the fundamental existent of reality. It was through these alterations that the
necessary reassessment of the antiquated system of the traditional values of humanity would
emerge to serve as the foundations for the creation of a newly emergent fluid system of values.
We experiment on truth! Perhaps humanity will he destroyed by it! Well, so he it!11
Nihilism, according to Nietzsche's interpretation, is not a philosophical dogma which preaches
the emptiness of human existence, but is in essence a doctrine of beginning. The advent of
nihilism12 was to be the historical event where man came to the realisation that there was no
absolute meaning contained within life except the process of life itself. It is the point in time
8Nietzsche, Pg. 8-9. Nietzsche's assertion within this context is laying bare the necessity; "To
recognise untruth as a condition of lite: that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a
dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond
good and evil."
9Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. Walter Kaufmann trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale.
(.aph. 480.) Pg. 266-267.
10Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 15-16.
1'Nietzsche, as quoted by Heidegger in Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art, Vol. I. trans. D. F. Krell.
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) Pg. 28. Op cit; See Grossoktavausgahe XII, (Leipzig, 1905)
Pg. 410.
12See J. Edie, J. Scanlan, & M. Zeldin, ed. Russian Philosophy: The Nihilists, The Populists, and The
Critics ofReligion and Culture. Vol. II. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1965) Pg. 1-10. The
term nihilism, refers to the attack mounted on the prevailing conventions of thought and existing social
institutions in Russia by a group of literary critics utilising the philosophical foundations of utilitarianism
and materialism. The main proponents of the doctrine were Nicholas Chernyshevsky, Nicholas
Dobrolyubov, and Dmitry Pisarev. The word itself first emerged in Ivan Turgenev's Fathers and Sons
dramatising the split between the humanitarian sentiments of the 'fathers' and the scientifically-minded
'sons.'
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where the reliance on a false destiny will be destroyed, revealing the potential avenue to an
undiluted knowledge that beckons him to explore its actual parameters and implications. For it
is this revelation at the dawning of a new horizon of opportunity where all will be permitted
and humanity begins simultaneously forming and bestowing its own meaning to the world:
"Nihilism then, is the recognition of the long waste of strength, the agony of the 'in
vain', insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover and regain composure-being
ashamed in front of oneself, as if one had deceived oneself all too long. This meaning
could have been 'fulfilment' of some of the highest ethical canon in all events, the moral
order; or the growth of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or the gradual
approximation of a state of universal happiness; or even the development toward a state
of universal annihilation-any goal at least constitutes some meaning. What all these
notions have in common is that something is to be achieved through the process-and now
one realises that becoming aims at nothing and achieves nothing."1 3
Though constantly expounding the extremely liberating attributes of this doctrine,
Nietzsche understood that coupled with these aspects were inherent dangers. This theoretical
'knife-edge' implicit to the doctrine indicates the intrinsic connection that the potential of
creation has to the concept of destruction. On a fundamental level, the acts of creation and
destruction are indiscernible as singular entities in polemical opposition, because they are, in
actual terms, constituent components of the same process.14 The notion of the creation of
something directly coincides with the destruction of something else, giving every act of
creation an inherent risk that something imperative to the existence of the present will be lost.
This, however, is a necessary risk, for the sole alternative available is to turn away from the
essential nature of reality and rely on fictional constructs of meaning. As Maurice Blanchot
illustrates the rewards for such risks can be immense; "If man overcomes such temptation, by
its own freewill and action, Mankind creates and delineates the parameters of its destiny."15
This doctrine underlies Nietzsche's proposal that Man is capable of, and must endeavour to
continually enact a process involving the Transvaluation of Values. Such a process advocates
the continual reassessment necessary to any system of beliefs. The dismantling of the
outmoded value system is not seen as destructive but creative, for it provides the foundations
for the construction of new value systems that correspond to the fluid temporal nature of the
world. The perpetual transformation proposed by this concept would provide the ground for a
13Nietzsche, The Will to Power (aph. 12A) Pg. 12-13. Op. Cit.; Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 38.
14Maurice Blanchot, "The Limits of Experience: Nihilism" in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles
ofInterpretation, ed. David B. Allison. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press., 1988) Pg. 123.
15Blanchot, Pg. 124.
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new breed of philosophers,16 who are intrepid in regards to contesting the boundaries of the
accepted truths of an epoch in order to create new methodologies for the accumulation of
knowledge and the constitution of conceptual frameworks of theoretical interpretation.
But, who will comprise this new breed of creative philosophers? What doctrines or
guidelines will direct their experiments? And what are the characteristics of the process reality
involved in the 'economy of the whole' that they will seek to reveal? Nietzsche's answer to
these questions lie in the central concepts contained within the Transvaluation of Values. With
the laying bare of the constituent components of this methodology, such as the concepts of The
Overman, The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, and the attributes uncovered by the further
exploration of The Will To Power, many of the intentions behind Nietzsche' system can be
uncovered and explicated.
I. The Will To Power: The Metaphorical Ground For The Knowledge ofthe New
Within the earlier discussion involving the essential nature of power, the concept of the
Will To Power was briefly discussed in relation to the possibility of power being described as
containing certain metaphysical connotations. The present discussion will focus on
ascertaining the characteristics of this conception within the context of Nietzsche's overall
argument against the notion of absolute truths. The endeavour subsequent to his declaration of
the vacuous nature of these valuations, sought to determine if a meaning to existence was even
remotely possible. In other words, he set out to consider the possibility of overcoming the
latent danger of a dehabilitating demoralisation emerging within the nihilistic message by
setting out to explore the all important question within this context: Is it possible for Man to
exist without a predetermined moral purpose or truth?
Nietzsche's answer alleged that though there was no ultimate 'meaning' to life in the terms
traditionally depicted, Mankind should not allow a sense of resentment against its existence
arise. It should perceive the nihilistic message as an impetus for the affirmation of the true
16Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Pg. 7. Nietzsche asserts that this new breed of philosopher will not
be afraid to address the dangerous notion of 'perhaps'. "It might even be possible that what constitutes
the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted,
and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things-perhaps even in being essentially identical with
them. Perhaps! But who wishes to concern himself with such dangerous "Perhapses"! For that
investigation one must await the advent of a new order of philosophers, such as will have other tastes and
inclinations, the reverse of those hitherto prevalent-philosophers of the dangerous "Perhaps" in every
sense of the term."
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nature of Being within the reality of the world. Such knowledge allows Man to embrace the
fundamental attributes of the world system, and to realise that he is an intrinsic part of a great
and eternal process. This system is in a continual temporal fluctuation having no
predetermined destiny or ultimate end, but merely exists. Given this, existence is the only
absolute and incontestable fact within the context of Nietzsche's argument. However, this does
not serve to direct an individual to an ultimate meaning contained within life itself. The
essential principle denoting this aspect is the Will To Power and it is this concept which
Nietzsche claims to be the fundamental drive underlying all the creative forces of life.
This metaphorical device is used to describe the essential principle that serves to explain
the true nature of reality where singular entities are in perpetual conflict within the arena of the
temporal process of the world. In other words, the 'will to power' is reality itself.17 It is the
fundamental ground for which the inner will of the essential Being of the world projects itself
beyond itself and pertains to the primordial ground implicit in the act of self-overcoming. As
stated earlier, this principle describes the fundamental affect whose intrinsic makeup is
constituted by an infinite series of fluctuating effects. Within Man, this universal affect finds
its essential ground within the attribute of the will.18 And by Nietzsche's concept of the will,
there must be a willing towards something, with this act becoming purer if the objective
towards which the will is directed is left indeterminate. For a will to overcome or project out
beyond itself, it must maintain a resolute openness towards itself through the projection of a
continually open object. Only by this method can it attain a mastery over or a surpassing of
the present conditions inherent to the definition of its Being.19
In the primary sense, this self-overcoming process of the will must begin externally because
the object of the will inherently manifests itself outside the will, and in doing so, provides the
basis for the definition of the will itself. Therefore, power can never be a goal or appendage
of the will, for it is the act of will as self-mastery, self-overcoming, or willing out beyond
itself, that releases the strength enabling the will to bring itself to power. The attainment of
this sense of strength or power from the projection of the internal will into the objective world
reality affords Man the opportunity to discover the inner-most essence of its Being. To quote
Heidegger; "In willing we come towards ourselves, as the ones we properly are."20
17Schutte, Pg. 76-78.





So it is this act of willing as projection which provides the sense of empowerment needed to
define the true essence of Being. As the will achieves its sense of mastery over, the passion
emerging from this act serves as a beacon indicating the path to the inner-most state of an
individual entity's Being. Thus, the will to power is the perpetual process of self-overcoming,
where if sustained, the feeling of power is enhanced and the pathway to the infinite creativity
of life remains intact. It is through this continual access to the fundamental ground of Being
that man's essential nature as well as his relation to the world is simultaneously defined and
understood.
II. The Eternal Recurrence of The Same
Within the text, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in an entry entitled "On The Vision and The
Riddle", Nietzche speculates upon the temporal process of the World:
"'Behold,' I continued, 'the moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane
leads backward: behind us lies an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked on
this lane before? And if everything has been there before-what do you think, dwarf, of
this moment ? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not all things
knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to come?
Therefore-itself too? For whatever can walk-in this long lane out there too, it must walk
once more.
And this slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and
you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things-must not all of us
have been there before? And return and walk in that other lane, out there, before us, in
this long dreadful lane-must we not eternally return?' "21
With this passage, the foundation is laid for Nietzsche's conception of the world process
which all Beings contained within its reality are perpetually entrenched. For this passage is
describing the Eternal Recurrence of the Same which portrays the infinite 'process of the
whole' which holds no ultimate meaning or purpose outside the existence of the process itself.
In other words, the only authentic justification for the incessant movements of creation and
destruction contained within this cyclical process of change is the brute fact that it actually
exists. Therefore, the Eternal Recurrence is the temporal sequence driven by the Will to
Power, where what has been will manifest itself again in a process of perpetual reversal. It is
the world's existence, where what is and has been will re configure repeatedly into what is to
21Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For All and None, in 7he Portable Nietzsche.
ed. & trans. Walter Kaufmann. (New York: Viking Penguin Inc., 1976) Pg. 270.
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come. This is the only underlying meaning behind the changes that are the manifestations of
the temporal movements of the world.
But, this description is not based solely on an overriding notion of destruction, for
intrinsically involved in this process is an important component of eternal creation. This
depiction of the temporal structure of the world as "flux" or the perpetual reciprocal interaction
between the destructive/creative forces, breaks down the conventional conception of the world
as a series of static relations of extension. It replaces this with the conception of this cycle as a
fluid process of eternally recurring, present spatial interactions of dynamic forces in tension.
It is a process where these eternally recurring present moments are encompassing all the spent
past moments and simultaneously projecting them as material resources for the future. In
short, the Eternal Recurrence is the process where all that is, has been and will be, in a
repetitive cycle of temporal movement trailing perpetually into infinity.
This process where the instances of time are circling back into themselves is the very
essence of temporality in relation to Being. It describes the fundamental temporal ground for
which the will to power inhabits and the revaluation of values must occur. It is within this
context where "A 'should' does not determine Being; Being determines a 'should.'"22 The
challenge then, laid down for humanity by the notion of the temporal sequence of the eternal
recurrence is to shed all fictions and blind ideals which rule human existence within the
modern age, and face the essential reality of the world as the manifest will to power. It is only
then that Mankind can be guided by the will that wills its existence creatively. To achieve this,
the present state of humanity must be overcome. How is this present state to be overcome?
Through the emergence of a new breed of human, an overhumanity.
III. The Ideal Type ofHumanity: The Overman
I teach you the Overman. Man is something that shall he overcome....23 This prophetic
statement is made by Zarathustra, the teacher of the 'eternal recurrence', in his description of a
new breed of Man who will supersede the humanity of the present. It is the emergence of this
figure which heralds a new type of human containing the capacity to leave behind the fictitious
constructs of the past and embrace the authentic nature of existence within the reality of the
world. This concept is probably the most misunderstood and misinterpreted conception
—Heidegger, P. 29.
23Nietzsche, (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) Pg. 124.
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contained within Nietzsche's work, due in large part to its association with the National
Socialist Party in Germany before and during the Second World War.24 However, in reality,
such associations were fallacious because the Nazi's claim of Nietzsche as their philosophical
ideologue was based on fabrications and deliberate misinterpretations of his work. To begin to
overcome this reputation and unravel some of the possible implications of this concept, it is
imperative to make enquiries into exactly what or who is being described and how this idea fits
into Nietzsche's overall system of thought. It is the final component in his attempt to lay bare
the parameters of a possible existence beyond the categorical dualism of good and evil,
affording Mankind the courage and ability to embrace the creative life endemic to the
Transvaluation.
Who is the Overman? It is a new kind of human which exists beyond the static fictions of
ordinary men and lives life in affirmation of the essential nature of Being. The Overman is the
ideal type of individual who has overcome the moral fictions or superstitions that have
hindered past and present Man in his attempts at reaching a fulfilled state of Being. This
Overhumanity then, is the metaphorical device utilised by Nietzsche to describe a new breed of
human who accepts that the underlying characteristic of the existence of all entities is the will
to power, and that it is this attribute which inhabits the fundamental temporal ground of the
eternal recurrence of the same. In short, the idea of the Overman is the description of the
spirit of humanity after it has bridged the abyss of its potential non-being and embarked upon a
journey which takes leave of its present state, freeing itself from its self-imposed constraints.
What are these conditions within the reality of the present which humanity must be
overcome? Nietzsche asserts that "the last human" (present Man) must be delivered from its
immediate state because it is engulfed in the spirit of revenge. Current humanity is locked in a
perpetual state of vengefulness, which causes it to turn away from the true nature of reality as
manifested in the 'will to power'. Therefore, at present, a huge expenditure of the essential
life force is directed towards a characteristic of existence which cannot be altered because it is
intrinsic to the very notion of Being. Within this context, revenge is exhibited as the aversion
of the will towards its fundamental temporality. It rebels against the inevitability of the event
where it will cease to exist and the profoundest symbols of man's antagonism towards this
24For a brief introduction to the argument of Nietzsche's appropriation by the Nazi's, see Keith Ansell-
Pearson, Pg. 24-34. For a defence of Nietzsche against the charge of Fascist or anti-Semitic tendencies,
see G. Bataille Visions ofExcess: Selected Writings 1927-1939. ed. & trans. Allan Stoekl, with Carl R.
Lovitt & Donald M. Leslie. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989) Pg. 182-196. For a
view opposing this perspective; see J. P. Stern, Nietzsche. (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978) P. 83-
84.
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finite state of temporal existence, are the fictional accounts of reality as portrayed through the
depiction of absolutes. Such descriptions ignore and fear the temporality of Being which
inherently affirms its existence through the contemplation of the possibility of its non-Being.25
For a deliverance from this intrinsic aversion of the will towards its inherent temporality,
humanity must accept the teachings of the eternal recurrence of the same. As Heidegger
asserts in his exploration of the subject of the Overman; "Only when the Being of beings is
represented to Man as the Eternal Recurrence, only then can man cross the bridge and,
crossing over, be delivered from the spirit of revenge, be the superman."26 Thus, it is only
after such an event that the will to power, as the underlying characteristic of all life and the
authentic representation of the transient nature of existence as Becoming, can be affirmed by
Mankind. By Nietzsche's argument then, the 'Eternal Recurrence' is the crucial definitive
description of the Being of all beings within the world, and it is within the revelation of the
true characteristics of this temporal arena that humanity overcomes itself to emerge as an
Overhumanity. Upon reaching this state, the essential Being of Man can then converse freely
with the authentic conditions of existence within the World.
Hence, this idea is speaking of a new type of humanity which has seized control of its own
destiny by seeking to comprehend the true nature of its existence and that of the world. It is
not a description of a master race of men enslaving humanity and manipulating them brutally
for the fulfilment of their capricious desires or a twisted logic, as was the case within the
historical events surrounding the National Socialist's concept of the 'master race', but man's
realisation of his own finitude. When Zarathustra speaks of this new breed of 'supermen', he
is foretelling of an event where humanity comes to terms with its own finite existence, leaving
behind all of its false ideals seeking to graft on to this existence a static system of absolutes or
the dream of an infinite permanence. The emergence of the Overman signifies Man's
overcoming of the intrinsic fear of its temporal existence. This event will not result in the
enslavement of the 'last human', but its deliverance from the malevolent spirit of its own
revenge. It is the embodiment of an ideal type of Man, one which seizes the true nature of
existence and moves beyond it to live within its finite temporal span creatively.
25Martin Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of
Interpretation. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1988) P. 73.
26Heidegger, P. 74.
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IV. The Political Implications of The Transvaluation.
The concept of the Overman then, is the literary vehicle utilised by Nietzsche to expound a
doctrine of human agency that seeks encapsulate the nobility of the human spirit. It is the
portrayal of the individual figure of humanity, which by embracing and overcoming the
frightening nature of reality, is capable of heroic and noble acts. This act of affirmation
regarding the true nature of life, enables an individual to challenge and reconstruct social and
political value systems once considered as sacred or divine. Therefore, the Overman is the
embodiment of the ultimate autonomous individual who has thrown off all the fallacious
intellectual baggage of the absolute ideal and is allowed to live according to its instincts.
Where the last man seeks only the comforts of the physical needs of its existence, the ideal
spirit of this supra individual is willing to forego these to undertake creative acts of heroism.27
Such an individual is Nietzsche's answer to the endemic problems of modern politics, because
it is the embodiment of the spirit set to combat and overcome the spiritual decay of the
conventional laws and customs of Man's present civilisation. Such a spirit calls for the re-
evaluation of modern man's conception of the relationship between the state and the individual
with the aim of discovering the 'great politics' of the age.28
These concepts herald insights advocating the formulation of societal institutions which are
beyond those existing within the present that correlate to the dreams of a newly emergent
existence over and above the judgements of the moral absolutes of the present. A different
kind of society must emerge allowing the uniquely talented to rise to a position of prominence
and privilege in order to lead the perpetual progression of the culture to new heights of
creative achievement. Society as it stands now, must relinquish its reliance on the false
conceptions surrounding the idea of social justice and accept that the true foundations of human
societies rests on the social forces of dominance and exploitation. It is only through this
realisation that the necessary elite class of creative individuals can give rise to events lifting a
civilisation to new heights of artistic refinement. Thus, according to this conception, an
individual doesn't contain any value to a society intrinsically, but must endeavour to achieve
its worth either by attempting heroic acts or by giving itself over to the service of those




is not capable of achieving such greatness, it should be placed within the service of those who
contain the capacity for such actions.29
Consequently, it is at this point that a paradox begins to emerge in Nietzsche's thought
relating to his narrow conception of an action that can be legitimately related to the noble spirit
of creativity. On the one hand, by insisting the creation of singular heroic events are the
standard in which to measure a society, he is lead to advocate an authoritarian social system
with a hierarchical class structure. As many recent events within the twentieth century have
shown, the ascendancy of a culture is often utilised as a claim legitimising actions undertaken
by repressive regimes seeking to solidity their control. Given the manifestation of such events,
there seems to be an innate danger that the very individual autonomy he sought to cultivate
culturally, would be at risk of being repressed out of existence within the social and political
sphere. As a result, the potential roots of totalitarianism seem to lie at the foundations of
Nietzsche's conception of the emergence of an creative elite.
On the other hand, however, the ascension of the uniquely creative individual on the basis
of their actions and abilities corresponds to the individualism endemic to many of the more
conservative strains of political thought contained within the liberal tradition. The underlying
intellectual premise found in his work that existence is inherently entrenched in a perpetual
state of Becoming, and the assertion that Man must continually undertake a process of
Transvaluation contain extremely liberating connotations. According to this challenge, all
fixed absolutes and categorical boundaries of thought must be incessantly tested in regards to
the legitimacy of their foundations. Within the social sphere, this translates into his claim that
static divisions or fixed hierarchical orders based on fabricated ideals must be eliminated if a
society is to reach its true potential.30 This fragmentation of thought is similar to the notion
discussed earlier in regards to the concept of power simultaneously encompassing the qualities
of capacity and that of domination. Nietzsche's claim that the creation of culture must
supersede the notion of politics does not overcome the paradox of power, but only focuses on
the attributes of the former, while ignoring the dangers of the latter.
It is here that the full force of the paradoxical nature of Nietzsche's approach surfaces,
because it serves as both the foundation and the primary undermining factor for the conception
of his cultural order. It is this potential uncertainty which lies at the heart of the relationship
of power and Utopia, and burdens a majority of the Utopian thought experiments within the
-9Ibid., Pg. 51. This directly contradicts Kant's notion that an individual must always be considered an
end, and never a means. This is also the departure point for Locke's Liberal doctrine.
30Ibid., Pg. 55.
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intellectual tradition of the West. To delve further into this issue, the focus of this study will
now turn to the Utopian perspective of the Ernst Bloch.
Ernst Bloch: The Metaphysics of Utopia
From the exploration of Nietzsche's theories illustrating the notion of the Transvaluation,
the focus of the study will now shift to the exploration of the central tenets of the utopia-based
metaphysical system of thought expounded by the revisionist Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch.
This will be undertaken in order to uncover the connections between his Open System and
Nietzsche's strategy for the emergence of a fluid order. The uncovering of such connections
can bestow upon this endeavour another dimension of understanding to the central objective of
this study, as well as shed light on the relation of the subjective nature of the individual and the
inherent objectivity of the world from the Utopian perspective.
Bloch's theories within the realm of Utopian theory have been influential in several ways
owing to their focus on questions surrounding certain beliefs concerning the functional aspect
of utopianism in relation to the intentions underlying human action. In exploring this subject,
Bloch considered basic questions connected with the essential qualities surrounding the human
condition and the potentialities involved in its future. The primary component of his thought is
founded on an element he claims to be an innate characteristic of the human psyche and is
described as the anticipatory consciousness. This attribute enables Man to perceive certain
aspects of the not yet in order to gain knowledge regarding future possibilities. By utilising
this aspect as the guiding force of his exploration and adopting the fundamental premise of
Nietzsche asserting the utility of the nihilistic tendencies of modernity, Bloch set out to
challenge the traditionally theistic categories of philosophical thought.31
The development of a methodology for this renovation of the conventional views held
concerning metaphysics, was based on the examination of the problem of temporality in
correlation to the dismantling of the barrier separating the internal subjective experience of
time and the objective temporality of the world. To Bloch, the intrinsic temporal experience of
the subjective entity was intrinsically connected to the world, with the totality of this process




imperative to consider the individual subject as an intrinsic and influential component within
the unfinished objective world process. After recognising the importance of this interaction
and the primary role it plays in the composition of reality, both in a metaphysical and historical
sense, Bloch proposed a syncretic Utopian philosophy resting on this interaction between the
individual subjective consciousness of singular entities and the events constituting the objective
world.
I. The Utopian Perspective
The foundations for Bloch's theories involving this functional aspect of the Utopian impulse
are based on conceptions resting on certain theoretical suppositions formulated to express the
central tenet of his argument; the anticipatory consciousness, and in his differentiation of two
distinct correlates contained within the concept of Utopia; one abstract and one concrete.33
With the formulation of this distinction, he sought to discard the purely historical implications
usually associated with the notion of Utopia and began his exploration from the standpoint of an
element embedded deep within the inner subjective nature of the human psyche. This
component is utilised as the basis of his argument as it moves from the subjectivity of the inner
nature of Man, towards analysing its potential effects on the external world. As was the case
surrounding the discussion on Nietzsche, it is imperative to understand the primary intention
behind the development of the entire system of Bloch's Utopian metaphysics, thus it is
important to examine to what extent his synthesis of politics, metaphysics, and aesthetics
provides a unique and useful insight into the essential parameters of the human condition.
In order to formulate a new fundamental political and philosophical category where the
notion of Utopia plays a more central role, Bloch sets out to dispel some of the traditional
critiques lodged against this discipline's major theoretical foundations. Much of the criticism
towards it, develops its ontological premises from certain claims that the true nature of reality
is a given totality, and that the Utopian's production of schemes seeking to reshape its essential
parameters, only indicates that the theoretical basis of Utopia is not grounded within the real
world of the present. Thus, its depictions actually seek to avoid the true nature of reality,
instead of addressing real issues contained within it. Consequently, man's ability to effect
33Refer to chapter 3, under the section heading of; 'The Negative Aspects of The Utopian Impulse'.
With these distinctions, Bloch attempted to overcome Utopia's potential of producing pure fantasy by
developing categories which distinguished changes actually feasible within the circumstances of their
creation from images largely misleading due to their innate abstractness.
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changes within this reality are severely limited, and its dreams of perfection ignore the
scientific facts proving its fallacious nature. As a result, Utopian thought is irrational because
it ignores the true nature of reality, which cannot be transfigured to correspond to reality as it
is imagined within the minds of men. Such activity is categorically doomed to failure because
the intentions underlying it, refuse to acknowledge the intrinsic limitations of humanity in
regards to its capacity in transforming the immediate environment. Such activity produces
only fictitious ideal representations which forego any actual opportunity for substantial
change.34
Bloch's answer to such criticism rested on the assertion that the true nature of the objective
reality is not necessarily given, nor as statically determined as the critics of Utopian thought
generally claim. According to his conception, the true character of the world reality is a fluid
temporal process of continuous formation that is perpetually unfinished, indeterminate, or
open. It is within the context of this 'open' reality, that the Utopian impulse can overcome the
nihilism endemic to modern man, who by surpassing the epoch of static moral and
metaphysical absolutes, has proved them theoretically untenable. By projecting new goals, the
Utopian impulse can instil a sense of meaning allowing Man to undertake a greater influence in
regards to shaping events necessary to the formation of the objective world.
Similarly, the charge of irrationality was contested by Bloch's illustration of the productive
attributes of utopianism. He asserted that Utopia's underlying methodology is actually based
on reason and contains the unique capability of instructing Man in his inherent willing towards
the fulfilment of his potential. It achieves this through the projection of images depicting
certain possibilities which can break open the horizon of potential alternative futures and
become a realistic impetus for social and political change. Seen in this light, the latent Utopian
desires underlying such images are to be conceived as much more than Mankind's misguided
longings for some dream-like state of perfection, they are the essential ground of the
fundamental ontological movements contained within the reality of the world. Since it is a
world whose essential attributes are intrinsically unfinished, indeterminate, and open to new
developments, humanity's actions and interventions take on an enlarged significance within the
its process, affording it the capacity to make radical and extensive changes.35
With these assertions, Bloch has sought to overcome the historically contexturalised




influence the social and metaphysical definition of Man's existence. These characteristics are
translated into symbolic representations describing vestigial desires found in human nature and
thus, contain the capacity of indicating new perspectives pertaining to their potential
manifestation. In depicting this essential Utopian characteristic, Bloch has replaced the
traditional problem of Utopia, conceived as the expression of an ideal place or society, with a
conception of Utopia as a process concerned with the exposition of the 'inner' subjective
yearnings of the individual within the objective context of the 'outer' world. In other words,
the Utopian impulse is conceived as an internalised paradigm that is materialised just in 'front'
of Man's conscious faculties of perception which guides its endeavours within the objective
world. The context for this activity is a world that contains the resources for the
materialisation of this paradigm, and can only reach its destiny by this kind of human
intervention. Such a relationship then, is the driving force behind the Utopian function of the
subjective consciousness within the indeterminate objective world as represented in the Open
System.
II. The Open System
Within Bloch's metaphysical conception, Man, as the open subject, and the World are
bound within a system containing an intrinsic attribute that is perpetually 'not-yet'36.
Following in the tradition of Hegel, Bloch claims that due to its unfinished state, the true
content of this world is 'not yet out'. The Open System then, is founded on attempts to
discover a methodology of theory/praxis which will aid in the progress of the world process in
its endeavour to uncover the essential content of its 'not yet', instead of attempting to impose
upon reality a set of rigid categorical devices of explanation.37 It aspires to envision a
philosophical method which provides a sense of direction for Man towards a future-oriented
36Ernst Bloch, The Principle ofHope. Vol. I. Trans. N. Plaice, S. Plaice, & P. Knight. (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Ltd. 1986) Pg. 196. Bloch describes this notion of the 'not yet' of the world and its
connection to the inner self in the passage; "Of course, nothing would circulate inwardly either if the
outward were completely solid. Outside, however, life is just as little finished as in the ego which is
working on this outside. No thing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed,
full of fixed, even perfected facts. Instead of these there are simply processes, i.e. dynamic relationships
in which the Become has not completely triumphed. The Real is process; the latter is the widely ramified
mediation between present unfinished past, and above all: possible future. Indeed, everything real passes
over into the Possible at its processual Front, and possible is everything that is partially conditioned, that
has not yet been fully or conclusively determined."
37Hudson, Pg. 82.
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manner of thinking that seeks to uncover the 'good' or beneficent elements within this elusive
reality of the 'not-yet'. Through the actualisation of these elements, Mankind is afforded the
opportunity to achieve its potential and reach a state of totally-fulfilled Being. Only by
devising a dialectical system such as this, asserted Bloch, that the alignment of the forces of
Mankind's intentions with the real possibilities found within the objective world can be
attained.
Given this, the 'truth' which the Open System seeks to uncover, like that of Nietzsche's
system of Transvaluation, is the authentic nature of the eternal temporal process underlying all
change within the world and humanity's interaction within it. The Open System provides the
rough guidelines which directs Man through its voyage of discovery by influencing his
interactive endeavours within the World. Though parts of this outline may prove untenable,
such components cannot be considered as defeats, because the only possible default within such
a system is the failure to embrace the potential of the future and attempt to remain within the
security of an illusory static present.38 It is imperative for Mankind to embark upon such a
voyage in order to fulfil the totality of the potential which inhabits the temporal geography of
the future while hidden within the immediate surroundings of the present. The totality of this
system serves as a paradigm of the latent possibility of reality and promotes a dialectical
conversation of critique with the inadequacy of the present.
Bloch's system of thought runs concurrent to Hegel's conception of the world process in
which the subject provides the partial substance in the form of a plan of action that informs the
processional unfolding of the historical events within the objective world.39 However, Bloch's
conception differs from that of Hegel's with his injection of the concept of the 'darkness of the
moment',40 which refers to the manifestation of the full existence of the Being of the world
within each passing temporal instance. The realisable potential of such a moment can be
discovered by man only through the proper alignment of his fluid subjective experience with
the possible finality of the objective world. With this insertion of the possible 'full existence
of the moment', a dialectical subject/object process of historical temporal movement is
established. A process, as Wayne Hudson describes it; "where the subject journeys in search





subject to fresh dissatisfaction, and reminding him of the intensity which is the unrelated
goal."41
As a result, this system contains several assertions with important underlying ontological
implications. In regards to the first, Bloch is expressly addressing the unsolved nature of the
world-at-hand. In ontological terms, he is asserting that the problem of the objective world is
a problem involving the fundamental notion of Being as well as the nature of consciousness,
and that these problems must be addressed in a tandem manner and not in isolation. S is not
yet P; meaning, there can be no subject which already contains its satisfactory predicate. This
equation indicates that the fluid subjective nature of Man can view the objective world as a
process in which he plays a role in the facilitation of its manifest potential. For the world
progresses only to the extent that humanity progresses.42 Hence, the ultimate reality of the
world is a dialectical interaction between the formative processes of it and Man, with each
reaching the potential being of the moment in direct relation to the other.
The second ontological implication contained within Bloch's system, involves the claim that
the world at present is laden with infinite potential realities which are 'not-yet'. Thus, each
instance of an existing reality is filled with a multitude of potential aspects of an impending
'not-yet' reality. Therefore, Bloch envisions the parameters of the present where; "The form
consists in a Now constituting itself through an impression, and a tail of retentions affiliating
itself to this and a horizon of pretentions."43 By this, it becomes apparent that Bloch's
ontology of the 'not-yet' portrays the world as an infinite series of objective real possibilities
perched on the edge of the future horizon, that are closely related to, but not completely
actualised within the reality-at-hand. These objective possibilities have not been fulfilled to the
fullest extent possible at any instance in time and may actually never be fully realisable.
Nevertheless, this does not lessen their effect because they can still influence the actions of
Man and his striving to manifest them can have a profound influence on the fundamental
parameters of the objective reality.
Finally, unlike Nietzsche, Bloch envisions an imminent full or absolute content of the
world's Being, which is at present, 'not yet', but entrenched within the continual process
directed towards the eventual total manifestation of this Being. Hence, Total Being, or Being
that has been completely fulfilled within the reality of the present objective world, is
41Hudson, Pg. 87.
42Ernst Bloch, "Incipit Vita Nova" in Man On His Own: Essays in the Philosophy ofReligion, trans. E.
B. Ashton. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.) Pg. 90.
43Bloch, The Principle ofHope, Pg. 292-293.
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foreshadowed continually within the context of its process, not as an actual state, but as the
possible state on the verge of the next horizon. However, Bloch insists that this 'totally-
fulfilled' Being will eventually be manifested within the present. When such an event occurs,
the distance between the subject and the object will be eliminated and these two dialectic
components will merge completely as one within the context of the "here and now". Within
this context, Utopia will no longer be an 'over there' in regards to its existence as a seemingly
different or 'alien' world, it will become the fundamental existent or 'presence' of reality. It is
at this temporal juncture, that the historical and world process will reach its absolute state as
manifested in a 'genuine present'.44
III. The Fundamental Components ofthe "Open System"
There are several ideas within the work of Bloch which are returned to repeatedly and
appear as essential concepts in his speculative system. Theories such as the Anticipatory
Consciousness, Front, Novum, and Concrete Utopia, serve as the foundations upon which
Bloch's system of thought is founded. Each idea serves as a singular theoretical facet
attempting to dislodge and overcome the stagnant interpretation of certain forms permanently
fixed within the reality of the present. By overcoming such forms or institutions of
interpretation, humanity can escape the burden of its past and rediscover the creative elements
found within its nature by constructing images illustrating such potential and projecting them
towards the future horizon. Such actions aid in the process of Becoming inherent to the
existence of both Man and the World. With the uncovering of the primary characteristics of
each of these components, a better picture of this conception of the world process and Man's
role within it can be brought to light.
In regards to the first and possibly the most important of these concepts, the anticipatory
consciousness, Bloch describes it simply as being; "....solely the pre consciousness of what is
to come, the psychological birthplace of the New."45 It is with this notion that Bloch outlines
the principle Utopian characteristic contained within the individual psyche that serves as the
primary foundation for the communal psyche of humanity. It is the essential characteristic
within the inner nature of Mankind aimed towards the fulfilment of its fundamental Being




intention. This intellectual construct directs its activities towards the uncovering of latent
possibilities contained within the world. However, such intentions are not focused on just any
future, hut one which contains the qualities of a 'good' future.
Bloch's definition of this faculty stems from a critique of Freud's theories involving the
human unconscious, where it is portrayed as a psychological receptacle for all the repressed
fears and neurosis contained within the psyche. To Bloch, it is this area of the human mind
that must be reconsidered and redefined to include a description of its fundamental
characteristics as comprising a fringe element which inhabits a prominent position on the
transitory threshold between the conscious and unconscious. It is not just a residual space
located within the deep crevices of the mind, nor a space where certain untenable impressions
and memories are shut away from everyday consciousness. It is a faculty with an innate
creative potential, a kind of pre conscious with a capacity imperative for existence: the
indication of new horizons. Seen in this light, it is inherently creative and serves as the origin
of the Utopian impulse.46
This consciousness operates universallywithin the world as well as particularly within the
human psyche and becomes manifest in the form of desires, wishes, and dreams.
Consequently, the anticipatory consciousness finds its basis in the mental wandering and
creative endeavours of the human imagination which are continually informed by the
surrounding objective reality (see chapter 7). This reciprocal process then, is linked to the
notion of anticipation, thereby enabling Mankind to envisage possibilities before they are
actualised within the world-at-hand. Thus, it is a form of consciousness lying at the root of the
Utopian impulse and inhabits the space within the mental faculties just prior to the endeavours
undertaken towards the actualisation of its intrinsic desires. It is the relationship between
intention and activity mediated by the 'anticipatory consciousness' which produces a distinct
Utopian dimension to the human imagination allowing it to serve as a touchstone between the
subjective inner nature of the psyche and the outer reality of its surrounding environment.
This notion then, is the fundamental component of Bloch's attempt to blur the distinctions
contained within the conventional dualism as expressed in Cartesian thought.47 Through this
device, Bloch sought to emphasise the connection and similarities between the subjectivity of




A second component important to Bloch's theoretical endeavour is termed as Front, and is
described as the essential point of convergence within the dialectically material
subjective/objective process of the world's historical unfolding. Within this context, Man and
the World's process stand on equal terms allowing a 'philosophy of optimism' or 'materially
comprehended hope' to emerge as an influential force on the foremost edge of the historical
process between the still untapped potential of its past and the upcoming revelations regarding
alternative futures as depicted by the anticipatory consciousness.48 It is the partially illusive
ideal which inhabits the horizon just ahead of the present state of Man and is connected to the
human capacity for inspired action. Though unashamedly Utopian and ethereal in its intrinsic
nature, such an ideal, nevertheless, serves as an invitation for Man to take the necessary step in
overcoming his state of incompletion towards the complete manifestation of an essential state
of Being, both in regards to his own nature and that of the world.
This concept is a major component in Bloch's intention of dissolving the implicit dualism
between the 'ideal' of the subjective conscious and the 'material' world. Its underlying
concept contains a simultaneity of meaning pertaining to the conception of Front as exterior to
human nature, as well as describing the internalised yearning or striving that impels Mankind
to attempt to move the subjective conscious out beyond the context of the human psyche. This
can be done in one of two ways: either by Man taking action through a projection of the
present state of his nature into the parameters of this transcendental ideal or by the assimilation
of this ideal into his essential nature.49
Intricately related to the notion of Front is another concept referring specifically to the
aspects of the 'new' which appear within the commonplace reality of the world. As was the
case with the preceding notion, connotations change depending on the context surrounding its
description. In the internal subjective sense, the Novum can infer the rapturous realisation of
the characteristics of ones' authentic mode of Being. It is a knowledge, which inhabits the
temporal space just ahead of this event, but partially hidden within the intrinsic dimensions of
the self. Consequently, it is a form of beginning, but one which is, and stays, intrinsically
connected to the past. The Novum is the element that is 'fresh' or the embodiment of this form
of beginning, but does not relate to the emergence of a completely new event having no
connection to past events. It is a beginning that takes the form of a discovery of an attribute
previously hidden because of its intrinsic interment within the objective world. This discovery
48Bloch, Pg. 200.
49David Gross, "Ernst Bloch: The Dialectics of Hope" in The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism
Since Lenin, ed. D. Howard & K. E. Klare. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981) Pg. 119.
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of the 'new' within the 'old' is described by Bloch as; " there can be no creation of
anything new, but only an uncovering of what is buried, a removal of encrustations from
primordial realities. Therefore, the New is new only for the man who comes to know it, but
never substantially new in itself."50
Thus, in a sense, this concept of beginning is the connection between the historical and
personal meanings of Novum. Within the historical context, the smooth temporal sequence of
history is interrupted by something wholly original to its surroundings, an event which shatters
the ordered progression of time and its constituent temporal ordering of events. It is seemingly
something from 'outside', but actually emerges directly from the fundamental parameters of
this context. Such a rupture can arrive from one of two possible directions, the past or the
future.51 If the direction of its arrival is from the future, the Novum will reveal itself as a
indication of untainted potentiality located within the compromised surroundings of the
present. If it arrives from the past, it appears as a significant event symbolising the
materialisation of certain ideals borrowed from previously manifest historical epochs (see
chapter 6), that were conceived theoretically, but never materially actualised. Thus, the
Novum, exists within the dormant expectation of history, at times discarded or forgotten, but
intrinsic to the temporal environs of the present.52
The final underlying component of Bloch's system of thought rests on the notion of
concrete Utopia, which represents the principle guiding his attempt at an infusion of
spiritualism into Marxism. This is facilitated through a theoretical connection between the
material world of the present and the idea of a future state of fulfilled Being. It is the
impending circumstance which becomes manifest where the subjective conscious has overcome
its intrinsic disenfranchisement with its surroundings.53 In this future, Man has moved past
living the mere appearance of humanity, and reaches a state where the essential nature of its
Being has encountered an imminent state of self-knowledge. It is towards this state that the
process of the historical reality is incessantly progressing. However, Man cannot effectuate
his full potential if his adopted indifference to the objective world is maintained. Thus, for this
state to be effectuated, he must realise that the composition of his essential humanity finds its
foundations within the interaction of the individual self and the objective world as manifest
50Ernst Bloch, ("Incipit Vita Nova") Pg. 82.
51Gross, Pg. 120.
52Bloch, (The Principle ofHope) Pg. 200-201.
53Hudson, Pg. 102.
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forms of Nature and society. It is this revelation that heralds the manifestation of concrete
Utopia.54
Thus, as Man strives to realise the essence of his inner self, he must transfigure the
objective world and the foundations of society contained within it, to discover the essential
'home' for humanity. This 'home' rests within the circumstance where its full potential has
been attained and mankind can be at one with itself. The Utopian dreams of the past,
transfigured the world to suit the needs of men inhabiting the intermediary temporal spaces
surrounding their texts. With the materialisation of this type of Utopia, such anticipation will
be aligned with the concrete correlates comprising reality, therefore making it a truly fit place
for the life of the self-actualised Man of the future. Given this, the concept of concrete Utopia
is the description of the imminent state where Mankind has attained its essence not only in
correlation to its 'inner' nature, but has also transfigured the objective world to such an extent
that it can abundantly provide for the needs of this previously undiscovered spirit of self-
actualised Being.
And finally, the underlying connective element of these individual ideas constituting the
Open System is contained within man's inherent ability to hope. However, within the context
of this system, this characteristic is more than a psychological concept, for it is a fundamental
force which plays an active role in the determination of the essential characteristics of the
world. This attribute of Hope, is the universal factor within the world that remains in a
perpetual state of discontentment throughout the entirety of the temporal process of its
transfiguration. It arises within the perpetual discrepancy between the goals projected by the
subjective self and the inadequate state of present reality. Moreover, it is this notion of hope
which contains the innate ability to interact with this reality in order to mediate or correct
certain deficient tendencies within it regarding the relationship of the subjective consciousness
of Man and the nature of the world.55
Thus, it is the principle ofhope as envisioned within the context of the Open System that
provides the point of departure for the critique of the moral, political, and metaphysical
parameters of the present. The function of hope as the manifest Utopian impulse
simultaneously fulfils the need for criticism of the inadequacies of the present as well as
projecting the ideals brought forth depicting future possibilities of change as anticipated by the




hope finds its intrinsic ground in the latent possibilities contained within the temporal horizons
of past and present. Hence, it cannot be conceived as the wishful longing underlying a fantasy,
but a presentiment directed towards discovering the real possibilities contained within the
World as the not-yet-being. In this way, a determinate Utopian imagination is developed which
serves to correlate the subjectivity of the 'inner' will and the objectivity of the 'outer' world.
It is this interaction which serves as a connective apex between these intrinsic components
comprising the essential parameters of existence. It is also at this juncture where the
determinate subjective imagination of the Utopian impulse manifested as the characteristic of
hope finds the fundamental interactive ground with the notion of power.
The Connections ofPowerand Utopia Within The Fundamental Ground ofBeing
Within the preceding exploration of the key theories of Nietzsche and Bloch, several
similarities of intention and approach began to emerge suggesting connections between their
respective systems of thought. Firstly, There is an attempt by both thinkers to fuse the
traditionally separate philosophical categories of politics, metaphysics, and aesthetics.
Secondly, both assert that the importance of the existential issues concerning the essential
Being of humanity and the objective world reality cannot be disassociated from the primary
issues surrounding many of the questions which appear within the realms of history, culture,
and politics. And finally, there are cognate attempts to dismantle the theoretical wall
separating the subjective inner nature of Man and the objective world reality that is prevalent
in many conventional metaphysical conceptions. The foundations for such claims rest on each
philosopher's examination of the innate creativity of Man's inner nature within the context of
its perpetual striving to transfigure its surroundings.
More specifically, several themes and objectives intrinsically akin to one another arise
within their respective works. The emergence of nihilistic attitudes within certain underlying
theories of modern thought, instigated each to propose systems of revaluation seeking to
question the latent ideals or values serving as the foundation to the existing social and political
systems that define many of the factors comprising the human condition. Further, the essential
influence of Man's temporality plays a major role in their conception of this condition and its
relationship to the course of events contained within the world. These connections become
more apparent when certain aspects of the Open System and the Eternal Recurrence are
compared.
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Moreover, the major components of each system of thought as manifested within the
concepts of the Will To Power and The Anticipatory Consciousness seemingly have a
connection within the definition of the major drives contained within the human will. The
claims made by Bloch regarding the necessity of mobilising latent Utopian impulses as vehicles
for the transfiguration of the external world seems intricately connected to the perpetual drive
of the will as described by Nietzsche. And finally, the concept of the Overman contains the
familiar ring of revelation found within a majority of descriptions generally considered
Utopian. Equally, Bloch's conception of the Utopian imagination is portrayed in light of its
being a type of capacity inextricably linking it to power.
The emergence of such aspects point increasingly to the intrinsic association of the
attributes of power and Utopia in relation to the existential questions raised in their respective
analyses. These forces are inherently found in one form or another within all the philosophical
components comprising each system of speculation. Thus, the demarcations between these
forces contain a degree of flexibility allowing a substantial conceptual overlap which serves as
the essential ground for the interrelation of the intrinsic drives underlying the dynamic forces
of power and Utopia. To fully uncover the extent of this interaction within the relationship of
the inner nature of and his interaction with the surrounding reality of the world, an exploration
of this overlap and the possible ramifications arising from it is imperative.
I. The Comparative Underlying Notions ofThe 'Open System' and The 'Eternal Recurrence'
The primary connection between these systems occurs within the fundamental conception of
a world process that is essentially indeterminate. Within each system, its constituent elements
or entities are perpetually transforming with each passing instance of time. Hence, the
components contained within the World are in a continual temporal 'flux' where the forces are
seen as interrelated processes entrenched in a perpetual assemblage of transfiguration. In both
accounts, it is a process where humanity can and must influence its progress through the
creative acts undertaken in the expression of its inner nature. This subjective nature seeks to
uncover its essential state of Being by interacting with its surrounding environment.
Therefore, this reciprocal relationship of influence operates simultaneously on the level of Man
as an entity contained within the existence of the world and as the totality of this intrinsic
existence.
This brings the notion of temporality to the forefront as an intrinsically important element
in the definition of existence. Each describes a paradigm of temporality where the whole
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process manifests itself within a single instance of time contained within a perpetually
occurring chain of instances trailing into infinity. The significance or meaning within life is
the fact that such a process exists, has existed, and will continue to exist long after the present
entities have ceased to do so. It is this temporal movement and Man's activity regarding it
which gives existence its meaning, not intellectualised strategies involving metaphysical and
moral ideals presented in the form of absolutes. Therefore, Man's actions within this world
create his reality through the transformation of certain attributes located within the world,
which in turn, influences human action through varying patterns of resistance.
Though the systems of thought expounded by both philosophers place importance on the
intrinsic temporality of the world process, their concepts describing the actual mechanics of its
movement vary somewhat. With the concept of The Eternal Recurrence, Nietzsche is
portraying a cyclical process of temporal passage manifesting itself as an infinite series of
present moments moving incessantly towards infinity. To a certain extent the present is seen
as the complete state of existence because intertwined within it's parameters is the latent
potential of the past and future. All the elements which have been part of the past, comprise
the present, and will constitute the future are contained within this endless cycle of present
moments. This temporal circle occurs continuously as the same elements and components are
eternally arranged and rearranged to comprise the fundamental characteristics of the world.
Given this, an entity which existed previously in a particular state will continue to exist
throughout the whole of eternity, but in other compositions, relations of substance, or forms.
So, in a sense, what is encountered now, has been encountered before, and will be encountered
again. Therefore, according to the theory of the Eternal Recurrence, it is the existence of the
process comprising the entirety of the system that serves as the ultimate justification that
bestows meaning to the existence of its constituent components.
Where Bloch's notion of the inherent temporality of the world process differs greatly from
Nietzsche's conception, is that he keeps within the Hegelian tradition of describing the intrinsic
temporality of the world as being a progression towards the manifestation of an absolute
existence56. Here, Bloch makes a recurrent mistake found in many Utopian descriptions
56See Hegel, The Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. A. V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977) Pg. 492-493. Hegel describes subjective/objective relationship comprising this temporal
progression as; "This Becoming presents a slow-moving gallery of Spirits, a gallery of images, each of
which, endowed with all the riches of Spirit, moves thus slowly just because the Self has to penetrate and
digest this entire wealth of substance In the immediacy of this new existence the Spirit has to start
afresh to bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from
the experience of the earlier Spirits. But recollection, the inwardizing, of that experience, has preserved
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claiming the possibility of an such ultimate existence. In other words, he portrays a kind of
culmination to the historical process of the world in the form of an end fulfilment which allows
humanity to exist in a state of peace and harmony with itself. Within this circumstance, Man
has reached a state of totally fulfilled Being and can be at home with himself and the world.
Though this ultimate state of Being is not an over there, in the sense commonly depicted in
Utopian texts, it is nevertheless a conception of an absolute or perfect existence. As discussed
earlier, this underlies the potential for deception inherent to the Utopian endeavour because it
portrays the possibility of a state where Mankind can transcend its intrinsic lack. Hence, there
is a certain implicit notion of destiny found within Bloch's conception of the temporal process
of the world. A Utopian reading of the Eternal Recurrence can overcome this by defining the
Utopian impulse as a process of criticism directed perpetually towards the existing conditions
of the present and not a 'theoretical map' leading to a 'promised land' of total fulfilment.
Within the context of these theories, one can see that Utopia is a process implicit to the greater
temporal system of the world, and one which will exist continually for the duration of
humanity's presence within it.
Another important agreement between these systems is that each addresses the relationship
between the subjective 'inner' nature of the self and the objective reality of the World. Each
theory seeks to overcome the categorical discontinuity within traditional philosophical
discourse by emphasising a process of affirmation between the subjective desires of the will
and the objective world. It is through this interaction that self-identity is created and
reinforced in both the individual and the world. There is however, within each argument a
difference in the emphasis placed on Man's role within this dialectical relationship. By
Bloch's account, it is only through the influence brought about by the activities of Man which
can unlock the true Being of the world, whereas within Nietzsche's system, Man is but one
entity of an infinite number of entities comprising the systematic whole of the World's process.
it and is the inner being, and in fact the higher form of substance. So although this Spirit starts afresh
and apparently from its own resources to bring itself to maturity, it is none the less on a higher level that
it starts. The realm of Spirits which is formed in this way in the outer world constitutes a succession in
Time in which one Spirit relieved another of its charge and each took over the empire of the world from
its predecessor. Their goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit, and this is the absolute Notion." He
goes on further to describe the manifestation of this goal of an absolute existence as; "The goal, Absolute
Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit, has for its path the recollection of the Spirits as they are in
themselves and as they accomplish the organisation of their realm. Their preservation, regarded from the
side of their existence appearing in the form of contingency, is History; but regarded from the side of
their [philosophically] comprehended organisation, it is the Science of Knowing in the sphere of
appearance..."
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Though an important component with an influential role, according to the theory of the will
to power, if man ceased to exist, some other life form would strive to fill the void left by its
absence. Consequently, the system of the world as the manifest Eternal Recurrence, reaches
its fulfilled Being within each present 'now', but also strives to reach an increased state within
the next. Its emphasis is on the manifest present instead of some distant future. The inner
nature of Man must accept this given characteristic of the world and embrace its liberating
consequences in order to discover the true nature of its essential Being within it. Such a
distinction implies that Man's responsibility is solely to the fulfilment of its potential, as is the
case with every other entity contained within this reality. Thus, Bloch's system seems to
prejudice man's role within the eternal system of the world, whereas Nietzsche's accepts that
man is but one type of entity in an eternity of entities, all striving to fulfil their intrinsic
potential. The latter conception reinforces the notion that Man forges his reality through
certain creative endeavours to transfigure it.
A final connection stems from the intrinsic notion of temporality implicit to each of their
systems of thought and is embodied by their assertions that the entirety of the world's process
is contained within the emergence of each passing instance of time. Each moment then,
contains the beginning and end result of the entire process. Therefore, its beginnings are not
entirely 'new', but are directly connected to past and future horizons. This similarity reveals
the intrinsic connection of the temporal phases of the past, present, and future. Hence, in
Bloch's words; "....every moment, when it has not emerged, is in the year zero of the
beginning of the world every moment therefore likewise potentially contains the date of the
completion of the world and the data of its content."57
By both accounts, these are not considered three distinctly singular temporal phases as is
commonly perceived, but seamless horizons comprising a singular temporal process. The
potential of the future has its foundations laid within a present that is intricately connected to
the past. Such a cycle is repeated continuously through the succession of historical events
unfolding in a perpetual process of Becoming, with everything that exists being entrenched in
this eternal temporal system. Such events are not determined and are essentially 'open' to any
order of occurrence. It is here that a contradiction in Bloch's argument arises through the
assertion that an emergence of an impending event of totally fulfilled Being, which seems to be
a determinate state of closure, becomes most acute.
57Bloch, Pg. 308.
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Coupled within the extremely liberating qualities inherent to this notion of a process of
perpetual beginnings emerges the implicit risk involved with any creative act void of a pre¬
determined outcome. Bloch labels such uncertainty the hazardi8 involved within the
emergence of the moment. This idea indicates that not only is the illusive impressions of the
world's potentially-fulfilled Being contained within each moment, but the potential attributes
heralding its final destruction exists within this instance as well. So, inherent to each creative
action is an implicit risk of its becoming destructive, and leading to the complete annihilation
of the process of existence. Nietzsche recognised this potential as well when he speaks of the
need for the experimentation on the parameters of human existence to the point that it may lead
to its destruction. Thus, within each system of thought there is the overriding assertion that
the process of creative freedom involves an inherent danger, but it is necessary if the full
potential of existence is to be reached and utilised.
II. The Anticipatory Consciousness and The Will to Power
A second implicit connection between these theoretical systems lies within the fundamental
link between the concepts of the will to power and the anticipatory consciousness. The
intrinsic ground for this appears in Nietzsche's claim that the notion of willing pertaining to the
concept of the will to power refers to a process involving an existent enmeshed in a perpetual
state of striving towards something that is not necessarily a fixed object. As explored earlier
in the discussion on the essential nature of power, Nietzsche contests Schopenhauer's
description59 of the will because he claims that the act of willing can never be considered a
pure state in itself, but that there must always be a willing towards something. Thus, the
relationship between the will and its fixed subject is an intrinsically dynamic and active one.
The essential parameters of this fluent relationship is described by Nietzsche in a statement
contained within the text, The Will To Power.
"There is no such thing as 'willing', but only the willing of something: the aim must not
be severed from the state-as the epistemologists sever it. "Willing", as they understand it,
is no more possible than "thinking": it is pure invention. It is essential to willing that
something should be commanded (but that does not mean that the will is carried into
effect). The general state of tension, by virtue of which a force seeks to discharge itself,
is not "willing".60
58Hudson, Pg. 96.
59Heidegger, (The Will To Power as Art) Pg. 41.
60Nietzsche, The Will To Power, (aph. 668) Pg. 353.
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This description indicates that the notion of willing intrinsically involves an object or
purpose, for the act of removing this element from the equation negates the possibility of an act
of will altogether.61 A question now surfaces as to how such an object comes into being as the
aim or purpose endemic to this notion of the will? The answer seems to rest within Bloch's
conception of the fundamental underlying force of the Utopian impulse, the anticipatory
consciousness. In his description of this faculty, Bloch contends that the not-yet-conscious is
the consciousness directed towards the 'new' and emerging elements of the immediate future,
those forward-dawning attributes which have not been completely manifested within the realm
of the present. Thus, this 'consciousness', is actually a pre consciousness, that inhabits the
essential ground for the Being of Mankind as the element driving its perpetual Becoming.
Such a consciousness draws on elements contained within the potential of the objective
world in an effort to define the object towards which the will seeks to overcome. In turn, it is
the striving towards this object that defines its essential parameters as envisioned within the
concept of the 'will to power'. The essential nature of such objectives is transitive, evoking an
eternal cycle consisting of the projection of the objective and the subsequent striving to attain
or surpass it. This cycle constitutes the essential act of self-overcoming which serves as the
fundamental component of the world as the will to power. In other words, it is the
anticipatory consciousness which casts the object in the form of an obstacle of latent potential
that the will to power seeks to overcome in its project to command.
So, in essence, the anticipatory consciousness informs the aim or purpose to which the act
of will is directed. Such a cycle is perpetual, affecting all living beings to a varying extent,
thereby within the world comprising their essential state of Being as the 'innocence of
becoming.' Through this process of anticipation the not-yet-conscious indicates the object for
the expenditure of strength manifest within the will to power. This relationship then, is the
essential ground for the fundamental being of Man as a temporal entity. Consequently, it is
within this process that individual entities seek to surpass or move beyond their present state
by an overcoming of the obstacles laid before them, that is the fundamental common ground
where the forces of power and Utopia merge and interact.
61Ibid., (aph. 675) Pg. 356. Nietzsche describes this relationship between the activity of "willing" and
its object as; "All 'purposes,' 'aims,' 'meaning' are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of one
will that is inherent in all events: the will to power. To have purposes, aims intentions, willing in
general, is the same thing as willing to be stronger, willing to grow-and, in addition, willing the means to
do this."
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III. Nietzsche's Utopian Vision: The Overman, and The Characteristic ofPower Within The
Open System'
Typically, the work of Nietzsche has not been associated with the more conventionally
accepted forms of Utopian thought, but certain characteristics arise that seemingly have a
connection to the ideas generally found within this discipline of thought. Though such Utopian
connotations are not as overt as those located within the work of Bloch, there are several
qualities akin to the characteristics generally associated with the Utopian genre. One such
similarity is found in the description of the Overman (Uhermensch) and the system defining its
social context. Similarly, Bloch's conception of the human imagination within the Open
System portrays this faculty as containing a Utopian dimension having the capacity to influence
the objective world in the endeavour to bring certain desires and intentions to fruition. In the
context of Bloch's argument the human imagination is portrayed as a form of power owing to
its implicit connection with the potential modification of the surrounding environment. It is
similarities and connections such as these that reinforce the assertion that at an essential level
the forces of power and Utopia are inherently connected.
With the notion of the Overman, Nietzsche projects an ideal type for humanity which
surpasses the present state through its fundamental 'openness' towards the authentic nature of
the world. It accepts and embraces the true nature of the process of reality as embodied in the
world's essential Becoming. According to this description, it is only this realisation that
enables Man to embark on a journey of discovery regarding his true essence. Therefore, with
the formulation of the concept of the Overman, the 'no place' intrinsic to the concept of Utopia
has been located within the notion of the individual. By this depiction, the true nature of
Man's quest for the discovery of its essential Being is not the creation of a rational and wholly
determined ideal social structure, but the formulation of a type of ideal individual. Such an
individual is not a contrived creation imagined within the day dreams of the dispossessed, but
can be found within the world as it stands and has always stood.62 There is an innate Utopian
spirit of self-realisation within the supra-individualised identity of the Overman, that longs
62Nietzsche, (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) Pg. 144. Nietzsche describes a new spirituality or will endemic
to this notion of an overhumanity, which intrinsically contains a spirit of acceptance serving as the
foundation for the affirmation of life. "A new pride my ego taught me, and this 1 teach men: no longer
to buiy one's head in the sand of heavenly, but to bear it freely, an earthly head, which creates a
meaning for the earth.
A new will I teach men: to will this way which man has walked blindly, and to affirm it, and no
longer to sneak away from it like the sick and decaying." Op. Cit. Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 107.
104
solely for the spiritual liberation elusive to the 'last' man who is entrenched in his torpid
materiality. The potential of this spiritual redemption does not rest in another temporal
horizon or heavenly place, but is implicit to the realm of the present, for it is within this
context that Man can discover and embrace his authentic nature. By doing so, the resentment
felt towards this reality is overcome and a new type of human can emerge.
Such an individual, accepts the true nature of existence with all of its experiences ranging
from the pleasure of feelings such as love and happiness to the equally prevalent acts of avarice
cruelty, violence, and pain. It is one who recognises the beauty as well as the tragedy of
human existence, allowing for the fact that what is determined as evil by the decaying doctrines
of the last humans is as important as those it deems 'good.' Such demarcations project a false
dualism dividing the fundamental unity of the world. The Overman openly acknowledges the
necessity of embracing the world as it is, in its inherent state of Becoming, where all events
and manifestations play a role in the perpetual interaction of forces comprising its process.
It is from this acceptance of the true nature of human existence, that serves as the point of
departure for the construction of a society which is completely congruent with the true nature
of reality. To Nietzsche, the quest for modern mankind should not be to instigate a social
revolution, but one that is essentially cultural and artistic. The central aim of politics should
be seen entirely as a means to an singular end: the production of a majestic culture founded by
and upon the noble actions of this new breed of humanity.63 Consequently, his ideal society is
not based on attempts to provide redemption from human suffering based on a random
conception of social justice, but finds its foundations on an existence which endeavours to
undertake noble acts of creativity.
In his text, The Rebel, the existentialist writer Albert Camus criticises this conception on
two distinct counts. One, concerns the concept of the Overman, which Camus asserts is a
representation containing a tendency located within the majority of radical Utopian texts; 'the
secularisation of the ideal'. The other, pertains to the inadvertent justification his philosophy
can provide for the most ignoble of actions.64 In regards to the first criticism, Camus claims
Nietzsche's philosophy involves similar religious connotations to the ones he sets out to
undermine and is akin to those found in many radical Utopian methodologies. This is due
largely to its demands for a kind of acceptance similar to the demands of blind faith made by
many messianic figures. However, the faith it requires does not manifest itself towards an
63Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 7.
64Camus, The Rebel, Pg. 57-71. Op. Cit; Ansell-Pearson, Pg. 58-59.
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obedience to a Deity, but in the form of a faith in positive attributes of nihilism. With this, the
second criticism comes into focus concerning Nietzsche's endeavour in asking the question;
Can one exist without some form of objective moral standard to guide ones' actions?
Nietzsche's answer was in the affirmative, by expounding the virtues of the nihilistic path with
its underlying premise that existence knows no limits. The openness of this supposition can
allow individuals ignoring the overriding purpose of his thought, to commit morally
reprehensible acts of cruelty or violence in the name of his philosophy involving the
affirmation of life.
It is this same spirit of nihilism which underlines the attribute of power within Bloch's
Utopian perspective. The notion which informs Bloch's utopianism is illustrated in Nietzsche's
description of the revelation which brings forth the nihilist attitude intrinsic to modern thought.
It is in the underlying idea that the actual manifestation of a goal as well as the process of its
visualisation, that constitutes meaning within the 'open system' that relates to the notion of
power as capacity. For it is Mankind's transfiguration of the objective world reality, through
the activity instigated by its striving to express its inmost subjective Being, that gives its
existence meaning while simultaneously allowing the world to fulfil its innate potential. Thus,
in the expression of its innate desires, Mankind endeavours to dominate certain parameters
contained within its surrounding context and in doing so, exercises its intrinsic capacity. This
is achieved through the guidance of the anticipatory consciousness grounded within the faculty
of the human imagination as it reveals the latent potential contained within the surrounding
environment.
Consequently, within the context of Bloch's thought, the human imagination is depicted as
a form of power. It is not a passive faculty merely compensating for the intrinsic lack
contained within human existence, but is utilised to transform Man's surroundings in
correlation to his innermost state of Being. In undertaking such activity, Man assumes a
central role in the manifestation of the World's impending absolute Being. He becomes the
central cultivator of the immanent 'not yet' through his endeavour to create an environment
corresponding his inner subjective nature. According to Bloch's conception, the full existence
of the world may have the potential to emerge within each instance of time, but the appearance
and utilisation of this potential can only be realised through the interaction with the creative
intuition of humanity. Hence, the exercise of Man's faculties, i.e., his capacity or power,
regarding his subjective fulfilment is intrinsically linked with the possible final outcome of the
sequence of events contained within the continual expression of the objective world content.
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The FundamentalMetaphysical Ground For The Connection ofPower and Utopia
In the exploration of the concepts underlying these two systems of thought, several
connections have been made between their central concepts that reveal the intrinsic relationship
between the forces of power and Utopia within the fundamental ground of Man's Being. The
characteristics of the relationship of these forces at this level directly influences the perceptions
upon which the social and political structures of Man's societies are founded. It becomes
apparent within the context of these theories that the relationship between these forces is
situated upon the primordial ground of man's essential Being and bestows an ontological
significance presupposing any ideology or theory.
Each philosopher's assertion claiming the intrinsic connection between existential, political,
and cultural, issues seems to reinforce the initial premise of this study that the interaction of
these forces underlying power and Utopia infiltrate and influence every facet of the human
condition. The surrounding issues raised within the connections explored above are
constituent components of the ontological link between the subjectivity of man and the
objective world. Such an interaction also illustrates the importance that the attributes of
temporality and change play within the perpetual "flux" constituting the fundamental existence
of the world. For Man to take an active role in this process there needs to be a revision of the
conventionally accepted categorical systems of thought to include some of the issues raised by
the arguments of Nietzsche and Bloch.
According to this assertion then, though the intentions behind power and Utopia may appear
on the surface as opposing forces, they are actually intrinsically connected within the
fundamental ground of Man's being as manifest Becoming. It is the essential characteristics of
this primordial ground that leads both philosophers to formulate existential links within the
categories of thought involving metaphysics, politics, religion, and aesthetics. By this fusion,
a conception of the political activities of Man can be formulated which reveals the impetus of
social and political events which lies deeper than more conventional political conceptions based
on a generic theory of social justice. Their theories rely on an interpretation of the authentic
nature of the interaction between the subjective self and the objective world. In other words,
they search for the dynamic forces that inform the basis of these constructs, within the
parameters of Man's fundamental ontology.
With the uncovering of this link, the connection of these attributes establishes the fact that
our ideals of social justice are created, at least partially to justify the results from the
interaction of such implicit societal forces. Consequently, it underlines the fact that it is
107
essential to the survival of both the individual and its society that such conceptions are
continually recreated corresponding to the nature of events arising within the temporal datum
of the world. In any such endeavour the risk may be great, but the only alternative is to rely
on fictitious absolutes designed to compensate, rather than inform. Thus, Man, the open
subject, must in his essential Being, seek to continually transform himself, his social
structures, and the world creatively.
With the discovery of these connections, a final trait of the relationship of power and
Utopia, begins to surface. This characteristic refers to the intrinsic unity of these two forces.
In avoiding the perception that this connection is a kind of dualism resembling the type that
Nietzsche and Bloch sought to overcome, it is imperative to assert that on a fundamental level
these forces are indistinguishable for they stem from the same impetus located within the
World. Therefore, it is an interaction which can be described in light of the relationship of the
universal forces of creation and destruction. These affects can never be conceived of
separately, for when a particular state is destroyed, another is created. The relationship of
power and Utopia is a constituent part of the same unity of process involved in the definition of
the fundamental existent of both Man and the World. Such forces as so intricately connected
that the differences, at this level are indistinguishable, because they are as one.
So, simply stated, what are the essential parameters of the metaphysical relationship of
power and Utopia? The answer lies in the legacy to which Nietzsche and Bloch's systems of
thought inherit from the philosophy of Heraclitus. The tension between the dynamic forces of
power and Utopia is a component process within the world's temporal mechanism where each
element emerges out of a perpetual conflict and strife. It is a process where entities are
involved in an eternal cycle of continuous change.65 By this, there is nothing permanent
within the world that is fixed or static. Nothing remains inert, as it appears in the
circumstances of the present, for it soon passes into its opposite. Hence, everything emerges
from everything, with all elements intrinsically related to all other elements. This cyclical
process of creation and destruction contained within the world never ceases, but is the manifest
process of Becoming inherent to the existence of the World and Man's position within it. So,
there is a perpetual balance produced as all elements merge into their opposites.66 This fluid
65E. Zeller, A History ofGreek Philosophy: From The Earliest Period To The Time ofSocrates, trans.
S. F. Alleyne. Vol. II. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1881) Pg. 11. See also; W. K. C.
Guthrie, 7he GreekPhilosophers: From Thales to Aristotle. (London: Methuen & Co., 1956) Pg. 43-
46.
66Zeller, Pg. 30-31. The author describes Heraclitus's notion of attributes stemming from opposites as;
"It follows then from the flux of all things that everything, without exception, unites in itself opposite
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equilibrium contains the appearance of harmony in Nature, in that it is a state that is not static,
but continually shifting, born out of the strife of opposites. Given this, it is an equilibrium
resembling the universal balance of Nature which is necessary within this interaction of the
forces of power and Utopia for a harmonious social condition to emerge allowing both the
individual and society to reach their full potential.
qualities. Each change is a transition from one condition to the opposition; if everything changes and
only exists in this mutation things are but a middle-term between opposites; and whatever point we may
seize in the flux of Becoming, we have only a point of transition and limit, in which antagonistic qualities
and conditions encounter one another."
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Chapter V:
The Interaction ofPower and Utopia Within the Social and PoliticalRealm
The discussion within the last chapter focused on the interaction of power and Utopia within
the context of the definition of Man's fundamental ontological characteristics. It emerged from
this exploration, that at this level these forces are intricately intertwined and provide the
foundation for the interaction between Man's subjective nature and the objective world. In
turn, it is these connections that influence the central convictions underlying the composition
of the social, political, and cultural systems of humanity.
Though it was discovered that these forces are involved in the unified temporal structure of
the World process, they emerge within the social sphere as separate and distinct dynamic
forces interacting to influence its essential composition. Accordingly, the Utopian imagination
is manifested as a genre of critical thought, while power becomes enmeshed within the
symbolic structures of the predominant existing ideology constructed to legitimise the actions
of the dominant group or party.
Although this separation is traditionally portrayed as being polemical, in reality, each
characteristic drive is an important constituent component of the fluid process of social
transformation. Such drives create new facets of, or reinforce existing components of the
communal psyche of a society. It is their influence that directs the integration of a multitude of
individual desires contained within a specific socio/political circumstance towards the
composition of the social imagination.1 This social focus mobilises these varying interests
towards undertaking the praxis necessary for the manifestation of certain social and political
objectives. As discussed above, this interaction contains the capacity to exact both
constructive and destructive consequences on a society through the reinforcement or
subversion of existing social and political structures.
Therefore, the focus of the discussion within this section will strive to expose certain
central characteristics involved in the interaction of these forces and the potential events
stemming from them. This analysis will be comprised of three phases. Within the first, the
relationship of ideology and Utopia will be explored to uncover the parameters of the
theory/praxis relationship that transpires between the imagery organising social action and its
consequences. The second phase of the enquiry will explore the specific effects that such
forces can have upon the mechanisms of the political arena, while the third and final phase will
concentrate on the possible positive and negative repercussions arising from the interrelation of
these forces. It is this interaction that underlies events ranging from progressive social reforms
to catastrophic episodes such as war, revolution, and social violence. To begin this
investigation, the focus of this study will now turn towards uncovering the central
characteristics of the relationship between ideology and Utopia as well as their influence on the
attribute of power within the social and political sphere of a society.
Power, Utopia, and Ideology
In undertaking this analytical endeavour, an imperative primary step involves the
clarification of several traditionally ambiguous terms. Within preceding sections of this text
several steps have been made towards the definition and clarification of the two primary
concepts contained within this study, but as this examination moves into the social and political
realm the relevant connections to the traditionally controversial concept of ideology must be
addressed to determine the type of influence such traits have upon the composition of a specific
social circumstance. Therefore, the concept of ideology must first be defined clearly in order
to allow for the clarification of its connections to power and Utopia. Only then, will it be
possible to uncover the intrinsic connections between the 'social conception' and its influence
on subsequent social actions.
'Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986) Pg. 1.
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I. The Concept ofIdeology
Since its appearance around the time of the French Revolution2, the concept of ideology has
played a central role in the definition of the discourse of a great many political movements.
However, when exploring the implications of the term, a persistent ambiguity is encountered,
due largely to the various degrees of significance it infers. Much of this ambiguity stems from
the term's dependence upon the specific characteristics of its context. Consequently, the
definition of ideology can be indicative of two possible meanings, one carrying with it
pejorative connotations, while the other refers to implications of a more universal nature.3
Marx's usage is the classic embodiment of the term utilised in the pejorative sense because
within his critique of the theoretical underpinnings of capitalism, it is used in a derogatory
manner. His argument claimed that ideology referred to the ruling social construct that
purposely spawned a perpetual alienation as a mechanism of control. Following within the
Hegelian tradition of basing the movement of history on a universal rationality,4 Marx saw
reality as a process of temporal fluctuation with only its appearance actually being transformed
by the prejudices contained within Man's perception of it. Such interpretations are generally
mistaken in their belief that Man's surrounding environment is comprised of stable and
unchanging constituent elements.5 His argument asserts that ideology is founded upon these
mistaken perceptions and prejudiced by various interests. Consequently, it is taken to be a
methodology of distortion which obscures the true nature of our praxis-oriented reality.
Though claiming to produce an accurate depiction of the social sphere intrinsic to the human
condition, in reality, ideology produces a type of reverse image that distorts and conceals its
true parameters through a process of selective negation.
2George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays. (New York: Vintage Books, 1967)
Pg. 4-5. The original creator of the term was Antoine Destutt de Tracy who was connected with the then
recently created Institute de France. He and the other 'ideologists' aligned with the Institute belonged
within the tradition of Liberalism and regarded intellectual freedom of expression as the ultimate gain of
the Revolution. According to Lichtheim's explanation, these early ideologues were considered
'ideological' because of their intrinsic concern with the nature of ideas, and their bestowing greater
importance on aims founded upon ideals to mere material interests serving as the primary foundation of
French society after the Revolution.
3Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology ofKnowledge, trans. Louis
Wirth and Edward Shils. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd, 1940) Pg. 49. In this
text, Mannheim's makes a similar distinction by claiming that the term ideology is connected with two
meanings that are clearly distinguishable-one of a particular nature, the other of a universal. The former
denotes the scepticism felt towards an opponent's ideals and symbolic system of values. It carries with it
connotations implying some form of deception, either intentional or otherwise. The latter describes the





So, ideology produces an inverse image in the form of an idealised paradigm of social
distortion, which serves only to distance or alienate the individual from the true nature of its
surroundings. Thus, there is a dichotomy between the actions or praxis undertaken by
individuals within the social reality and their ideological conceptions of these events.
According to Marx, individuals undertake certain actions dictated by this reality, and then
formulate conceptualisations pertaining to their meaning and content. By this, the idea does
not presuppose the act, because it is the action that informs the idea. Social action precedes
ideology, which serves only as delusive mechanism seeking to control and legitimate certain
behavioural patterns through the production of a 'false consciousness.' In the pejorative sense
then, ideology doesn't influence action in a positive way, but its function is to produce
deceptive images that distort the true nature of social reality.
Within this conception of ideology, there is an overriding assertion that its foundations rest
intrinsically on the latent interests trying to dominate the surrounding social context through
the determination of the possible social actions that an individual can undertake. It functions
on a purely psychological level and directs its focus towards manipulating the motivations of
various groups seeking to acquire an influence over a social circumstance. As a result of this
association, when an adversary is claimed to be ideological, there is an implicit insinuation that
certain interests, either internal or external, are causing the distorted imagery serving as the
foundation for his mistaken perception of reality. Hence, ideology is not only describing the
illusions contained within a political adversary's view of reality, but also the scepticism
confronting it. This first meaning of the term carries connotations more particular in nature,
for it is referring directly to the conscious or semi-conscious fabrications that obscure ones
perceptions of the true conditions of the social reality.6
Coupled with this, is a second meaning more universal in nature. It indicates the
systematic compilation of certain symbols and perceptions into a conceptual framework that
simultaneously creates and interprets Man's communal reality. Such fundamental belief
systems comprise the social and cultural patterns that organise and interpret the multitude of
seemingly disparate perceptions contained within the existing social reality. They serve as
theoretical paradigms which inform and reinforce human actions within this sphere. Contrary
to the former conception, it is these intellectual constructs which presuppose and inform human
actions within the social and political realm.
According to this more generalised conception, ideology is referring to the intellectual
framework which serves as the theoretical foundation for the collective configuration of human
ideas and actions that comprise the essential conditions of a given historical circumstance. It
defines both the form and content of a specific system of thought and provides the intellectual
6Mannheim, Pg. 49-51.
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foundations for the categories of belief that rationalise and legitimate the very existence of the
cultural configurations stemming from it. Therefore, it describes the unified perspective that
emerges as the dominant force within a given epoch and is the totality of the intellectualised
cultural mechanism that encompasses the beliefs, desires, and actions of the various individuals
contained within its reality. In short, it refers to the wide-spread integration of the experience
and desires contained within large scale groups of individuals.7
The duality of function stipulated by these arguments is not necessarily polemical and can
actually be seen in a complementary light. These differences are actually intricately
interconnected with both being needed to provide an accurate description of the social reality.8
This situation stems from the fact that an individual belonging to a specific group or social
circumstance interacts with only a limited portion of the totality of that structure. As a result,
this individual can only be a limited manifestation of the wealth of experiences and interests
that constitutes the systematic whole of a culture. Given this, the question of ideology is
fundamental to the process of socialisation intrinsic to the human condition because its
universal nature is never shown as a coherent totality within the present, but always as an
outcome or result of a past epoch. The past is the apparatus of revelation concerning the more
integrative meaning of the term, for the dominate ideological structure within the present is
only partially unveiled through the outlook and actions of those individuals it influences.
It is here that the duality of its inherent nature becomes most pronounced, as do the reasons
underlying this fundamental characteristic. Owing to its intrinsic involvement in the
constitution of the structures of a particular social context, at times ideology appears as a
defused referent providing a highly abstracted indication of the complexity of the underlying
interaction of beliefs and symbols contained within a social circumstance. At other times
however, it gives a clear indication of certain definite causes to the actions and beliefs of an
individual. This appearance of an incessant circular movement of meaning produces the
ambiguity that has made the concept of ideology so contentious. In one instance, it appears as
a referent to the founding ideas behind a whole cultural system, while alternatively it affords a
specific critique towards the personalised structure of belief an individual carries in relation to
such a system. It is within this ambiguity that a certain clarity of purpose resides, for in both
cases ideology provides the intellectualised factor of legitimization underlying human
existence. The conceptual framework produced by ideology, justifies its existence through the
mere fact that it constitutes the essence of meaning contained within the human condition.
Hence, at a fundamental level, ideology is concerned with legitimising the existing hierarchical




structure, or in other words, the status quo. This makes it a necessary mechanism for the
machinations of the dominant power inhabiting the social structures of Man.
II. Ideology, Authority, and Utopia
As discovered in the preceding section, the concept of ideology references the system of
beliefs that underlies the social constructs of Man. Subsequently, this description is
inadvertently referring to certain implicit connections between such a system and certain
attributes of power and Utopia. Within the social realm, the emergence of a distinct group or
individual differentiated from the populace by an elite rank, signifies a claim regarding the
right to govern. Implicit to this claim, is the demand to utilise force in the implementation of
the measures needed to materialise its conceptions for the organisation of that society.
However, no group or leader can rule solely by forceful or violent means, so coupled with this
claim to a legitimate utilisation of force is a related demand that its subjects must bestow their
consent. In short, it requires a belief in its legitimate claim to dominate.9 It is this second
factor that is of primary importance to maintaining a position of power within the social realm
and it is impossible for a governing body to rely solely on the use of violent or coercive force
in the implementation of its intentions indefinitely. Because of this, it must therefore cultivate
a certain belief in its legitimacy as a governing body.10
Ideology provides a useful method of creating such a belief through the creation of a system
of values and ideals that propagates an image legitimising the actions of a dominant regime. It
achieves this by denoting the codes that dictate and define the perceptions of the individuals
within its domain. This value system allows the individual to assimilate the perceptions,
values, and ideals necessary for its inclusion within such an order. Ideology provides the
communal perspective of interpretation created by an existing power structure that legitimises,
consolidates and reinforces its conceptual configurations. This communal perspective is the
basis for the codes, laws, and social practices installed by the ruling contingent of a society
seeking to integrate a diverse variety of individual interests and desires into a unified
9Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline ofInterpretative Sociology. Vol. I. ed. Guenther Roth
& Claus Wittich. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) Pg. 213.
10Weber, Pg. 215. Weber specifies three types of authority (Herrschati), each resting on various claims
of legitimacy. The first, legal authority, is the right to govern on rational grounds. This claim finds its
foundations within the structure of legality embodied in the laws and rules which bestow upon an
individual or group the right to govern. The second, traditional authority, is founded upon an
established belief passed from generation to generation through rituals or traditions and utilises the cloak
of their legitimacy for its command. The third and final type, is charismatic authority. This type refers
to the form of domination resting upon the unique persona of an individual or the social order created by
this person. It is also noted by Paul Ricouer that the German term Herrschafi, has been translated into
English simultaneously as authority and domination, thus giving one a certain insight into the true
connotations of the term. See Ricouer, Pg. 13.
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perspective. This provides the opportunity for the party in power to orchestrate social action
and reinforce its control.
There is, however, generally a discrepancy involved between a governing structure's claim
to legitimate domination and the belief or consent given by the masses. There is an implicit
unease or tension involved in this relationship between the demands of the dominate group in
power and the willingness of those it controls to confer their consent. This situation arises
within all structures of power regardless of their specific ideological content, but the amount of
friction encountered depends on the effectiveness of these measures. As an ideology seeks to
overcome this perpetual tension, it may move from being a purely integrative device to one
purposely distorting reality according to the content of the policies and actions it seeks to
justify. If these actions are exceptionally unpopular or repressive, the ideological machine of a
government may seek to distort the facts surrounding certain events in an effort to conceal or
obscure them. It is at this point that the potential for deception emerges, for the ideology is no
longer utilised to integrate varying perspectives, but attempts to conceal the actions of a power
structure that is no longer legitimate in the eyes of its subjects. Thus, by seeking to overcome
this friction, the deceptive capabilities of ideology justifies the existing distributions of
power.11 Here, the reason for power's affinity towards the ideological surfaces, for it can
serve as an apparatus for maintaining the existing distribution of power. Thus, ideology
contains the potential of becoming a manipulative device as well as an integrative system of
beliefs.
Utopia's relationship to this interaction brings in the possibility of bestowing upon the
inhabitants of a particular ideological system the ability to achieve a certain distance or
detachment from this all-encompassing process of legitimacy. Through its perpetual
constitution of alternative possible worlds, Utopia can obtain the capacity to move beyond the
machinations of the ruling ideology. With such an insight, Utopia is placed in a commanding
position to subvert and transform the very ruling ideology that spawned its existence. Seen in
this light, it can provide the opportunity for a reassessment, cutting through the distortion of
the existing ideological structure. It is here that Utopia's intrinsic connection to power within
the social and political realm comes into full view, for this connection lies within the
fundamental ground of an ideology's attempt to overcome its crisis of legitimacy. Thus, the
Utopian imagination interacts with power within the social sphere mainly through the
ideological mechanisms that legitimise its exercise. Given this, the dominant ideology seeks to
justify the exercise of power as domination, and the impulse towards Utopia is born out of the
discontentment stemming from the discrepancy between an authority's claim to this right and
the affirmation of this decree by its subjects.
^Ricouer, Pg. 13-14.
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Therefore, ideology and Utopia are addressing the same problem; the legitimate division
and use of power.12 However, they are addressing this issue from two varying perspectives or
methodologies. Ideology attempts this through the distortion or integration of the perceptions
justifying an existing configuration, while Utopia seeks to test and subvert these endeavours by
visualising possible alternatives. Given their close proximity and common intentions, an
inherent danger is involved if a Utopia is encompassed within the process of legitimacy
undertaken by the dominant ideological structure and if this occurs, the distance (constructive
insight) provided by a Utopia is lost. It then becomes a useful mechanism for distorting the
perceptions concerning the true nature and meaning of the social reality.
In this situation, Utopia no longer creates alternatives outside the ruling structure's domain,
but only indicates opportunities inherently compatible with its ideological structures. When
this occurs, a Utopia loses its intrinsic power to subvert the intentions of an authority, and
becomes enslaved to them and utilised for its purposes. It becomes a useful device for
obscuring and concealing the true nature of the actions that an authority intends to take. The
deceptive capacity of this methodology is hard to counteract because of its appearance to
undermine or uncover the very actions it is concealing. Thus, within this circumstance, a
Utopia has betrayed its true endeavour.
Here, the intricacy of the interconnection of power and Utopia within the social and
political realm is uncovered with the discovery that their central connection rests within the
ideological structures of a given society. For the relationship to function in a manner which
can provide progressive social reform, Utopia must supply alternatives that have the ability to
inform the ideological systems of belief legitimising an authority. If, however, the Utopian
imagination loses its detachment and distance, it serves only to strengthen its dominance. It
becomes possibly the singularly most effective tool in the fabrication of an ideological
paradigm attempting to negate the true nature of a social reality. In this way, the Utopian
impulse serves to reinforce the ideological equivalent of the 'Noble Lie' that legitimised the
division of power in Plato's Republic,13
The Interaction ofPower and Utopia Within The Political Realm
Within the continual machinations of political life, many 'idealistic' speculations are
deemed Utopias and conceived as being opposed to the more 'practical' suggestions emerging
from the parties or individuals claiming to be 'political realists'. According to this description,
12Ibid„ Pg. 17.
13See Plato, The Republic, 2nd edition, trans. Desmond Lee. (Middle Sex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974)
Pg. 238 (458c) and Pg. 181-182 (414c-415d). Also see note 9 of the introduction of this text.
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policies deemed to be carrying Utopian connotations lack the important element of practicality
and thus, contain no real potential because the targets proposed are higher than what is at the
time, overtly feasible. This assertion relates to Marx's contention concerning the role and
nature of ideology. By his argument, all Utopias, are ideological because their social
approaches are pre-scientific, therefore they are making similar demands to those commonly
found in many religions. Their portrayal of reality is not founded upon factual data gathered
by scientific analysis, but call for a leap of faith or trust in their subjective social visions.14 As
a result, both Utopia and ideology are based on a mistaken conception of reality, which is
further distorted with the introduction of their proposals.
The undercurrent of the political realist's argument against this 'idealism' stems from a
similar conception of the possible as dictated by the surrounding political environment. By
this, political ideas are only truly important if they can feasibly build an advocacy which
allows a policy to advance easily towards implementation. Therefore, from their conception,
they must be intrinsically linked to certain interests, especially those with a ready access to
power. To ignore this is to disregard the reality of the social and political sphere and present
policies which are merely social dreams or a covert means towards a purposeful deception.
Consequently, the realist's argument is implicitly claiming that a policy must implement and
reinforce the values of the existing power structure or risk failing to raise the necessary
support (power) to actually bring its conceptions to fruition. To go outside this structure then,
is to risk alienation from it. This, however, is precisely what the imaginative proposals of the
idealist endeavours towards in hopes of discovering an alternative to the modes of control
executed by an existing power structure. Hence, it is not necessarily the case that such ideas
wouldn't work if they were actually realised, but due to the composition of the present political
context and the public opinion surrounding it, implementation of such a proposal is a political
impossibility.
This attack centres almost entirely around the notion that a proposal is politically futile
because of its failure to build the necessary advocacy needed to acquire the capacity for
implementation. Consequently, it is said to be 'out of touch' with the actual dynamics of the
social reality. Though advocacy is an important aspect in regards to the potential execution of
a policy, the 'realist' argument oversimplifies the complex conditions of society and
underestimates the potential influence that such a proposal can acquire given certain minor
changes in public opinion. To comprehend the relationship of the 'utopia' to the geography of
power encompassing the day to day social actions of a society, it is important to understand the
total temporal structure of the political realm. Once this is achieved, the 'realist' assertion of
the irrelevance of the 'idealist' can be shown to be less damaging and the potential
14Ricouer, Pg. 6.
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machinations influenced by the interaction of Utopia and the predominant ideology can be
further exposed.
In addressing the claim put forth by the 'realist', an intrinsic oversight on the part of
his/her argument must be examined. By establishing the foundations of its attack on notions of
advocacy within the present social and political context, the logic of the argument fails to take
into account the potential temporal sequence of the implementation process that a proposal
undergoes within the political realm. For the purpose of explanation, this sphere can be
conceptualised as a arena consisting of a series of concentric rings relating each political
party's access to power. Political groups containing the greatest ability to gather support, or in
other words those in power, inhabit the centre of this sphere, while others less successful in
this, owing to their adherence to more politically radical views, generally inhabit the
subsequent rings. The further a party or group is from the centre of this 'arena', the harder it
is to access the power base needed for the direct implementation of their proposals and
policies.
Though this distance is usually a political hindrance, in some respects a group finding itself
in such a position is allowed a certain amount of freedom to experiment with the parameters of
the mainstream policies in order to project unique solutions for solving problems ignored or
overlooked by the dominant group. Such a luxury is not afforded to the groups in the political
'epicentre' who must maintain their support or risk losing their power base and prominent
position. Another factor involved relates to the political temperament towards the centre
which innately desires to reinforce the existing contours of the power structure and generally
maintains a more conservative agenda less receptive to unfamiliar methodologies to solving
social problems. Such desires arise the moment a group becomes dominant and dictates the
political agenda, for it then acquires the responsibility for most of the problems contained
within society. This is due largely to the perception that events of this nature are directly
related to the government's actions. Thus, the admission of the existence of such problems
undermines the legitimacy of its claim to govern. When a party or group inhabits this central
position of power, its discourse is generally set to deflect criticism, not to test the merit of the
existing division of power.
Coupled with these aspects, is a further difficulty faced by a party in a position of authority
due to the shortened temporal span for the implementation of its policies. This is due to
fluctuations in the public interest which forces the time span from the conception of a policy to
its implementation to be relatively brief. For this reason, the party at the centre finds the
struggle for advocacy almost perpetual, and it is this factor which influences the choice of
which policies it will pursue. The content and merit of such proposals play a secondary role to
their potential acceptance and reinforcement of a group's image as being able to competently
rule. If a party in power continually undertakes actions that are out of touch with mass
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opinion, it risks undermining its own power structure through an erosion of belief involving its
capacity to govern. Given the importance such a factor plays in the objectives of a modern
political group, maintaining power becomes its central interest instead of producing policies
that may prove unpopular or can involve too much time for their implementation.
The groups at the periphery, on the other hand, abide by a differing temporal span, one that
is greatly lengthened in comparison to the time frame at the centre of the power structure.
Actions and proposals undertaken at the periphery of the political realm do not have the same
expectation of rapid implementation. Due to this fact, ideas contained within these proposals
can be considered more on their possible merit for solving social problems than their potential
for political advocacy. Therefore, their potential influence is not reliant on generating direct
advocacy, but can be attained through other methods.15
The first of these alternative methods involves a situation where a political movement has
little or no chance of successfully capturing power or instigating social change on its own, but
can become an ideological resource for another movement possessing a greater capacity
towards the achievement of this objective. In this scenario, one political movement becomes a
preliminary stage in a later ascent to power. In a second possible method of influence, two
political movements that seemingly support opposing political agendas can actually contain an
underlying similarity of values or social methodologies. In this way, radical fringe groups
having little or no chance of exercising power can attain influence through the assimilation of
their objectives by a party whose more moderate policies contain a greater chance of placing it
in a dominant position within the political sphere.
Hence, in the reality of this realm, all parties regardless of their present position can attain
a dominant position of power or influence through an affiliation to, or assimilation by, another
group with more acceptable policies to the political mainstream. It must be noted that each
group within the political realm has the potential to play an important role and influence the
conditions within a society. Given this, the realist's attack seems short-sighted and somewhat
premature. Though generally, there is a concerted effort to discredit social and political
conceptions which come from outside the discourse propagated by the ruling ideology, it is
imperative that such conceptions are examined despite the seeming unfeasibility of their
implementation within the political realm of the present. They serve to test the legitimacy of
the ruling party by indicating various other possible configurations aiding in the examination
of the ideology and actions of the ruling group. So, in reality, it is not of primary importance
if a 'utopian' proposal does not acquire widespread support because it can then remain 'on the
outside' where the clarity of its perspective is the most poignant. It is from this perspective
15H. J. N. Horsburgh, "The Relevance of The Utopian" in Ethics. Volume 57, 1956-57. Pg. 131.
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that it contains the greatest ability to detect, clarify, and keep in check the individuals or
groups that are dominant.
The Potential Ramifications of This Interaction
There are several possible consequences, both of a positive and negative nature arising
from the interaction of these forces within the social realm. When the relationship of these
forces is balanced, the potential for the positive emergence of avenues conducive to the
production of certain desired social, political, and cultural circumstances can be revealed.
Such insights have the potential to lead to beneficial social reforms which can rectify the
circumstances where such possibilities have been mistakenly overlooked or cynically ignored
by a society's ruling elite. If the Utopian imagination is utilised in its proper role it contains
the potential to indicate and provide possible solutions to recurrent problems endemic to the
existing social order. This view from nowhere can serve as a social gauge and instigator for
change within a given social context. When its relationship to the attributes of power are
correctly aligned it can focus the social forces of a community towards reforms and programs
which aid in the ascendancy of a culture through the production of positive conditions allowing
for the freedom, security, and avenues of expression necessary for the creative nature of its
inhabitants to emerge.
However, as mentioned earlier, these are not the only possible circumstances which can
arise from the interaction of these two attributes within the social arena. If this interaction
becomes unbalanced, allowing one force to supersede the other, destructive forces may be
released which can damage if not destroy a society or culture altogether. Catastrophic events
corresponding to the downside of the attributes of power such as war, revolution, or social
violence can emerge and be concealed from public scrutiny through attempts to legitimise
socially disintegrative actions through an appeal to the optimism of the social imagination with
its underlying Utopian content. The manipulation of this social psyche attempts to portray such
events as necessary to the life of the culture or community, but in reality, habitually leads to
the breakdown of its existing configurations. Generally, when the political charade has been
discovered the damage to the social fabric is irreversible. For this reason, understanding the
circumstances and effects surrounding the possible development of such events is imperative.
Towards this end, our study will now turn to discerning the advent of potentially beneficial
social reforms arising from the interaction of these forces.
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I. The Beneficial Effects: The Possibility ofSocial Integration and Reform
Traditionally, within a society's political arena, the introduction of a policy is an action
seeking to alleviate a problem and it is this type of solution which the various political groups
competing for power propose in an effort to gain the confidence of the population. Given this,
political image is of central importance to any party hoping to ascend to a central position of
power. To gain the trust of the general population, most parties can ill afford to take risks by
proposing innovative, yet politically dangerous proposals which could alleviate many of the
recurrent social ills of a given circumstance. Intrinsically, such parties seek to maintain the
status quo of the existing social configuration by endeavouring to undertake small and
measured changes which will be easily acceptable by the population at large. Such strategic
moves are imperative for the compilation and maintenance of the solid core of advocacy
necessary to remain in power.
Though the groups at the periphery of the political arena may lack the wide-spread
advocacy to ascend to power and directly implement their proposals, they do carry with them
the unique ability to perceive and speculate upon certain problems contained within the social
fabric of a society. This capacity manifests itself in several ways or methods. The first,
involves the ability that such groups can have drawing attention to certain social problems
continually overlooked or neglected by other parties. Also, such groups can provide the
preliminary incentives for their alleviation through the production of images involving their
potential solutions.16 The very traits which hinder such a group or individual at the centre of
the political arena becomes a strength at its periphery. This inherent single-mindedness and
disregard for political self-gain are characteristics needed for the creation of audacious
proposals that can evoke strong social convictions and dislodge public opinion from its state of
unquestioning compliance or social apathy. With the visionary's portrayal of the possible
solutions to such problems, the truly central issues of the day can be more forcefully depicted
and clearly defined. Such clarity eludes a governing party whose central focus is usually the
defence of the past decisions or programs serving as the cornerstone of legitimacy for its claim
to dominate.
A second ability uniquely located within such a visionary contingent is its aptitude towards
drawing attention to certain negative characteristics of a social structure which can progress
unacknowledged, is disregarded, or actually concealed by the functionaries of the existing
power structure. Such an explanation can shed light on the depth and complexity of certain
dilemmas which have been inadequately understood or purposively explained in an obtuse




overcome with the production of unpopular solutions and the generation of clever arguments
advocating their support undertaken in an ironic manner. By working in the abstract, a certain
clarity of thought is achieved that can lay certain social attributes previously hidden by the
complexity and machinations of the varying institutions contained within the existing social
structure. Such a method becomes an effective apparatus for gaining a new perspective on
current social circumstances and can overcome the tunnel vision obscuring the real issues and
problems of a particular social circumstance.
A final attribute emerges within the context of the intrepid and obsessive nature of the
visionary embodied in its persistent attacks which attempt to pierce the prevailing conspiracy
of silence habitually accompanying politically sensitive problems. These relentless attempts to
address problems of this nature can counteract the neglect by mainstream politicians due
largely to their cynicism or ignorance.18 The clarity and forcefulness of such proposals can
capture the imagination of the populace and force the hand of the influential by placing them in
uncomfortable positions on issues where they have traditionally controlled the discourse.
Through the instigation of a change in the parameters of the discussion, an individual
containing a propensity towards the production of visionary proposals can evoke the ruling
authority towards taking the first step in addressing a social problem; the acknowledgement of
its existence. Though a visionary contingent of a society may not be able to control the
political discourse directly, it can, through the clarity gained from its imaginative proposals
acquire a beneficial influence.
These attributes suggest that the proposals produced by the social imagination can fulfil a
role within a society as the instigator of new values or an advocate for the reinforcement of
existing ones through the realisation of their renewed impact. The ruling contingent of a
current social configuration, is often forced into defining the merit of existing policies solely
on the feasibility of their acceptance. Visionary proposals, free from the burden of popular
acceptance, are afforded the luxury of experimentation and can therefore speculate on social
and political problems in a manner removed from the pressures of everyday politics. This
detachment allows the validity of a proposal to be based solely on its potential for providing
the most efficient and morally acceptable solution to the social problems it seeks to address.
This is the primary attribute of the Utopian imagination in that it contains the ability to provide
forceful and emotive depictions concerning necessary changes to the fabric of a society. It is
this capacity which can inform public opinion through the introduction and clarification of
specific value conceptions that contains the potential for instigating changes within the social
and moral fabric of a society. These values and ideals can, in turn, influence the ideology and
political structures of power dictating the day to day social actions affecting the social fabric of
18Ibid., Pg. 135.
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a culture. Therefore, the Utopian contingent may not directly control or influence the practical
activities of the political realm, but it does provide a necessary influence on the values and
objectives serving to guide them.
II. The Negative Effects: The Potential For The Disintegration ofthe Social Realm
Running parallel to this potential, is a darker possibility that arises within the context of
Utopia's interaction with power. Events corresponding to this capacity generally become
manifest in the midst of a context embroiled in a tumultuous state of turmoil. Systematic
violence, revolution, and war, are all symptomatic of a social system in a cycle of social
upheaval. Ironically, such circumstances are directly related to the same play of forces
comprising social configurations propagating a harmonious state of affairs. Such events come
to the forefront when one of the underlying forces of power or Utopia supersedes the other,
thus ushering in turbulent or violent social or political transformations. The severity of such
events are often utilised as examples of the inevitability of catastrophe of the Utopian
endeavour by its critics.
As discussed above, such dangers exist whenever an attempt is made to creatively
transform or change pre-existing social orders. The emergence of these events serves as a
reminder of the dangers involved when the Utopian imagination becomes subservient to parties
advocating radical transformation through violent means. In such circumstances, the Utopian
impulse is not the instigator or guide of such actions, but is manipulated into the means
legitimising such circumstances. To comprehend how the interaction of power and Utopia
within the social realm can cause these events, our study will now explore the essential
characteristics of the conditions surrounding the potential advent of systematic social violence,
(a) Social and Political Violence: Acts of violence within the social context are inextricably
linked to the notion of power, yet contain singularly distinct characteristics. Such acts, unlike
instances surrounding the exercise of power, are instrumental in nature and therefore rely
directly on the use of technological apparatuses, especially surrounding the advent of war.
However, despite this reliance on technology, any violent action contains a degree of
unpredictability because of the latent potential involving the mutual destruction of both
combatants.19 It is this that bestows upon violence a certain enticing quality and it is this
possibility of rupturing the smooth passage of temporal events which has lead writers such as
19Hannak Arendt, On Violence. (London: Harvest/Hareourt Brace Jovanovieh, Publishers, 1969) Pg.
4.
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Sartre and Sorel, to speculate on its potential to bring about a sudden and radical
transformation of existing social structures.20
However, though violence can command an ultimate obedience within the short term, to
maintain this control over an extended period takes the attribute of power. As Hannah Arendt
indicates in her study concerning the nature of violence; "power always stands in need of
numbers, whereas violence up to a point can manage without them because it relies on
implements."21 According to this, power corresponds specifically to the capacity to undertake
a desired course of action. Therefore, within the complexity of a group or society, this
attribute references the circumstance where an individual or ruling elite captures the capacity
to dominate others in order to carry out actions corresponding to its desires. Consequently,
the most despotic of regimes needs a power base to exist and utilise the available mechanism of
violence. However, if a regime's power is consolidated completely and successfully, violence
becomes necessary only in rare instances.
Given this, when a governing body resorts to violence, this signifies a substantial loss of
power. Hence, the use of violence is indicative of a weakened or semi-impotent power.
Power rests on a claim of a legitimacy concerning the right to dominate, while violence openly
undermines such a demand. The former rests on rational grounds that a governing body can
competently manifest the objectives of the group by the means at its disposal, while the latter
can claim no such attribute because its use signifies a lack of confidence in such matters. Due
to this intrinsic irrationality, violence can never be legitimate, but it can nevertheless be
justified. The legitimacy of power rests on the competence exhibited pertaining to its decisions
and their consequences contained within the past. The justification for violent actions is sought
through an appeal to an end envisioned within the future.22 It relies on the argument that the
end justifies the means, though in actual fact, the extent of the ramifications of violent actions
can rarely be accurately predicted. It is here that the Utopian spirit demanding the 'wiping
clean' of the societal slate mistakenly creates a puzzling enigma, for its claims of rational
perfection are undermined by its demand for the occurrence, in the first instance, of an
irrational act.
20See J. P. Sartre's preface to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of The Earth, trans. Constance Farrington
(Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1967) Pg. 18. Within this text, Sartre states
"...irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor the effect
of resentment: it is man re-creating himself." See also, Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.
T. E. Hulme & J. Roth. (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1950) Pg. 302. Sorel describes a certain
potential virtue of violence with the statement; "Social war, by marking an appeal to the honour which
develops so naturally in all organised armies, can eliminate those evil feelings against which morality
would remain powerless".
21Arendt, Pg. 42. This point is further elaborated upon by Arendt with the statement; "The extreme
form of power is All against One, The extreme form of violence is One Against All. And the latter is
never possible without instruments."
22Ibid., Pg. 52.
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Throughout history, instances have arisen where a weakened government will resort to
violent acts in order to end the haemorrhaging of its control. After utilising such means it will
seek to provide a justification for such events through a barrage of propaganda that
manipulates the emotions of the populace. A highly emotive imagery is created supposedly
advocating a means that will create better social conditions. In this way, the desires and fears
of the masses are accessed to provide the pretext for acts of torture, murder, and oppression.
Such actions are generally undertaken under the guise of a 'cause' described as necessary for
the stability of a society or radical transformations necessary to it. In this way, the 'objectives'
envisioned by the Utopian imagination are cynically harnessed to construct a deceptive
apparatus concealing the brutal actions of a ruling elite against the 'enemies of the people'.
This image is utilised to focus the remainder of the societal forces loyal to its command
towards the consolidation of its power base by removing all perceived threats to its position.
All collateral damage to the social fabric is blocked from view by the brightness of the vision
propagated by the regime in order to conceal the violence undertaken against its own people,
(b) Revolution: The instability brought on by the use of violence can also work against an
authority to undermine and weaken its ability to dominate. When this capacity becomes so
compromised that a regime cannot effectively rule, it is superseded or overthrown by another
party in an event generally described as a political revolution. Such an event was outlined by
Aristotle as metabole kai stasis, and pertains to the cycle of dramatic changes and uprisings
which occur periodically within a given political circumstance.23 Thus, a revolutionary
circumstance is commonly embodied by a sudden tumultuous change within the existing
process of governing that instigates political tremors throughout the whole of the social order.
However, this conventional perception of a sudden political fissure is based on the rather
detached view of historian's accounts of such events. What seems sudden and catastrophic to
subsequent generations, may tor those involved, appear as part of a gradual process of
incremental transformations culminating in such an event. If this view is taken to the extreme,
the whole of history would have to be considered as one continuous revolution. Therefore, it
is imperative to limit the focus to incorporate and include the tumultuous ramifications of the
changes occurring at various definitive temporal junctures within the world's history.24
This turbulent end result is often brought about by the interaction of a multitude of singular
factors, all necessary, but in themselves insufficient to actuate such events. Preceding such
situations is generally a period of latent unrest which explodes when certain social factors
merge unifying formerly disparate grievances against a regime. As Tocqueville observed
23Eugene Kamenka, "The Concept of a Political Revolution" in Revolution, Nomos MIL ed. Carl J.
Friedrich. (New York: Atherton Press 1969) Pg. 124.
24Ibid.
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during the French Revolution, the social instability that is the harbinger of a revolution can
arise at what seems the most paradoxical of moments;
"Thus it was precisely in those parts of France where there had been most improvement that
popular discontent ran highest. This may seem illogical-but history is full of such paradoxes. For
it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break. On the contrary,
it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period
without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against
it Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear
intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. For the mere fact that certain
abuses have been remedied draws attention to others and they now appear more galling; people
may suffer less, but their sensibility is exacerbated."25
An indication of an important factor concerning the emergence of the final phase of an
uprising is found within this quote in the form of a renewed awakening of a long dormant
discontent. Members of a group with revolutionary intentions will often seek to raise support
and incite action by propagating images of a new social order which raises the expectations of
the general populace. Such expectations serve to accentuate and inflame the discontentment
felt by a population. In such a situation, a revolutionary discourse will describe the need for
progress and demand the transformation of the existing social configuration to alleviate specific
hardships immediately. It is within this context of greater social expectations that the function
of the Utopian imagination can most efficiently capture the attention of the public and influence
the growing desire for change. By providing the visions outlining the potential of a new social
order, it can become an influential factor for the manifestation of such changes. By focusing
the various disparate perceptions contained within a society into a unified force acting to bring
down and replace the crumbling foundations of the existing social structure.
However, there is a certain danger involved in these expectations which can become
detached from the immediate reality and lead a movement towards the instigation of events
leading to catastrophic consequences for the society as a whole. Such events also occurred
within the context of the revolution in France:
"Thus alongside the traditional and confused, not to say chaotic, social system of the day there
was gradually built up in men's minds an imaginary ideal society in which all was simple,
uniform, coherent, equitable, and rational in the full sense of the term. It was this vision of the
perfect State that fired the imagination of the masses and little by little estranged them from the
here-and-now. Turning away from the real world around them, they indulged in dreams of a far
better one and ended up living, spiritually, in the ideal world thought up by the writers."26
25Alexis de Toequeville, The Ancien Regime and The French Revolution, trans. Stuart Gilbert.
(Manchester: Collins/Fontana, 1976) Pg. 196.
26Tocqueville, Pg. 167.
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This observation exhibits the threat that is posed if the imagination of the masses is fired by
images which are not just incongruent, but completely removed from the real state of affairs
surrounding their creation. When such imagery becomes prevalent, the demands for change
becomes increasingly irrational and violent action often ensues. Consequently, visions of a
supposed impending reality procured through violent means generally doesn't precede the
implementation of an new harmonious order where all involved in the revolution will be
rewarded. Usually quite the opposite circumstance is forthcoming.
Habitually stemming from the emergent chaotic circumstances incited through an
irresponsible manipulation of the mass psyche, a more consolidated and despotic power will
arise from the remnants of the old regime. Traditionally, once the old state apparatus is
destroyed by an anarchist movement, another stronger, more centralised and repressive regime
is installed by those who lead the revolt 'of the people'. Within recent centuries, this trend of
the centralisation of power within this form of movement has become more than just a
possibility, it has become the foregone conclusion of the revolutionary methodology.27 This
method has proved to be an efficient means of organising a diffused society into a structure of
centralised power and authority.28 Here, the paradoxical consequences of ideals are exhibited
most profoundly within the context of the social events that are endemically violent, for a
revolution instigates a cycle of violence seeking to dismantle the existing social apparatus.
This in itself is an act of negation, designed to undermine a rational political construct with the
irrational and unpredictable nature of violence. After this negation, the same movement then
seeks to reinstate and maintain an even more rationalised social organisation through similar
means.29 Thus, far from delivering an entirely new social configuration delivering the
individual freedom promised, most revolutions only replace a weakened power, with a
stronger, more consolidated one
(c) War: Related to this potential for the manipulation of the social imagination for the
instigation of violence within a specific social and political context, is the ability to evoke
aggressive behaviour and a bellicose policy against another society. The same potential that
rests in certain visionary images allowing them to be utilised by a state apparatus in the cynical
justification of violent acts of oppression lodged against certain societal factions within its
27Kamenka, Pg. 131.
28Bertrand de Jouvenel. On Power: The Natural History of its Growth (Indianapolis: Liberty Press,
1993) Pg. 238. Jouvenel points out the seeming inevitability of this outcome; "The Cromwells and
Stalins are no fortuitous consequence, no accidental happening of the revolutionary tempest. Rather,
they are its predestined goal, towards which the entire upheaval was moving inevitably, the cycle began
with the downfall of an inadequate power only to close with the consolidation of a more absolute power."
See also Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin
Books Ltd./Hamish Hamilton, 1953) Pg. 146-156.
29Peter Calvert, Revolution and Counter-Revolution. (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990) Pg.
76. On this point, Calvert is following a line of argument established by Hannah Arendt in her book, On
Revolution. (London: Faber and Faber, 1962) Pg. 14-15.
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domain, can also be used to motivate the varying groups and interests comprising a society to
unify under the singular intention of extending this domain. Consequently, there is a distinct
relation between ideals and acts of war. Such relations are similar to those found between the
conception of certain ideals or values and systematic acts of social violence or revolution. The
central difference is that these occurrences are internal and the act of war is an external
endeavour. In other words, it is the overt manifestation of an intentionally violent foreign
policy. The comprehension of how and why such imagery is utilised demands the clarification
of the definition of war and some of the characteristic intentions behind it.
An act of war, as Clausewitz defines it, "...is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will."30 Therefore, one must assume that the actions involved in war are undertaken
with a specific intention directing the application of force involved. There is a specific end
which is to be brought about by the means utilised in war. This ultimate aim can be instigated
by one of two possible hostile motives; one based on passion, the other on rational intentions.
Within the highly involved nature of modern societies, the latter is a more predominant motive
than the former. Nevertheless, it is possible for the members of the most highly evolved
civilisation to be provoked into taking rash and violent actions through the provocation of a
passionate hatred which can circumvent their faculty for rational decisions. Such actions can
be evoked by a government through the manipulation of pre-existing fears and distrust of the
other. Though war may not emerge solely on the basis of the passions of hatred and distrust,
such emotions surface in tandem to the original intention, intensity, and duration of the
subsequent use of force.31
Consequently, it is at this point that the utility of the Utopian vision in regards to
undertaking a campaign of war is exhibited because of its ability to mobilise support for such
an action. Though a government may have a hostile intention which is rather rational and pre-
mediated, it will utilise the emotive potential of the Utopian imagination to manipulate certain
passions contained within the populace. Images evoking the idealisation of ones culture by
contrasting it with misrepresentations of another culture are often used to unify disparate
factions in order to undertake a mobilisation for war under the provision of a common
enemy.32
30Carl von Clausewitz, On War. ed. & trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976) Pg. 75.
3'Clausewitz, Pg. 76. "Savage peoples are ruled by passion, civilised peoples by the mind."
32Erich Fromm, The hear ofFreedom, ed. Karl Mannheim. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner &
Co., Ltd., 1942) Pg. 155. Fromm indicates the power of such emotions in his statement; "Love, duty,
conscience, patriotism have been and are being used as disguises to destroy others or oneself. However,
we must differentiate between two different kinds of destructive tendencies. There are destructive
tendencies which result from a specific situation; as reaction to attacks on one's own or others' life and
integrity, or on ideas which one is identified with. This kind of destructiveness is the natural and
necessary concomitant of one's affirmation of life In most cases the destructive impulses, however,
129
Once again: war is an instrument ofpolicy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy
and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy
itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think
according to its laws."33 This statement indicates that war is considered as a potential outcome
of the political activities of a nation state and therefore cannot be separated from them. As is
the case with other activities that are political by nature, the instigation of a campaign of war
needs the advocacy of certain groups with a wide-range of interests. To overcome these
divisions, a political regime advocating aggressive action will attempt to appeal to a trait which
all these groups share; a common cultural heritage. This common trait is accentuated by myths
and naive perceptions concerning the traditions within the culture, while simultaneously
propagating an alarmist campaign claiming the existence of outside threats. It is a call to
motivate action by pandering to the idealisations, fears, and desires, which comprise the wealth
of images defining the meaning of ones existence. Thus, war and politics are intricately
connected and just as political actions can be instigated through support built upon policies that
unify disparate interests under a singular social conception, acts of war can be similarly
justified.
Though the calls to take up arms is often accompanied with visions of dramatic
transformations, changes instigated by such actions are rarefy predictable. Consequently, the
stability which is wrought as petty interests are put aside in the name of a 'cause' is
jeopardised and undermined by the volatile and uncertain nature of war. Hence, the more
protracted and destructive the war becomes, the more dramatic the changes, and the more
unstable the social structure involved as its future becomes increasingly uncertain.34 Given
this, war on a limited scale, seems to have the potential to produce a certain unity within the
structures of a society. However, the actual outbreak of fighting traditionally signifies the
beginning of the end for a civilisation.35 Also, the transformations or changes produced within
the context of wars are generally not of a progressive nature, but are merely turbulent
fluctuations in the civilising process of Mankind. As Quincy Wright states in his extensive
examination of war; "What persistent evolution there has been in human history is not due to
are rationalised in such a way that at least a few other people or a whole social group share in the
rationalisation and thus make it appear to be 'realistic' to the member of such a group."
33Clausewitz, Pg. 606. The capacity for unification of this policy is described with the statement; "It
can be taken as agreed that the aim of policy is to unify and reconcile all aspects of internal administration
as well as of spiritual values, and whatever else the moral philosopher may care to add. Policy, of
course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests against the outside world. That it
can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there.
In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat
policy as representative of all interest of the community."
34Quincy Wright, A Study ofWar. 2nd edition. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965) Pg.
128.
35Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study ofHistory. 3 Vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934) Pg. 134.
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war but to thought. The Alexanders, Caesars, and Napoleons have produced oscillations; the
Aristotles, Archimedes', Augustines, and Galileos have produced progress."36
Reflections on The Potential of The Interaction ofPower and Utopia within the Social Realm
Within the context of the preceding chapter, our study has explored both the creative and
destructive potential of the interaction of the Utopian imagination and the exercise of power.
Events ranging from positive social reforms to events such as revolution and war have been
explored to discover how this fundamental interaction influences the essential parameters
comprising the various civilisations of Man. Consistently throughout this study, a paradox has
arisen which seems to be intrinsically bound to the evolutionary process of human culture.
Consequently, it is the very nature of this process which led Freud to speculate; 'The process
of evolution of culture' includes 'the best of what we have become,' as well as 'a good part of
what we suffer from.'37
Given this, the very same elements and influences which aid in the progressive creation of
human culture can also interact to facilitate its eventual downfall and annihilation. The social
relationship of the Utopian imagination and the intentions underlying the exercise of power
serve as important propagators of change whose influence can never be underestimated. What
must be guarded against is the changes instigated by this process that are not necessarily
heralding the creation of culture, but its destruction. Thus, the social transformations
instigated through the evolutionary process relating to the interaction of the influential
attributes of power, ideology, and Utopia, should be measured and incremental. (See chapter 7)
Though violent events such as war and revolution may capture the mass imagination and
appear to be instigating radical transformations on a huge scale, they rarely bring about truly
beneficial changes or a lasting stability. Such convulsive cycles take on a life of their own
resulting in the manifestation of circumstances generally beyond the dreams or wishes of those
desiring their occurrence. Habitually, such events rarely end at the point envisioned by their
supporters at the beginning of the process.
Moreover, it is imperative to understand both the dynamic role of the destructive as well as
the creative tendencies contained within the process of socialisation within a culture. Coupled
with this should be a comprehension of the roles of the mental constructs fabricated to interpret
and inform the human actions undertaken to fabricate the material reality. Moreover, an
36Wright, Pg. 131.
37Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, in The Standard Edition of The Complete
Psychological Works ofSigmund Freud, trans. James Stacy. Vol. XXI. (1930) Pg. 124. Op. cit.:
Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation ofSlaughter in The Modern Age. (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993) Pg. 220.
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attempt must also be made to discern and regulate the various intensities of these forces within
specific conditions. A balanced interaction of power and Utopia is an integral part of a positive
civilising process and influences the creation of a culture at an ideological level. Both of these
influences are necessary for the proper formation of a culture, and ironically, the very same
influences can spell its demise as well.
Accordingly, several important points have surfaced within the context of our discussion
concerning the interaction of these forces which should be duly noted. In the first place, the
proper balance of these forces is imperative if the ascendancy of a culture is to be maintained.
If one supersedes or attempts to manipulate the other, catastrophic events can arise. Also, the
most beneficial position of Utopia within the social realm is detached from the everyday
political machinations of this realm. It should serve as a standard with which to measure the
machinations of power involved within the political sphere. Finally, the forces of power and
Utopia are integral parts of the continuous evolution of a culture, but are still driven by desire.
Therefore, the arguments condemning the Utopian imagination; overlook the fact that it is as
necessary to this realm as the attribute of power. One must remember that it is still the real
intentions behind the actions of men which must be held morally accountable, not the specific
vision of society they claim to advocate.
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Chapter VI:
Power, Utopia, and The Manipulation of The Historical Consciousness
Monumental history lives by false analogy; it entices the brave to rashness, and the enthusiastic to
fanaticism by its tempting comparisons. Imagine this history in the hands-and the head of-a gifted egoist
or an inspired scoundrel; kingdoms will be overthrown, princes murdered, war and revolution let loose,
and the number of 'effects in themselves'-in other words, effects without sufficient cause-increased. So
much for the harm done by monumental history to the powerful men ofaction, be they good or bad; but
wha t if the weak and the inactive take it as their servant-or their master!
Nietzsche, "The Use and Abuse ofHistory"1
From the study undertaken in the last chapter which centred on the influential role that
power and Utopia play in the shaping events within the social realm, our exploration can now
turn towards uncovering their effects on a society's conception of its historical past and the
traditions stemming from it. Often, it is this 'historical perspective' that serves as the
foundation for the production of propaganda which seeks to capture the imagination of the
populace in an effort to instigate certain social actions. The discussion undertaken within this
chapter will seek to uncover the role that the 'historical consciousness' of a society plays in the
creation of propaganda, the moulding of public opinion, and their effects on social praxis.
When approaching this issue, certain questions begin to surface surrounding the essential
characteristics involving the bond between individuals that allows a community or collective to
'Nietzsche, "The Use and Abuse of History" in The Complete Works ofFriedrich Nietzsche: Thoughts
out ofSeason. Vol. II, Part II. ed. Dr. Oscar Levy. (Edinburgh: T.N. Foulis, 1909) Pg. 21.
form and perpetuate. In other words, this chapter will set out to explore the intrinsic
characteristics of the collective perceptions and ideals that are frequently manipulated in order
to strengthen the process of ideological integration that underlies any social intervention.
An aspect that could fulfil the role of such a characteristic emerges within the collective
body of individuals that encounter similar experiences within their present circumstances.
Cognate views, tastes, and fears provide the impetus for the forging of a unity of spirit
generally found in the social formations of Man. In times of perceived danger from outside
adversarial forces; issues of race, class, religious or political beliefs, can be transcended to
provide a unified front against a perceived threat to common interests.2 Within any social
structure, there is a myriad of forces that unify and forge a spirit of community between
individuals usually holding disparate interests. Though this explanation goes some way in
describing the primary stimulus for this bonding procedure, it leaves unexplained the enduring
identification of an individual to their 'home' country when living within another culture.
Present experiences and perceptions can only partly explain these feelings, thereby leaving
open the possibility that there are other factors acting upon an individual that serve to reinforce
these connective feelings. In correlation to this, the overriding question of this chapter then
becomes; What are these influences and from what sources do they traditionally arise?
A possible response to this lies within the connections felt between individuals who share a
common heritage. The underlying perception of the traditions which reinforce these bonds
are, in turn, influenced by the interpretations of this past that are constructed by each
succeeding generation's historians. These cultural interpreters serve to translate the past
within the context of the present and are crucial contributors to the formulation of a communal
identity based on interpretations involving the ramifications of the exploits of preceding
generations. The prevailing view involving these events and the traditions stemming from
them serve as the foundation for a population's beliefs and values, thus, making it a fertile
ground for the calls of loyalty accompanying actions on behalf of the society as a whole.
It is this fundamental ground that both the impulse to power and the Utopian imagination
draw heavily upon to produce an imagery that either coincides or subverts the existing
structures and institutions of a society. Accordingly, the production of historical
interpretations by certain groups can directly influence the perceptions and expectations of its
members. Given its basis on subjective interpretation, the methodology of history can be
2Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War 1939-1945: Organisations, Policies, and Publics, in Britain and
Germany. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) Pg. 420. The author asserts that people are
generally inclined to favour the interpretations of persons sharing the same environment and will
habitually reject those perceptions formulated by others who do not share a common experience.
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utilised to bring about an independent, objective, and neutral account of the past that creates a
healthy enthusiasm and sense of community, or it can be distorted to legitimise certain
questionable social actions or beliefs. With the latter, the objective search for the intrinsic
nature of past events is given over to the formulation and reinforcement of certain prejudices.
It seeks to paint a distorted view that instils a false sense of tradition that falliciously placates
or provokes under purposely deceptive pretences. It is the discovery of the characteristics
underlying the potential utilisation of the historical perspective which will be the task-at-hand
for this exploration. Our theoretical point of departure is the assertion that the methodology of
history can have either advantageous or negative consequences on a specific social
circumstance depending upon the intentions behind an interpretation. Within this context,
history emerges as containing the potential to serve as a useful device for both an existing
power structure or the forces seeking to undermine its authority.
I. The Interrelation ofUtopia, Power, History
The influence of Utopia upon the historical perspective emerges with the inadvertent
injection of the values, ideals, and beliefs, into the formulation of the accounts of past events
by the historian. This occurs, because complete objectivity is impossible, owing to the bias
intrinsically inflicted on an individual by the prevailing intellectual tendencies and beliefs of
the present. In reality, since human perceptions are fundamentally interwoven within the
intellectual fabric of such a context, a complete detachment from its prevalent conceptions is
difficult. Consequently, the belief systems serving as the foundation to the surrounding social
structures will invariably taint any account as well as the reader's interpretation of it. If such
an account is then widely circulated and accepted, new perceptions emerge informing the
fundamental characteristics of a community's self-identity.
This method is beneficial if the view reinforces or creates noble values and ideals which are
then adopted by the mass public. For example, if an image of a society's past describing its
endeavour to produce an equalitarian society is propagated, certain social programs seeking to
aid the less fortunate of its members will stand a greater possibility of achieving popular
support. In this way, values and ideals found implicitly within prevalent historical
interpretations can encourage the forging of a unified identity capable of orchestrating
proposals for solutions to recurrent social problems. Contrary to this possibility however, is
the danger that historical images and the mythology built around them, can become merely
compensatory and produce the illusion that certain problems are non-existent or are already
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being addressed. Such imagery can incite a sense of denial, leading to a latent apathy. This
weakens the sense of urgency necessary for accumulating the support that could bring about a
potential solution. Such a state of affairs can emerge naturally from the interaction of social
forces or be produced intentionally through the manipulation of prevailing mass perceptions.
These intentional manoeuvres are similar in method, but opposite in effect, to the
benevolent potential of the historical perspective. Such machinations contain the capacity to
create certain conditions that can carry over to future generations. A political force can seize
power and subsequently maintain control through the creation of a mythology of historical
traditions that affect the minds of the populace. Such conspiracies provide the mental
conditioning that enables the control of popular opinion through the use of propaganda and are
usually undertaken by 'historians' that are somehow intellectually indentured to the regime in
power at the time. Accounts of this nature, massage the portrayal of historical events to
provide a legitimate facade shrouding the true nature of the intentions and actions of the ruling
elite from public scrutiny.
A good example of such a method was utilised by Julius Caesar in the accounts formulated
to describe his conquest of the northern territories of the Roman empire. These were personal
accounts given by Caesar himself, but formulated in the third person in order to give them the
appearance of being an objective historical account. In reality, their purpose was not to be an
unbiased description of these events, but to provide the basis for a formidable political image
that would facilitate the defeat of his political adversaries in Rome and pave the way for a
seizure of power. This act would ultimately result in his crowning as the supreme emperor of
Rome, and as history reveals, it achieved its underlying objective effectively by securing his
place as one of the pre-eminent figures of world history. This circumstance serves as an
explicit illustration of the point indicated by Ernst Toller in his statement: History is the
propaganda ofthe victors,3
Coupled with this potential of concealing the true intentions behind a political agenda, a
ruling power can also manipulate the idealistic or Utopian tendency found within the collective
mentality comprising social structures. It undertakes such an action by depicting the events
unfolding within the present as the fulfilment of prophecy based on a mythical historical
tradition. Such accounts are highly questionable in their validity as serious expositions of past
events, but they do begin to indicate the extent that subjective interpretation has in any
historical account. Consequently, a cynically dishonest account can acquire a wide-spread
influence if presented strategically. By conveniently rewriting the past, it is possible for a
■Quoted in Balfour, Pg. xvi.
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government to create or reinforce certain prejudices in order to gather support for certain
political endeavours that are potentially unpopular by portraying them favourably in light of a
historical myth. To this end, a regime creates a history that serves to legitimise its present day
political agenda, and by utilising the concept of tradition, it stands a greater chance of success
in mobilising the differing groups which comprise a community into a collective conducive to
the implementation of its policies.
Before endeavouring to undertake our task-at-hand, it is imperative to clarify the theoretical
implications of the phrase; 'the mobilisation of societal groups or forces'. Throughout this
study, there has been an examination of the role that the concepts of power and Utopia play in
the instigation of such occurrences, but it is essential within the context of the 'historical
consciousness' to provide a clear definition of the parameters involved in this statement. This
clarification will supply a rough mental picture of how the notion of history influences the
emergence of this type of event. Such a description will be a 'working definition', guiding the
discourse of the chapter as it unfolds, and serving as the departure point for the exploration of
the importance of the historical influence and the subsequent propaganda it generates.
II. History and The Mobilisation ofSocial Groups or Forces
With the description of the mobilisation of social forces, a process is being identified
whereby a group or society is transformed from a collective of passive individuals with
differing views to a group with a unified mentality actively participating in unison to achieve
certain common objectives. Through such a movement, one group or individual can begin to
influence others in order to gain control over a large portion of the resources and assets of the
public formerly controlled by individuals or groups with diverse interests. Thus, when
describing the mobilisation of such forces, an account is being given of an enhanced capacity
to control and utilise resources which serve as the operative in any social or political context.4
Such assets generally fall into three approximate categories of classification. The first,
coercive, describes the resources of a society involving its military strength and subsequent
technologies. The second category consists of those goods, information services, and other
general currency which contain a utilitarian purpose within a society. And the third and final
category, normative, involves gaining a means of control by utilising certain loyalties or
obligations amongst the various groups or interests comprising a society.5




Manipulation of the 'historical consciousness' falls under the normative category, because
its intentions centre on the building of support through the instigation of loyalty. This sense of
obligation is evoked through the propagation of a certain image or perception, based on either
true facts or fabrications. Once certain loyalties are reinforced or created by this process, it is
possible to begin to control resources found within the other two categories, thereby giving the
ruling elite an expanded repertoire of controlling devices and strengthening its position for
substantial political action. It is in this way that the wealth of potential found within the social
configurations of Man can be utilised to endeavour upon the materialisation of certain singular
intentions.
Through the usage of a society's latent preconceptions, a politically astute regime can set a
propaganda machine into motion that can legitimise the most irrational of proposals. To
understand how conditions emerge which afford such opportunities, it is imperative to
ascertain the essential nature, object, and meaning behind the historical endeavour. Once this
is achieved, some of the key aspects of the paradoxical influence of the relationship of power
and Utopia endemic to human societies can be explicated and clarified further. The primary
step in this procedure is to explore the inherent assumptions involved in our fundamental
precepts involving history. Therefore, certain factors involved in the act of recounting past
events must be explored to uncover their intrinsic influence in the formation of the collective
spirit underlying a social configuration.
The Essential Nature ofHistory
The sequential process of history and the compilation of the historical consciousness is a
segment of Mankind's experience and knowledge of the world that embodies several aspects
unique to its object; i.e. the disclosure of events contained within the past. This endeavour
involves the examination of incidents which have already occurred within the space/time
continuum of the world and cannot be understood through other methodologies involving the
interpretation of events contained within the human experience of reality. Other techniques,
such as those associated with mathematics or the other sciences are unable to fully ascertain the
significance of such events because the interpretation of their content and meaning may be void
of a specific location or material evidence within the present. This condition foregoes the
potential production of a paradigm enabling the first hand observation of their apparent effects
or influences. Thus, such methodologies cannot discern the full implications of this specific
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kind of event because their procedures are based on observation and experimentation, which
lend themselves to objects or events that can be verified empirically at the time of their initial
occurrence. Hence, owing to the fact that avenues of observation of many of the events
contained within the past have subsequently vanished, it is difficult to obtain statistical data
proving or verifying a hypothesis about a historical event conclusively. Consequently, the
factors surrounding the methodology of history are unique in many respects in comparison to
other methods of enquiry.
Therefore, if history is the unique form of thought which many of its constituent
components seem to indicate, to fully apprehend its endeavour, several issues surrounding its
essential nature, object, process, and value, must be explored. This type of exploration into
the philosophy of history inevitably opens a 'Pandora's box' of conflicting interpretations
concerning its nature, but amongst all this theoretical strife, the possibility of forging a rough
consensus involving its essential characteristics is possible. However, for this to succeed,
many of the preconceived notions concerning history must be dispelled, allowing for the true
nature of this activity to come to light. Thus, to comprehend the implications of the historical
consciousness and its influence on human actions, it is imperative to examine the prevalent
preconceptions involving its essential nature.
/. The Nature, Object, Method, and Value ofHistory
The first question pertaining to this exploration involves the fundamental nature of history,
or simply what history is. As Collingwood describes it, intrinsically, history is a form of
research or investigation.6 Generally, it is for this reason that the connection between history
and science is often made. The actions underlying both methods are based on the formulation
of questions and then speculating on the potential answers indicated by evidence gathered
through an investigative procedure. To this point, the historical method corresponds directly
to the methods of science due to its concern with the uncovering of data needed to reinforce or
dispel speculative hypotheses created to direct its investigations. Therefore, at this level,
history may be considered a science, but in reality, such similarities are superficial.
For if history is to be defined as the enquiry into a particular subject matter, then some
form of object is encompassed within its methodology. The specificity of the categories of the
sciences differ primarily in their chosen subject matter, for the actual techniques of
6R. G. Collingwood, The Idea ofHistory. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946) Pg. 9.
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investigation are often quite similar. The 'science' of history is no exception, because it
focuses on a specific object; the past. Thus, the object involved in the enquiry of the historical
methodology is the human events and actions which have already taken place somewhere in the
temporal horizon of the past. Since the parameters comprising this horizon are vast, a
historian's investigation can involve events occurring anywhere from yesterday to thousands
and thousands of years ago. As a result, at an essential level, history is set apart from the
other sciences in that its object is to discern events or actions undertaken by humans that
transpired somewhere in a previous time period.
How does history discern the events of the past when the actual circumstances and people
involved no longer exist? The answer lies in the fact that history's speculative results are
based on the interpretation of evidence that survives from the actual conditions surrounding
the events and actions under investigation by the historian.7 Such evidence may be in the form
of documents or material objects which constituted the environment where a past episode took
place. With such documentation, the historian must interpret and speculate upon the
importance of such elements in answering the questions guiding the enquiry. Regardless of the
potential outcome of the various investigations or techniques, fundamentally, the historical
method of investigation finds its basis on the interpretation of evidence intrinsically connected
to some event that occurred in the past.
The question now arises involving the notion of why humans feel it is necessary to
undertake such investigations. What is hoped to be achieved by attempting such inquiries and
what are their inherent value to Man? The response lies in Mankind's perpetual quest for self-
knowledge.8 It is the study of past events that provides Man useful insights into the
peculiarities of being human. By endeavouring to investigate the events of past lives, an
individual inhabiting the present can discover what separates the characteristics of its existence
from that of others as well as its attributes and limitations. In this search for self-knowledge
amongst the events of the past, man learns what can be achieved in the present by what has
been achieved before. So, essentially, history is the enquiry and interpretation of the
significance of events and actions that have transpired in the past. Its inquiry seeks self-
knowledge, and it's intrinsic value lies in its presentation of human achievements in the past





II. The Science ofHistory
Generally, within many of the descriptions concerning the essential nature of history,
reference is made to its intrinsic resemblance to the methods of science. Indeed, such phrases
as 'the human science' or 'the science of Man' are quite common within discussions
concerning this endeavour. Such descriptions would seem to run counter to the assertion that
the object of the history could not be apprehended by the empirically based procedures of
science. As mentioned above, these descriptions are referring to the outward appearance of its
procedures and not to its content or object. The procedures of the natural sciences are based
on systems of interconnected concepts allowing for the designation of specific categories that
denote the universal connections between particular elements.
In other words, the knowledge of the universal in the natural sciences is the theoretical
framework that allows the extrapolation of the specific characteristics of the particular.
Hence, the methodology of the natural sciences utilises the connections between general
concepts to discern the characteristics of singular elements. History, on the other hand, starts
from a knowledge of the particular and moves towards indicating a universal. It is from the
results of its investigation into the nature of particular events that certain connections are made
which serve to define the universal characteristics of being human. Therefore, where natural
science seeks to discover the general theory that can explain particular events, history seeks to
explain the nature of particular events directly, and in doing so, implies their connections to
the universal.9
Owing to this emphasis on the particular, the knowledge gained from historical
investigations is somewhat imperfect or incomplete. To a certain degree all the enquiries of
Man succumb to this incompleteness, but in the case of history, due to the elusive nature of its
subject matter, it is notably so. Consequently, historical knowledge is highly subjective
because speculation on the characteristics of the general emerges from an inadequate
knowledge of the particular components comprising its subject-matter. Therefore, it cannot be
thought of as being objective, in the sense normally reserved for the other sciences, because
the data it gathers does not refer to concepts that are readily verifiable.
As a result, the knowledge of the universal in the historical sense, is actually descendent
from the knowledge of a particular in the same manner as a knowledge of the singular parts
can allow informed speculation on the constitution of the nature of the unified whole. This
9Arthur Schopenhauer, "On History" in The World as Will and Representation. Vol. II. trans. E. F. J.
Payne. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958) Pg. 440.
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exemplifies a marked difference from the enterprise of Natural science which seeks to verity
that a singular manifested event coincides with the general rule. This process of verification is
the ultimate aim in the formulation of a general concept which will explain a system within the
natural sciences instead of the discovery and interpretation of singular facts. Thus, in the case
of the natural sciences, it may be possible to obtain an in-depth definition of a particular
incident with the knowledge of the general rule that underlies it, but with the historical
endeavour this can never be possible.10 Hence, natural science can be described as seeking a
universal and objective knowledge, while history speculates upon a more particular or
subjective one.
Coinciding with this first difference, is the uniqueness of the problem encountered when a
historical investigation attempts to ascertain information from the reconstruction of past events.
Nature, the object of the scientist, presents itself in the form of phenomena usually accessible
by methods based on empirical observation, while the subject of the historian, past actions and
circumstances, cannot be experienced in terms of a direct sensual experience. The historian
uses his evidence less in the sense of its being the object examined, and more in the manner of
its being a type of lens allowing him to discover the real subject of his investigation: the
thought instigating such events. Collingwood describes this characteristic in his exploration
concerning the attributes of history:
"For science, the event is discovered by perceiving it, and the further search for its cause
is conducted by assigning it to its class and others. For history, the object to be
discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed in it. After the historian has
ascertained the facts, there is no further process of enquiry into their causes. When he
knows what happened, he already knows why it happened."11
With this statement, Collingwood illustrates the fact that with the study of nature, the
scientist seeks to describe concepts explaining the reason and causes behind the sequence of
events constituting its processes as they become manifest. The investigative techniques of the
historian seeks an explanation of a different type. Contrary to the popular conception of it, the
historical process is not a progressive sequence of events, but is actually a process of actions
with a singular root cause, thought. What the historian is endeavouring to discover is the
process of human thought that instigated the actions and events that comprise the past.




thought.12 So, in essence, the procedure of history seeks to decode and explain the process of
human thought, while the methodology of science proper seeks to unravel the mysteries of the
natural process underlying the manifest events of Nature.13
This comparison to the methods of natural science has both aided and harmed the historical
endeavour in its quest to be recognised as a unique form of thought. Through its attempt to
follow the methods laid down by the other sciences, a certain precision of method has evolved,
but a fallacious conception depicting its events as inert occurrences which can be objectively
recorded for posterity has also surfaced. The latter view has subsequently burdened it with the
perception of the need for the provision of statistical data seeking to reinforce certain attempts
at describing universal concepts which it is ill-equipped to ascertain. In reality, the historical
past is still alive because it is being continually re formulated within the context of the
perpetually emergent present. Its nature is fluid because the concepts of history are maintained
by the thoughts and actions of its interpretations contained within the present. Within this
methodology, a change of perspective, does not necessarily annul the validity of the former, as
in the case of science, but actually secures its survival through its continual development and
critical re-examination. The historian then, seeks to acquire knowledge concerning what the
human mind has done in the past and this action of reconstruction and reinterpretation allows
such events to have an impact on the present. Given this, the methodology of history must be
seen as elucidating the status of the development of the human mind up to, and including, the
surrounding circumstances of the most recent historical account.14
III. The Interpretation ofHistorical Events
Surfacing within the comparison undertaken in the previous section between natural science
and history, is the fact that the historical endeavour is a unique and specific technique of
speculative investigation. This discipline has acquired its own specific type of influence on
every segment of human thought, and subsequently, human action. It is not, as is generally
assumed, a partial familiarity with the transient circumstances of the past, nor is it a partially
reasoned knowledge of the abstract ideals of thought manifested in these past actions. It is a
circumspect method of investigation which provides the knowledge to differentiate the






Thus, the historical endeavour presents Mankind with a sequence of seemingly disparate
individual events, but actually depicts the same fundamental element that emerges within the
varying temporal junctures of the past. This essential constituent component is the human
spirit.
It is this spirit which is revealed in the actions and events that serve as the material for the
study of history. In discerning their significance, the historian becomes more than an
investigator in the scientific sense, he becomes a kind of believer. This role is assumed
because its investigation is reliant on the descriptions of circumstances, which are in the first
instance, perceived by someone else. This fact would seem to imply that the historian is
merely representing previously formulated accounts of past events and that the only avenue to
historical truth is through the strident recapitulation of such chronicles. If this were the case,
it would seem that the historical method could be completely objective, because the historian is
merely recounting the evidence discovered within the context of its research. There are some
grounds for this perception that Collingwood describes as the 'common-sense' theory of
history, but such an illusive perception can be easily dismantled through an examination of the
fundamental interaction between the historian and historical evidence.16
The basis for the argument against this view of history rests on the fact that the historian
must alter the evidence of an event discovered during an investigation. There are several ways
in which such alterations may take place. In the first, a transformation may emerge in the
process of selection undertaken in the determination of the relevant material in regards to the
focus of the investigation. In a majority of the cases, the extent of the evidence concerning a
historical subject is vast, so a historian is forced to select certain pieces of information
important in the constitution of the desired portrayal. This process of selection is akin to
editing because the inclusion or exclusion of potential material has a profound effect on the
historical conclusions stemming from it.
A second means stems directly from the first, in that certain conjectures are then
formulated corresponding to the perceived implications of the chosen material. Hence, it is not
only the selection of the material that is important to the foundation of the interpretation, but
the conjectures that follow from this act. This process of selection and subsequent conjecture
determines not only the content, but also the theories concerning its meaning. Finally, the
criticism regarding such evidence is imperative, because a historian is often forced to reconcile
problems or inconsistencies arising from the evidence gathered during an investigation. Such
reconciliation is usually undertaken through speculation which seeks to draw theoretical
16Ibid., Pg. 232.
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connections between the disparate or disjointed evidence discovered. With such steps, the
historian is utilising a technique of interpretation which relies on selective, critical, and re¬
constructive processes that allows preceding accounts to be superseded by descriptions
illustrating the historian's own autonomous thoughts.
As Nietzsche points out in his text exploring the concept of history, the impossibility of
complete objectivity and detachment by the historian is similar to the circumstance confronting
a painter attempting to recreate an accurate representation of a landscape.17 In such an
attempt, the artist must undertake an intense set of procedures including selection,
simplification, and abstraction, which ultimately determine the intrinsic nature of this
representation. Underlying the leap from the spatial reality of the world to the planar
attributes of the canvas is the artist's imagination which transforms the canvas into a finished
work of art. Similarly, the historian must also utilise the faculty of the imagination in an effort
to discover the intrinsic characteristics of the past. He must sift through the wealth of
information contained within the past, abstract it, and discern its implications on the present.
Consequently, the imagination of the historian is generally of two minds, one akin to the
artist, while the other resembles that of the detective. In the case of the artistic imagination,
this faculty must interpret the implications of the evidence presented and formulate them into a
representation of the historical event. Coupled with this, is another procedure involving the
creation of conjectures which connect disparate events in order to overcome the discontinuity
and fragmentation of such evidence. Just as the scene of a crime will provide multiple clues
pertaining to the true nature of the event, it frequently does so in a disparate and fragmented
manner. Thus, a detective must piece together an imaginative reconstruction by speculating
upon the reason and sequence of events leading to the execution of the crime. Likewise, the
historian constructs a similar paradigm from the evidence discovered which is evaluated in an
attempt to produce an accurate reconstruction. This theoretical paradigm must then be justified
by factual evidence and serves as a guide for the examination of this data.
Given these similarities, it becomes evident that the historian's methodology is akin to the
artist's as well as the detective's, because it is ultimately a product of the imagination. The
existence of this interpretative component of the historical process dispels the common-sense
notion of a detached and completely objective description of the past. In reality, the ultimate
justification for the sources and facts presented as evidence is that they were selected as
sources (i.e. they contained an importance to the historian). It is largely due this prevalent
perception, that highly prejudiced depictions can emerge that rest their interpretations on
I7Friedrich Nietzsche, Pg. 52-53.
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misinformation or are cynical attempts to manipulate the perceptions of the mass public. The
only guard against such occurrences, (and it is only a partial one at best) is a critical and varied
examination of the past. Every historian must attempt to judge the evidence as thoroughly and
objectively as possible in an effort to discover any discrepancies or falsifications. If a
historical account rests on valid interpretations and evidence, it will withstand renewed critical
examination. For it is the same faculty of the imagination which constructs such events that
can simultaneously provide the material for its critical examination and thus, contribute to the
maintenance of its presence within the identity of the community.18
TV. The Meaning ofHistory
Given that this endeavour relies heavily on the activity of subjective interpretation, does
this not call into question the possibility of history instilling any real meaning to Man's
existence? If it is intrinsically comprised of a series of imaginative reconstructions of past
events where the values, ideals, and personal prejudices of the historian can influence its
formulation, how then, can such accounts indicate the potential meaning of the circumstances
confronting the present generation? In reply to these and other questions related to this
subject, the historical endeavour seems to contain an intrinsic value to the human condition,
but not in the form of the provision of a singular meaning.
Due to the factor of interpretation that is involved, no singular meaning to history can be
ascertained, only a multitude of interpretations which supply various degrees of meaning
relating to the context surrounding each account. This is brought about because within this
endeavour it is impossible to avoid undertaking a specific 'point of view'. However, these
differing perspectives may not necessarily be incompatible. This factor of multiple
perspectives equates to the way in which different artists may discover varying attributes of the
same object. Though their depictions may focus on different aspects, a consistent
characteristic arising within all their representations is the spirit or essence of the subject-
matter. This aspect may be portrayed in many ways, but in essence it is always the same,
though each artist will derive a 'meaning' from that spirit which is unique to their individual
perception and situation. Therefore, each of the interpretations will contain a piece of the
artist that created them. Each of these attributes are unique to a representation, but this does
not lessen their relevance or the validity of their insight.
18Collingwood, Pg. 245.
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Accordingly, given that each successive generation inherits or produces its own set of
problems inclusive to its own interests, values, or objectives, it must be allowed the flexibility
to interpret history in correlation with its perspective. Such freedom is admissible as long as
an interpretation attempts to maintain a certain continuity with previous generations. In this
way, each succeeding generation has the opportunity to assert its own meaning into the
temporal continuum of history that relates to its priorities and circumstances.19 However, this
is not meant to insinuate that all interpretations are of equal merit, for historical depictions
which contain inconsistencies or have overlooked certain poignant facts must inevitably be
considered less valid than more thorough investigations. Nevertheless, the main concern
involving meaning within the historical perspective is to be aware of its subjective nature and
to be as critical as possible in order to avoid succumbing to prejudiced or tainted
interpretations.
Consequently, there can never be a re creation of the past that is absolutely accurate in
every detail to the original event, thus, all history is based on the interpretation of the evidence
surrounding such an event. Given that a single interpretation can never be the final authority
on the ramifications of a historical event, each successive generation must produce its own
interpretation from the evidence provided through its own investigation and those of previous
ages.20 It doesn't matter how fragmented or faulted many of the individual accounts may be in
isolation, for together they form a general continuum, where the spirit that history seeks to
reveal, perpetually exists. It is here, within the unfolding temporal sequence of this continuum
that the varying interpretations of each generation are drawn, and in a reciprocal action, they
further enrich its content by bestowing upon it their meaning that correlates to their respective
points of view.
The Potential of The Historical Perspective.
From the foundations uncovered previously concerning the essential characteristics of
history, the importance of it's influence on the formation of the identities of both the individual
and the community now becomes clearer. The notion of history is important to both the
individual and society in two primary ways. Firstly, it illustrates the importance of an
individual's connection to other individuals through the provision of necessary insights into the
19Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: Hegel and Marx. Vol. II. (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1945) Pg. 268.
20Ibid.
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potential consequences of ones actions within the social sphere. It informs one in regards to
the struggle which has taken place, both from within and without, in the formation of a
culture. Secondly, it provides valuable information, that is intrinsically important to the
perseverance of a culture, and forms the basis for the creation of meaning concerning the
suffering endemic to human existence.21 Thus, because of its ability to provide a society and
its members a measure of understanding in regards to questions involving the fundamental
characteristics of existence, the study of the past retains a central role in defining the
fundamental characteristics of Being within the present.
Similarly, the historical perspective can also be a party to the production of negative effects
as well. An excess of history can stifle the innate creativity of individual members of a society
by burdening their lives with the weight of a historical mythology that causes stagnation
instead of serving as an impetus towards action. When such a situation arises, its traditions
become so entrenched that social change and individual expression are impossible, causing
apathy and complacency to beset a society. Such dominant customs can also be manipulated to
produce an environment more conducive to the intentions of a governing power. Through the
corruption of this perspective, it is possible to lay the foundations of influence facilitating the
acceptance of its measures and the overt oppression of those individuals who may be inclined
to speak out against such actions. In this way, tradition and history become an apparatus of
control or seduction instead of the provider of enriching insights.
It is this aptitude for utilisation in regards to the mobilisation of the differing factions of a
society which connects history to the social forces influenced by power and Utopia. The
exploitation of the historical perspective to gain influence over these varied groups can set the
foundation for the acceptance and implementation of certain social and political proposals. It is
through such historical imagery that bonds between groups or individuals are forged as well as
the divisions which also beset a society. Such imagery can be so effective that the ties formed
are so strong that individuals will readily sacrifice themselves, or undertake acts of violence or
oppression towards their perpetuation. For it is this imagery which lays the foundation for




I. The Utility ofHistory
The historical consciousness can influence in a profoundly positive manner, the social
imagination that underlies the formation and perpetuation of the cultural identity. It is a
primary factor in forging the psychological attachment which allows unfamiliar individuals to
act in unison towards the achievement of the common goals necessary for the existence of a
community. The communal spirit evoked by this potent sense of belonging can become more
powerful with each passing generation, as its historical imagery becomes more defined and
accepted. Accordingly, such a spirit is one of the major influences surrounding the formation
and maintenance of the social structures that reciprocate by reinforcing this cultural unity in an
effort to create a national identity. The feeling of empowerment which stems from this unity
that underlies most nationalist tendencies bestows such a strong sense of association, many
individuals will readily sacrifice themselves to assure the perpetuation of the symbols and
structures that provide a sense of meaning to their existence. These powerful feelings can
inevitably bring about certain positive effects to the life of the community if channelled in a
positive manner. Therefore, the imagery of the historical perspective can influence a society in
several ways in regards to the instigation of actions that will greatly benefit its inhabitants.
One central role of influence that history can have on a society stems from its provision of
references and examples of past actions or deeds which serves to inform the present generation
as to the intrinsic nature of human possibility. It is through the continual demarcation of
Mankind's progress, that this perspective accentuates its potential. Such examples of
achievement may not be found amongst the activities comprising the present generation, so
certain individuals must rely on the past for indications of what is possible within the present.
In this way, history serves as the fundamental ground for the accumulation of the knowledge
and courage needed to undertake and implement certain social and political changes. In this
role of mentor, history can indicate the direction and actions needed to conquer the stagnant
attitudes that may inhabit a social context.22 The courage needed to overcome the adversity to
change that is often directed towards certain dynamic proposals can be attained by a reference
to the past. History can be a useful acolyte in such circumstances through its provision of
examples where similar problems surfaced and changes were successfully made to alleviate
them.
From the perspective gained through the study of the past, a foundation can be laid within
the present that can stress the necessity of creative action. For a culture to remain vigorous
22Ibid., Pg. 17.
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and healthy, it is imperative that it perpetually redefines the social structures formulating its
identity in an effort to avoid social stagnation. History can serve as a lesson regarding this
important characteristic by providing cultural archetypes that can serve as ideals in reference to
past examples of successful cultures in ascension. Returning to the earlier analogy involving
the activities of the artist, the intention behind the painting is not to recreate the landscape in
exact detail, for that is an impossible as well as an undesirable feat, but to create a renewed
interpretation capturing the essential spirit in terms of the artist's individual perception of it.
The panorama set before the artist serves only as a guide or example. It is the imagination that
creates a fresh interpretation which expresses the attributes of the landscape in relation to the
inner creative impulses of the artist. History contains the potential to provide a very similar
influence.
Through this analogy, the intrinsic value of history becomes manifest; for its most positive
attribute is its ability to reveal to Man the multitude of variations in the form of the manifest
spirit of the World's temporal movement. These variations are the attributes which bestow
upon both the World and Man's existence within it, its beauty, depth, and endless divergence.
Each facet of this existence, past and present, contains the appearance of chance due to the
containment of the multitude of singular tendencies which seems disjointed, but it is the
historical endeavour which can divulge the thread of continuity that underlies its vast array of
individual possibilities. It contains the ability to inform humanity of the essential nature of the
highest and most noble ideals that are the foundation of a society. If the imagery of history is
utilised in this manner, as a guide to bringing about the most admirable characteristics of
Man's potential, it can serve to inspire him to a creative existence. Such a condition of
perpetual individual creativity is an imperative trait to the formulation of an 'open' and diverse
society.
History then, can highlight the potential of men, and is a necessary ally to the Utopian spirit
in its struggle against the emergence of the possible cynical and repressive nature of power.
Because of this, it can be of great benefit to the health and stability of a society. However,
given the intrinsic connection that history has to these forces, it contains a rather more sinister
potential as well, which can counteract the cultivation of this creative spirit within a
community. Such potentiality doesn't enrich the lives of the individual members of a society,
but seeks only to control and oppress them.
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II. Excess & Cynicism Within The Historical Perspective.
Though the historical endeavour contains the capacity to illustrate some of Man's noblest
possibilities, an excess of history can also become one of the greatest adversaries of this
creative spirit. There are several ways for such adversity to arise. In the first instance, an
excess of history can produce a 'flattening' of the historical perspective by bestowing a
significance on everything that occurred within the temporal horizon of the past. This act
tends to imbue a certain historical weariness amongst the individuals of the present generation
by ignoring the role which ideals and values of the present must play in the definition of
historically important events.23 If all aspects of the past are considered equally venerable
solely on the basis of temporal location, everything contained within the context of the present
that differs from this overwhelming presence, will be ostracised as a form of degeneracy.
If too much importance is placed upon tradition and its maintenance, the creative spirit that
underlies the desire for the 'new' can be repressed to near extinction. The history of a culture
no longer provides the foundation for the embarkation of creative endeavours seeking new
interpretations of human existence, but desires only to preserve the past in an unnatural
manner. The present is thus corrupted, forcing a society to live outside of its time, not
towards the dawning of the future horizon, but towards a morbid recreation of the past.
Within this circumstance, a society attempts to artificially adapt to a mentality that doesn't
comprehend how to exist creatively, but only seeks to understand how to preserve Man's
existence artificially.24
A second risk involving history's influence is its potential misappropriation of past images
in order to perpetuate the belief that the present is merely the last stages of a civilisation that
has spent much of its vitality, and is corrupted. Such a perception breeds a dangerous irony
and heralds a cynicism that undermines the potential of the human spirit. With the emergence
of this characteristic, all aspects of existence are beset with the oppressive perception of an
intrinsic emptiness. Life becomes a laboured activity focused on mere survival. The capacity
to pose the question of 'what if disappears as the impetus for creative action melts away. A
generation burdened with this trait becomes increasingly comprised of creatures of mere habit,
clinging to what is familiar, while foregoing the search for anything new.
If such an age is allowed to progress in this manner for an extended period of time, a




which ignores the present reality altogether. Such romanticism can instigate a pilfering of
history that seeks reckless transformations of the present social structure and habitually
underlies the opportunistic actions of persons seeking to gain a dominate position within a
society. With such a context, the propaganda campaign produced to evoke certain emotional
responses may edit out substantial portions of history in order to create a sterilised view of the
past that elevates a few heroic examples to a mythical status. With such activities, the actual
events of the past become indistinguishable from a culture's mythology. History becomes
mere analogy, utilised as propaganda to transform an emotionally-charged cultural enthusiasm
into a formidable fanaticism.25
The danger here is immense, for if this fanaticism is focused by an individual or party with
hostile intentions, existing power structures can be overthrown or seriously de-stabilised. (See
chapter 5) With this fictionalisation, a radical political party may attempt to instigate social
unrest or justify violent acts of terrorism under a campaign to re enact the events of a mythical
past. Such examples indicate the possible outcome if the historical perspective is purposely
distorted to manipulate the mass psyche of a culture. With such a procedure, entire segments
of a society can be mobilised to carry out certain social actions under its false idealisations. If
the group facilitating this manipulation has less than noble intentions, the effects on a society
are likely to be catastrophic.
It is this possible connection between the notion of history and the apparatus of propaganda
which underlines its importance to the structure of a society. This correlation allows history's
utilisation by political groups to unify and mobilise the various factions of a society. Often,
these parties seek to utilise history as a resource legitimising the ideology underlying their
aspirations. Without this legitimacy, mobilising the support needed to embark on any change
in a social structure would prove difficult. The usage of the historical perspective as a
resource by a propaganda campaign is of primary importance to any social movement,
regardless of the political intentions underlying its actions. To uncover how various
individuals or parties can mobilise generally diverse and disparate social groups to endeavour
upon singular or unified objectives, it is imperative to analyse the true nature of propaganda as
well as its utilisation of the historical perspective or visionary images in its endeavour to gain
influence and control. Hence, it is towards the analysis of this apparatus that the focus of our
study will now turn.
25Ibid„ Pg. 20.
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The Nature andMethodology ofPropaganda
As was the case concerning the popular perception of the historical endeavour, there are
many mistaken assumptions about the nature, method, and meaning, surrounding the concept
of propaganda. Generally, it is the high emotional content to this idea that evokes and
exaggerates many of the mistaken perceptions surrounding its use. Much of its reputation also
stems from the central role that it has played in many of the darker episodes within the
twentieth century and its encroachment upon almost every aspect of modern life. It is due to
these facts that propaganda has come to be conceived as the personification of an ever more
oppressive media assault on modern society. Consequently, its methods are usually associated
with evil, deception, and control. Some, though not all, of these perceptions are well founded
because its methods have definitely been a party to the occurrence of such events in the past.
However, careful scrutiny, shows that propaganda is a procedural device that contains no
intrinsically negative characteristics in itself. This is not to assert that propaganda cannot
bring about social actions with questionable moral implications, but it is not the procedure
itself which should be judged, it is the intentions behind its usage which should be scrutinised.
This factor will serve as the primary crux of the discussion concerning its characteristics
because until certain mistaken assumptions are overcome, many misconceptions will be
sustained, thus obscuring the true measurement of its effects. These mistaken perceptions
could also hinder the discovery of the parameters involved in its interaction with the social
attributes of power, Utopia, and history, as well as its efforts to acquire and maintain influence
over the perceptions, values, and attitudes of the individuals comprising a society. Given this,
propaganda could be accurately described as the overt orchestration of all of these social
tendencies in the endeavour to manipulate public opinion. Due to its being an extension of
such forces, the use of propaganda can incur similar paradoxical connotations to those
uncovered previously within the relationship of power and Utopia.
Thus in order to clarity the essential characteristics of propaganda, its relationship to the
historical perspective, and to the notions of power and Utopia, it is necessary to dispel some of
the negative connotations of the term. Similarly, it is also necessary to establish the fact that
where public opinion is concerned, some form of propaganda is being applied.26 It is utilised
within the discourse of all political systems to illustrate the policies of the parties involved in
an attempt to build support for the implementation of their visions. Its importance has
increased phenomenally in the modern age, because of the advent of mass media which
26David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda. (London: Routledge, 1993) Pg. 5.
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provides unlimited avenues of influence to the public at large. Coupled with this, is the fact
that societies are becoming so complex and extensive that in-depth discussion on such a large
scale is impossible. This condition is one of the primary reasons that propaganda has become
the apparatus of choice for modern political factions.
Thus, in the formation of social structures based on clear ideological visions, or the
undertaking of political action, propaganda is not a temporary divergence, but plays an
essential role. Its capacity to provide an influential imagery can transform public opinion and
places it in a central position of importance within this realm as social groups seek continually
to mobilise support on various issues. Within modern politics, the art of persuasion has
become one of the single-most important factors instigating any faction's rise to power. Given
this, in undertaking any political action, the ability to control public opinion is an absolute
necessity and it is this ability that links the use of propaganda as a tool to convey the imagery
produced by the contingencies of power and Utopia. To clearly ascertain the potential of
propaganda is to go some way in uncovering how the values and ideals of a society inform and
motivate the social praxis undertaken within it.
I. The Definition ofPropaganda
It is imperative to begin this exploration by questioning certain traditionally prevalent
assumptions about propaganda. Concerning this, several questions must be addressed: What is
propaganda? How does it affect the perceptions of individuals within a society? And, can
such effects be overcome or avoided? In answering these questions, Mankind's perception of,
and interaction with, certain components of its surrounding social reality must be examined to
discover where its foundations lie.
When humans interact with their surrounding reality, a collection of stereotypical images
are built up within the consciousness through its continual interaction with the psyche. Due to
the sheer complexity of the elements and events experienced, the mind must break up the
continuous whole of reality into significant parts which are then categorised in accordance to
an individual's immediate desires, intentions, and actions. In other words, the human mind
must undertake a process of abstraction and simplification of its external surroundings in order
to survive. Consequently, with such a method, there is always a danger of oversimplification
which undermines the reliability of the decisions made based on its framework of abstraction.27
27Balfour, Pg. 419. The author describes this danger with the statement; "This process of abstraction,
though essential, calls for the omission of the features not selected as significant, so that it is also a
process of simplification. There is a great temptation to oversimplify. . . Yet reality is complex, so that
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Such flawed information can then inform the intentions of an agent, which may subsequently
enter into certain actions attempting to transform the complex set of conditions comprising the
external reality, which can lead to damaging miscalculations.
The potential for objectivity within this process of interpretation becomes further removed
by the presence of latent values, ideals, desires, and fears within the individuals constituting
the social structures of civilisation. Such expectations create preconceptions about reality
which further clouds an individual's judgement through the perpetuation of an assumption that
one interpretation of reality supersedes another. Such implicit assumptions influence people to
the point that they are inclined to accept only interpretations of reality that are consistent with
their values and experiences. The inherent danger of relying on such simplified associations is
that their underlying presuppositions are based on emotions rather than the extensive scrutiny
of facts revealed through a process of critical thought.
However, such perceptions cannot be jettisoned easily, for they constitute an individual's
essential nature and are formulated through a life-long process of exposure to personal
interactions, historical interpretations, and the media. This constant bombardment can leave
the human faculty of reason with a proclivity towards the influence of the emotions and
unleashes two incompatible tendencies inherent to its nature.28 The first, desires an objective
view of reality through a process of critical examination and seeks to reduce the subjective
distortion between reality and its sensual perceptions. The second, seeks the opposite, and
desires the control and limitation of such discourse in order to justify the acceptance of an
interpretation based on emotion rather than actual evidence. The former, is the basis for the
methodology of science and other human endeavours seeking an objective knowledge, while
the latter is the foundation for the practice of producing propaganda in an effort to facilitate
some predetermined end. Within the context of this distinction then, propaganda may be
defined as the inducement to action through the limitation of access to evidence that would
allow a more informed and rationally-based decision. It is therefore, a choice based on an
emotional response, instead of a measured decision based on a thorough examination of all
evidence available.
The differences between these two tendencies are not as pronounced as they first appear,
and it is largely due to this that propaganda is so effective. The primary object of the
propagandist is to persuade individuals to endeavour towards certain actions. To achieve this,
the more simplified any system is, the less close the relationship which it is likely to bear to the external
world and therefore the more unreliable as a basis for action intended to change in a particular direction.
That is why the historian Burckhardt warned us to be on our guard against simpMcateurs terribles."
28Ibid., Pg. 421.
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the arguments advocating such action must appear to be both rational and in relation to the
experiences of those it seeks to motivate. To this end, a skilled propagandist will strive to
camouflage these persuasive techniques as objective arguments. Astute practitioners have the
ability to project the illusion of advocating a position that can deflect spontaneous objections
on rational grounds, whilst implicitly pandering to the emotional prejudices of the audience.
Granted, within any argument there is a certain amount of propaganda involved, but this is
generally due to an enthusiasm for certain attributes, thus leading to attempts to emphasise
certain positive aspects while playing down negative ones. These actions and those undertaken
by the propagandist are profoundly different in both intention and degree. The practitioner of
the objective argument is not usually consciously bombarding a selected audience with an
emotive language whose underlying ambition is to provoke an emotional instead of intellectual
response.29
Generally, propaganda is utilised to incite intense feelings within a group of individuals.
By creating an atmosphere where they think that rational decisions are being made, they are
duped into making emotional decisions based on purposeful distortions with a specific outcome
in mind. Thus, in a way, propaganda evokes a blind leap of faith, because its theories rest on
a limited and focused perspective. Its potential rests on a tenuous connection to the true nature
of reality, because the likelihood of the materialisation of its projections is measured on the
assumption that events within the future can be deduced from the outcome of events in the
past. Therefore, the expectations stimulated by such a discourse can enslave both those who
practice and those influenced by its methodology.
Consequently, the fortunes of many prominent figures or parties depends on the successful
manifestation of their proposals for the future within the immediate context of the present.
This is due to the fact that their competency is measured by the outcome of the implementation
of their policies. Such results either validate or undermine their interpretations and predictions
concerning the future. Many political figures or groups will utilise the mechanics of
propaganda in an attempt to persuade a large enough number of individuals that their policies
are valid and in so doing influence them to act on these proposals which can then transform the
character of that future.30 Such actions can be successful if the proposals are feasible, both in
the extent of the changes proposed and the temporal span needed to implement them. It is here
that propaganda's connection to the dynamic forces underling power and Utopia becomes most




The irony involved in the use of propaganda, however, is that for such decisions to
successfully influence the parameters of the future in a positive way, they must be based on an
objective and rational examination of the facts, not the emotional impulses provoked by the
machinations of a propaganda campaign.
These factors begin to indicate the integral part that the art of persuasion plays in any
political machine and the numerous ways it can engage the feelings and perceptions of
individuals in order to dominate their actions. It habitually seeks to evoke these desired
actions within the context of the present by employing the emotive imagery connected to both
the past and future. Propaganda generally favours working within these temporal horizons
because the full extent of its claims within these contexts cannot be verified empirically.
Therefore, propaganda is intrinsically a methodology which seeks to manipulate the prejudices,
values, and perceptions of individuals provoking them into undertaking social actions
corresponding to the political intentions of the group utilising its procedures. In modern
societies, its potential is immense, for a governing structure can be created or destroyed
through the explicit success or failure of its propaganda.
If a campaign can successfully engage the dreams or fears of a majority of the individuals
within a society, it can mobilise support to suppress opposition, raise armies, or instigate
revolutions. It undertakes such endeavours based on information that doesn't describe the true
implications of actual events, but only the manipulated perceptions of them. Thus, its ultimate
aim is to establish control through the orchestration of the perceptions that inform individuals
of the nature of their reality. Images involving the past and future are especially useful to its
machinations, because they intrinsically involve a certain attribute of faith in the validity of the
assertions specifying their conditions. Such faith, in the wrong hands, is an immense danger to
all involved. Consequently, the device of propaganda is an integral part of the formation and
functioning of any society, as well as the instrument which can ultimately spell its destruction.
II. Prevailing Misconceptions Concerning The Methodology ofPropaganda
To this point, our study has established that the use of propaganda is aimed at affecting the
emotions rather than the intellect, and by its very nature seeks to manipulate our perception of
reality. However, there are several misconceptions which must be dispelled before its full
implications can be laid bare.31 The first, rests on the conception that the device of
propaganda is a persuasive technique which has the ability to completely transform the values
31Welch, Pg. 5-6.
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or beliefs of those exposed to its discourse. In reality, it does not create or change existing
beliefs, but attempts to reinforce or accentuate them. Any form of psychological manipulation,
mass or individual, does not have the ability to completely transform a mind through the
insertion of a set of totally foreign ideas, but works primarily through the power of suggestion.
In other words, it must manipulate the psyche of the individuals constituting a society by
appealing to the existing prejudices, desires, and fears, implicitly reinforced within the
institutions and structures of a society. As Aldous Huxely observed:
"Propaganda gives force and direction to the successive movements of popular feeling
and desire; but it does not do much to create these movements. The propagandist is a
man who canalises an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water, he digs
in vain."32
Given this, for a regime to increase its influence or to maintain a hold on power, its
policies must appear to coincide with the experience and perceptions of the individuals it seeks
to influence. If the discourse expounded by a group is contrary to the desires, moral
convictions, or historical perceptions of the members of a society, its success in influencing
individuals to undertake certain actions will be extremely limited. As is the case involving the
conceptions of ideal societies, successful propaganda cannot be conceived in a vacuum.
A second misconception rests on the mistaken insight that all propaganda is the falsification
of the facts, with no relation to the truth.33 Actually, it utilises many variations of the truth
ranging from the complete fabrication of facts, or the semi-distortion of their potential
implications, to their presentation void of any relation to their original context. The perception
that propaganda is a form of deception is correct in its basic premise because it seeks to distort
the truth in order to provoke a certain belief, but it normally retains some connection to it.
Such a connection stems from the fact that though the emotive imagery of propaganda seeks to
appeal to the irrational and emotional side of human nature, it must make a gesture to the
rational side as well. Because within this nature, emotions are based in part on rational
perceptions, therefore propaganda must appeal, at least partially, to rational decision-making
process.
In propaganda as in love, anything is permissible which is successful - (Joseph Goebhels)34
Within this statement, many of the moral indictments endemic to the prevailing misconceptions
32Aldous Huxely, "Notes on Propaganda" in Harper's Magazine. (No. 174, December, 1936) Pg.
39. Op. Cit.: Welch, Pg. 9.
33Welch, Pg. 9.
34Quoted in Welch, Pg. 17.
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surrounding the crucial characteristics of propaganda can be exposed. Propaganda, in and of
itself, is fundamentally neutral in the ethical sense because it has the ability to produce both
positive and negative effects. Therefore, its moral evaluation must be focused on the
intentions behind its use and the consequences that are brought about as a result. Propaganda
is merely a device for persuading individuals to act in a certain manner that may bring about a
preconceived end result. Consequently, it must be considered morally neutral in much the
same manner as a gun involved in an act of violence. The gun is not intrinsically immoral for
it is only an apparatus which contains the capacity to carry out a morally repugnant action. It
is the intention behind its use which must be held up to the scrutiny of a moral code of a
specific society, not the device. In all social and political causes, both good and bad,
propaganda plays an intrinsic role. It is intrinsically an apparatus that embodies an intention,
and it is this, coupled with the consequences of its use which should be morally evaluated. As
for the notion of propaganda itself, the moral responsibility lies with the operator and not the
device.
III. Power, Utopia, History, and Propaganda
From the preceding sections outlining the intrinsic nature and characteristics of the
historical perspective and propaganda, a discussion on the connotations and methods of their
utilisation by the social forces of power and Utopia can now ensue. Since propaganda must
rely on the prevailing perceptions of a culture to be fully effective in its objectives, its slogans
must coincide with the predominant historical interpretations at the time. If, as asserted
earlier, a culture attains a large part of its identity from its historical self-portraits, then
seemingly the most fertile ground for material effective in the transformation of the communal
psyche will be found in its history. In other words, to apprehend the history of a culture, is to
understand a large part of its intrinsic mentality and the foundations of its self-identity. If this
identity can be manipulated by creatively elaborating upon the events of history, then it is
possible to orchestrate the perceptions of the public and increase the possibility that the
objectives of the political group will become manifest. As a result, at an essential level, the
apprehension and connection to the historical consciousness is what a propaganda campaign
seeks to achieve.
Our primary question now becomes in what manner do the forces underlying power and
Utopia seek to utilise this latent historical identity, to produce propaganda that has the capacity
to mobilise support for their proposed social actions. In attempting this, the methodologies
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utilised by each of these societal tendencies are similar, but their respective objectives are
noticeably different. In preceding chapters, the intrinsic characteristics of power and Utopia
were explored to uncover their fundamental linkage to a dual tendency found within human
nature. As was discovered within this context, one tendency is oriented to the promotion of
creative change, while the other strives to control its surroundings.
The former, is the manifest Utopian element within a society and habitually utilises the
device of propaganda to illustrate its visions in an effort to instigate action towards
materialising its social reforms. It may draw on certain emotionally-charged historical
perceptions that depict problems endemic to a culture by projecting images describing the
alternative future that might solve them if certain changes were to proceed. Similarly, the
Utopian imagination might seek to contrast its proposals with the prevalent historical
conception, either to re-instate values and conditions lost to a culture or break the hold of
burdensome traditions stifling innovation. Its propaganda generally seeks to provide a
depiction of a better existence within the future horizon and strives to gather support for
changes to existing social and political structures that will remedy existing situations through
the provision of alternative conditions. However, the possibility remains, that its intentions
may be misconstrued, producing the opposite effects foreseen by their author or serve as a
disguise for the cynical actions of a group attempting to seize or maintain control.
The latter, is intrinsically associated with the notion of power and the machinations
corresponding to its attributes. Such characteristics also utilise the perspectives and mythology
provided by history to accumulate support for the mobilisation of its intentions. Since the
emphasis within this tendency is domination, the propaganda of power seeks to manipulate the
fears of a society to reinforce the status quo of the existing power structure. Foreign threats,
or the emergence of a cycle of moral and economic degeneration, are utilised as examples of
the conditions arising if the existing division of power is questioned or weakened. In this way,
the inhabitants of a society will support those in power, fearing the insecurity encountered at
the thought of the unknown. To maintain a sense of security, many individuals will endure
great hardships, for the future can produce a greater fear than the known repressive
circumstances of the present.35 The propaganda of power seeks to accentuate this fear of
35Aldous Huxely, Ends and Means: An Enquiry into The Nature and into The Methods Employed For
Their Realisation. (Edinburgh: Readers Union and Chatto & Windus, 1938) Pg. 56. Huxely makes an
insightful observation pertaining to this point in his statement; "The patience of common humanity is the
most important, and almost the most surprising fact in history. Most men and women are prepared to
tolerate the intolerable. Their reasons are many and various; there is ignorance, first of all those who
know no state of affairs other than the intolerable, are unaware that their lot might be improved. Then
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change, because it is the emergence and perpetuation of such an emotion that enables the
maintenance of its control.
Also, this negative propaganda often strives to evoke a sense of unity and allegiance
through the creation of fear pertaining to a certain segment of society or a foreign power. By
fuelling such anxiety, a regime will seek to deflect criticism against its own policies by
focusing the brunt of the frustration of a society towards certain social or ethnic groups.
Various factions are encouraged to rally behind the government to eliminate these perceived
threats. Concurrently, the propagation of an external threat is still more effective for such a
unification because it combines innate prejudices with the fear of the unknown to produce a
potent imagery of hatred and distrust. This atmosphere can transform the entire power
structure of a society through intimidation and fear, allowing the governing power to control
all aspects of the lives of its electorate in the name of their defence.
All of the methods mentioned above are effective in terms of mobilising the support of
disparate perceptions or interests and are therefore potential components within any social
formation. However, propaganda is not, as it is often asserted, a modern malaise caused by
the spread of the mass media. Its methods have always been utilised in one form or another
within the civilisations of Man throughout much of humanity's history. Mass media has
strengthened such measures and made them more potent because it can reach an extensive
audience, but its techniques were not invented within the modern era. This wider coverage
does make this technique potentially more dangerous, for it provides access to a public opinion
more susceptible to being swayed by the distortion of facts.
Consequently, it is the scale of its use within this era which has brought the methodology of
propaganda to the forefront. Also, it is because of this expansion that the idealisations
produced by the Utopian imagination have a greater potential of influence and actual
materialisation than ever before. Similarly, those in power who have acknowledged its
potential in the past are utilising it with greater efficiency than ever before. Thus far, its
attributes have been analysed and cited in an abstract manner in an effort to establish its
connection to the historical consciousness, power, and the Utopian impulse. However, to
uncover the full implications of these connections, it must be analysed within the context of an
actual society. For such a context, a telling example of the potential of an orchestrated
propaganda campaign in transforming a society is found in the programs enacted by the
National Socialists in their radical transformation of the social structures of German society.
there is fear. Men know that their life is intolerable, but are afraid of the consequence of revolt. Mere
habit and the force of inertia are also extremely powerful."
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Nazi Germany: A Case Study in The Manipulation of The Historical Consciousness
To look to an event within the world's history where the utilisation and manipulation of the
historical consciousness was extremely effective in mobilising a large portion of the population
towards the support of a specific ideology, one has to look no further than the twentieth
century during the Nazi party's rise to power in Germany. During their twelve year reign, the
structure of German society was transformed substantially in a number of ways, with the
ultimate outcome of this campaign being catastrophic for both the German nation and the world
as a whole. This event also serves to exemplify how the creation of a Utopian discourse
founded on a historical mythology can be utilised by a repressive and violent regime attain
power by deflecting attention from its true intentions and actions.36
Such an event reinforces the assertion that groups seeking influence to instigate changes or
to maintain control can utilise such measures in the manifestation of their intentions. The
events of this period also underline the importance of the relationship between a societies'
perception of history, its propaganda, and its political machinations. It becomes clear within
this context that to disregard or ignore such imagery is to be placed in the dangerous position
of inadvertently becoming a party to its intentions. It is important then, to understand how
these social and political tendencies can gain a position of influence, if only to establish a
vigilance against the malevolent effects that may emerge if they are left unchecked.
Within the prevalent propaganda of Germany at the time, there were elements which were
Utopian combined with characteristics common to the machinations of a repressive power
structure that contributed directly to the image of the party. The values, desires, and
prejudices of the German masses were manipulated through the utilisation of a utopian-like
mythology of tradition reinforced by a methodical use of terror and violence. The genius
behind such a campaign was its ability to adapt its propaganda machine to appeal to varied
groups and classes of individuals throughout the whole of the society. Through the usage of
this methodology, the party sought to replace the political system of the Wiemar Republic and
36Hermann Rauschning, Germany's Revolution ofDestruction, trans. E. W. Dickes. (London: William
Heinemann Ltd., 1939) Pg. 27. As the author observed at the time of the Third Reich's rise to power
in the 1930's; "He (Hitler) succeeded in a concealment of the true facts on a scale never before known.
Under its disguise it succeeded in foisting on the country, in place of an authoritarian State, an instrument
of dominance that serves simply and purely for the maintenance of its own absolute power. Under the
mask of a movement of national liberation, it achieved the despotic repression of the nation, with the
voluntary assistance of the middle classes and large sections of the working class.
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its traditional class barriers with an image of a unified, structureless nation, both in the
economic and political sense.37
Though the outcome of such manoeuvring was to ultimately destroy the social structure of
the German state at the time, such events were not due solely to the images projected by its
suggestive campaigns, but also rested on the intentions or motives behind these projections.
Similar methods were being utilised by Hitler's counterpart in America, Roosevelt, to embark
on a more peaceful endeavour by engaging the mass media in an effort to overcome the
economic hardships brought on by the great depression.38 His 'new deal' slogans,
employment of artists to depict a positive image of its programs, and the "fireside chats", were
instrumental in his attempts to restart the economy through the restoration of confidence in the
'American dream'. These actions were in striking contrast to those undertaken by the Nazi
party in its attempts to prepare the German people for war. Their differing intentions which
spawned markedly divergent actions in the same era, provides a historical example of the
inherent potential of the interaction between the historical conscious, the Utopian imagination,
and the quest for power, in both the negative and positive sense. When abused it can, as in the
case of Germany, leave a society in ruins, or if utilised with positive intentions overcome great
hardships to reach prosperity.
The case of Germany is also interesting within the context of this study because the
perception of its rise to power was seen as more than a change of government. Its supporters
perceived this event as the installation of an ideology that would radically transform the social
and political conditions of the German society to bring about a classless system based on the
concept of a national unity. Such objectives were not in themselves morally reprehensible and
may actually have benefited the society, but it was the violent and repressive techniques
utilised for the undertaking of this transformation that lead to the atrocities committed. It was
these acts of violence that were an indication of the cynical and purposeful disjunction between
the 'image' of the party's intentions and their true nature. As Rauschning described at the time
of the Nazi's ascent to power; "The doctrine is meant for the masses. It is not a part of the
real motive forces of the revolution. It is an instrument for the control of the masses. The
elite, the leaders, stand above the doctrine. They make use of it in furtherance of their
purposes."39
37Welch. Pg. 16.
38Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. (New York: Verso, 1989) Pg. 54.
"Thus, while Roosevelt's New Deal America was using radio and film to regulate the 'war of the home
market' and to restart the industrial production machine, Hitler was directing millions of unemployed
Germans to relaunch war as an epic."
39Rauschning, Pg. 20.
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In the achievement of these objectives, there were several primary elements important to
the method used by the Nazis in seizing control of the German State.40 The first consisted of
the utilisation of the pre-existing state apparatus to gain a legitimised control over the civil
service and the military. Secondly, there was a widespread terror campaign in which the
property of individuals or groups opposing the regime was confiscated and their persons
violently abused during the lawless state accompanying its rapid rise to power. After such
measures were carried out, raising support for the opposition of party policies was hindered
thoroughly, if not rendered completely impossible. Finally, such violence was offset by the
positive images produced by its propaganda which utilised the available media technology with
alarming success. The image of a German renaissance had a huge impact on a nation which
was burdened by economic hardship, mass unemployment, and a deep-seeded sense of national
humiliation caused by the outcome of the first World War. Thus, its appeal ran much deeper
than the contemporary circumstances, for it reached the traditional intellectual tendencies that
had been cultivated and reinforced by the existing Prussian State's inclination towards
romanticism.41
It was these factors which provided the fundamental ground for the major themes of the
Nazi propaganda campaign that became immensely successful in appealing to the emotions of
the German people. The major themes produced by this state apparatus to achieve this social
mobilisation was founded on three simultaneous campaigns; the idea of the national
community, the doctrine of racial purity, and the cult of the Furhrer.42 All these elements had,
to a certain degree, mystical connotations found within many forms of utopianism known as
millennial thought. They also contained, especially in the case of the relentless persecution of
specific sections of its society and it aggressive campaigns of war, the worst effects involving
the abuse of power.
/. The Image ofthe National Community (Volksgemeinschaft)
Within the parameters of the Nazi ideology, the primary goal was to radically alter the
structure of German society to replace traditional social, political, and religious loyalties in
such a way as to evoke a strong emotional connection to the state. The propaganda focused on
achieving this, relied heavily on an idealised mysticism to evoke the imagery of a 'people's
community'. This desire for unity stemmed from the latent perceptions of a consummate
40Welch, Pg. 51.
41 Ibid., Pg. 52.
42Ibid.
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mythology of the past instead of events located within the present.43 Propaganda and art were
simultaneously utilised to construct this image which instructed the people in regards to the
accomplishments of the party, and provide the justification for its demands of total loyalty.44
The basis for this conception was the principle of the 'community before the individual',
and it was the theme that later became the cornerstone of the social mobilisation for war. Once
the war was underway, this campaign was extended to incorporate measures for the
maintenance of the resolve necessary to the military and the society as a whole. Such measures
were coupled with the attempted dismantling of the existing class divisions, but there remained
a marked difference between the images produced by the party's propaganda and the actual
social reality. The class system remained and was as distinct and divided as at any other time
in Germany's history. As far as the war was concerned, however, this campaign was more
successful, though it was not due entirely to the virtues of the unity described by this
propaganda, but the fear of an impending military defeat.
Nevertheless, the concept of Volksgemeinschaft was a Utopian vehicle which aided in the
mobilisation of huge segments of the German populace and allowed the party to gain control
over the existing State apparatus. Under the cover of the seductive imagery of its discourse
and supposed philosophy of a harmonious national unity, its violent political machinery could
be assembled and utilised in a seemingly legitimate manner. In reality, such images only
enslaved the people, with an emotional and intellectual idealisation of German tradition and
history portrayed in a mythological form. Their need for deliverance from the hardship of the
times and humiliation was too heavy a burden for the rational decision process needed to
discern the real feasibility of the Volksgemeinschaft. Though on the surface such a doctrine
seemed to be the saviour of a flagging national pride, in reality, it turned out to be a fanatical
fantasy which cynically promised a new epoch of German culture and influence, but only
provided an avenue towards its destruction.
43Ibid., Pg. 53.
44Rauschning, Pg. 28. Rauschning describes the ramification of this call for total loyalty in terms of;
"Nothing is more mistaken than to talk of a "totalitarian State" or a "classless society" within the realm of
the nihilist revolution. In the place of these there is the machinery of absolute dominion, recognising
independence in no sphere at all, not even in the private life of the individual; and the totalitarian
collectivity of the Volksgemeinschaft, the 'national community,' a euphemism for an atomised
structureless nation."
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It The Doctrine ofRacial Purity and The Charismatic 'Leader'
A second propagated image utilised by the party for the mobilisation of the differing groups
within the German society was based on the concept of a 'people and a country', which served
as the source for the image of the master race, (herrenvolk)45 This imagery sought to evoke
the traditional peasant virtues of a mythical Nordic past and were reinforced by the depiction
of the warrior hero as the embodiment of the sanctity of the German fatherland. It also
simultaneously provoked the feeling amongst the populace that the treaty of Versailles had
been a criminal act against the nation and its sacred right to reach its full potential as a culture,
even if it was at the expense of the 'lower races'. In this way, the vision of a pure unsullied
race could build support for the implementation of the campaign of persecution aimed at non-
Germans. It was imperative that the positive image of the 'master race' be contrasted to the
image of the impure other, which could serve as a focal point for the fears and frustration of
the masses.
The fanaticism which the party provoked amongst the populace had to be continuously
diverted or it would have inevitably turned against their policies and it sought to overcome this
danger by reinforcing the desired sense of national unity by offsetting the 'pure' image of the
German against the negative 'hybrid' image of the 'lower' races. The invention of such an
enemy, could provoke the spontaneous emotions of hatred and violence which are the most
successful method of unifying numerous individuals into a mass mentality that is easily
controlled. With the displacement of ones misfortunes onto another party, a sense of hatred
towards that party serves to satisfy the emotional vacuum left in the wake of frustration over
certain existing conditions. Though hatred is the most base and simple of human emotions, it
is also one of the most emotionally satisfying and easily stimulated. The production of a
unified mass mentality is greatest if there is a target in which all the ills and pain of the crowd
can be vented. A differentiated 'other', perceived as the cause of such frustrations serves as
the perfect recipient for such a hateful revenge. This technique was an increasingly important
feature to the Nazi propaganda machine as its positive images faltered. Such accusations
became more prevalent as Germany's fortunes deteriorated and were expanded to strengthen
the resolve to fight.
The third and final component of this propaganda machine was the mystical image of Hitler
as the saviour of the German nation. He was seen as the man who embodied the national spirit
and was its ultimate guardian. Such imagery found its historical basis within the Christian
45Welch, Pg. 66.
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images of the messiah and a distorted interpretation of Nietzsche's concept of the Overman.
This imagery sought to instil within the minds of the masses, that only a man of Hitler's
character could bring about a German Renaissance. It was this image of the 'guardian of
Germany's destiny' that allowed Hitler to justify his claim of the title of supreme 'ruler'. The
power of this position was drawn from his personal charisma and mythical status within a
fabricated historical tradition instead of a legal doctrine. Thus, the office of the Fuhrer became
the most powerful institution within the hierarchy of the party and it was this image which
became the main legitimising force for the advent of the National Socialist revolution. Hitler,
then became the positive symbol or image of the ideal German, who because of his willingness
to sacrifice his own life for the nation, claimed the right to expect the same loyalty from his
people. It was this image that completed the triad of components in the arsenal of the Nazi
propaganda front which was to fulfil Germany's destiny.
Overcoming The Negative Effects ofPropaganda
It may appear strange, at first glance, to utilise the conspiracy of deception against the
German people by the National Socialists to reveal the connection of the historical
consciousness to the forces underlying the attributes of power and Utopia. In reality such an
example serves to reinforce the primary assertion that this relationship is an influential force in
several ways. The first, centres on the discourse that was produced by the Nazi's abuse of the
potential of the Utopian imagination and its intentional distortion of historical facts in order to
propagate its revolutionary activities. The second, stems from the rapid ascension to power
and eventual defeat of the German war machine. The party was extremely successful in the
mobilisation of diverse social and political groups focusing their pursuits towards singular
objectives needing a unified mass mentality for their implementation. And finally, it
exemplifies the possible outcome if a repressive regime utilises such latent imagery to control a
society or disguise the true nature of its actions and intentions.
Since propaganda is used in one form or another within the social and political discourse of
a community, to attempt to ignore its potential effects is to face the same danger of
complacency that allowed the National Socialist party to seize power, sustain its position, and
lead Germany down the path to its eventual devastation. Therefore, it serves as one of the
clearest historical examples of the potential influence that can be acquired through the
manipulation of the ideals, values and historical mythology of a society by groups in or
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seeking power. Such material is instrumental in the production of the propaganda that serves
to raise and maintain support for the policies of such groups, through an appeal to the fears and
prejudices of the populace that generally find their basis within the prevailing historical
interpretations of the times. Hence, it is an example of the misappropriation of the Utopian
spirit by an administration whose intentions are not to instigate change for the sole benefit of a
society, but to control it for use as a means to manifest its intentions.
Given that propaganda is intrinsic to a society's political discourse, its methodology must
continually be addressed and its potential regulated by critical examination. Habitually, the
propaganda of a political party, especially if it holds a dominant status in the existing division
of power, seeks to place itself in a position immune from any damaging challenges. It is due
to this desire that its discourse will seek to portray itself as containing the legitimacy and
competency to rule. Accordingly, it is a prudent measure to examine a multitude of sources to
distinguish the purely emotionally-directed propaganda from more objective political
discussions. The critical method of examining discourse in the form of exploring a variety of
differing interpretations can reduce the possibility of inconsistencies between certain theories
and the reality of the political realm. Such a methodology contains the ability to evaluate
proposals in a practical manner that could increase the chance of success in their enactment.
It is not possible to dispense with human values and emotions completely, for they are the
elements of human nature which contribute and indicate our goals and aspirations. However,
it is imperative, that such subjective attributes are countered-balanced by the faculty of reason
which contains the capacity to stipulate the most efficient methods of realising such desires.
Such a balance is difficult to achieve because such aspirations are a major factor in the
composition of ones' identity. This fact makes it an arduous task to expose them to a critical
examination that is objective, but if there is to be any chance of the successful implementation
of such aims, the discontinuity between the speculative methods of theory and the pragmatism
needed for their possible realisation must be bridged.
Since the device of propaganda, is intrinsically neutral in the moral sense as well as
endemic to the machinations of groups within the social realm, it is the intentions behind, and
the consequences of the actions it influences, which must be critically examined. Propaganda
itself, can be utilised to bring about both positive or negative effects, so in reality, it is merely
an instrument. Its potential to bring about beneficial consequences rests on its ability to evoke
an interest in a certain set of ideas, values or emotions. Such an emotive interest must then
become the basis from which a multitude of critical interpretations concerning its validity could
spring forth. What must be avoided, is the production of a multitude of material expounding
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the same view under various disguises. Discriminating exploration from varying points of
view is the foundation to any 'open' society which sanctions a freedom of expression.
Relentless propaganda campaigns seek to limit or discredit any objective attempts at building a
varied and far reaching critical discourse and therefore serves as the foundation on which a
'closed' one is constructed. For the best of all possible worlds to exist within the structure of a
society, the realisation of the former tendency must take precedence over those inherent to the
latter.
This method of objective discourse becomes extremely difficult in times of social, political,
or economic crisis, because any group or individual attempting such a methodology within
these circumstances often becomes the focus of attacks from those wanting to maintain the
existing structures and conditions of a society out of the fear concerning the uncertainty of
change or for the maintenance of a privileged position. It is essential at such times that
rational thought is utilised to access the actual implications of the perceived crisis and to
discern the best avenues for the successful alleviation of its problems. It is only through this
method that a potentially successful solution can be discovered. Because of this necessity of
rational thought, the emotional content of propaganda must never be allowed to overpower the
reason that is intrinsic to the intellect, nor should the faculty of reason be allowed to hinder the
enthusiasm needed to undertake any actions seeking to implement changes which might bring
about more desirable conditions. An excess of introspective examination can lead to inaction,
and eventually stagnation through a loss of interest and support. The balance which must be
struck between objectivity and enthusiastic faith is as difficult as the equilibrium involving the
tendencies of power and Utopia, and just as necessary.
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Book III: The Potentialof This Interaction.
Chapter VII:
The Necessity ofIdeals
Throughout the preceding chapters, this study has revealed the extent and means by which
the inter-relationship of the forces of power and Utopia influences the definition of many of the
essential characteristics of the human condition. At a fundamental level, when describing the
foundations of a social configuration, ideal or otherwise, these forces dictate the very nature of
its essential premises and suppositions. Given this, it seems a safe assumption that in
describing such a system, a reference is being made to a specific division of power, and
subsequently, to the vision or ideal that underlies it. No ideology can transform the conditions
of an existing society without capturing the imagination of its members. Hence, the ideal
imagery produced by the Utopian spirit is an important feature to the functioning of a society
and serves as a central focus in the formation of a unified collective from the diverse groups
located within a cultural structure.
Similarly, if an individual or group that seeks to implement certain social reforms cannot
attain a position of sufficient influence, then the visions which they seek to manifest will
remain images of a purely wishful nature. These factors are at the root of the assertion
stipulating that the alignment of these forces influences in a profound manner, the conditions of
any social configuration as well as the ideology that defines it. Therefore, any evaluation of
the potential of such a system must address the nature of the connection between these two
forces. Consequently, it is imperative to understand the role and essential characteristics of the
system of beliefs and ideals that define the essential parameters of a social structure. As a
result, by understanding how the matrix of ideals and subsequent praxis interact at this
fundamental level, it will be possible to cut through much of the ideological rhetoric in order
to discern the essential premises of many existing social structures.
Through an exploration of several of the issues which arise in relation to the necessary role
that ideals play in the formulation of social configurations, it will be possible to ascertain the
influence that such ideals can attain. In doing so, some of the arguments against the Utopian
imagination and several misconceptions concerning its potential could be clarified as well. To
begin this, the traditional stance against Utopia must be re examined to indicate where some of
these misconceptions surface. Some of these criticisms have been touched on earlier within the
context of Utopia's definition, but several significant issues still remain undefined which
pertain to the potential of its methodology. In asserting the importance of this method of social
reform and its connection to the notion of power, the argument against its procedures needs to
be explored and some of its criticisms addressed directly. A classic attack lodged against this
method is put forth by Karl Popper1 in his text, The Open Society and Its Enemies, and it is
this argument which will serve to embody the classic anti-utopian stance. It is within this
context that the necessity of the role of the ideal in the formation of human society begins to
come to light.
I. The Case Against Utopian Speculation
"Everything has got to be smashed to start with. Our whole damned civilisation has got to go, before we
can bring any decency into the world." 'Moulin', in Du Gard's, Les Thibaults.
This quote2 sets the tone for the critical attitude Popper takes towards the notion of Utopia
within his text. He envisions it, for the most part, as a form of social engineering. According
to his definition, its main intention is the complete reconstruction of a society utilising a
predetermined plan of action generally portrayed as rational and scientific.3 One of the central
factors of any rational plan is that it must contain an ultimate objective formulated in advance
'This argument can be found in chapter 9, (Aestheticism, Perfectionism, Utopianism) of The Open
Society and Its Enemies by Karl Popper. Volume I: The Spell of Plato. (London: Routledge & Kegan




of any action undertaken. After such an objective is decided upon, the next rational step is to
determine the means which will bring about this desired end.
Consequently, the visualisation of this ultimate end is the first step that must be taken in
distinguishing the hierarchical structure which orders the relationship between the preliminary,
intermediate, and ultimate objectives needed to materialise it. When this principle is applied to
the concept of political action, the first step is the depiction of a proper and necessary social
order. It is only after the creation of such a 'blueprint' that the most efficient strategy for the
achievement of such a state of affairs can be developed. These premises are claimed by those
advocating such a scheme to be the most rational, and therefore containing the greatest chance
of successful implementation.
Popper's central criticism of this argument rests on the idea that though such a
methodology may work on objectives which are clear and straightforward by nature, the social
constitution of a culture is complex enough to annul any validity that the predications of
proposals advocating such sweeping changes might contain. In other words his main criticism
is not directed towards the notion of utilising ideals or the conception of ideal states per se, but
the creation of a set of ideals which calls for the complete transformation of a society's
institutions through radical measures within the short term. The consequences of such an
undertaking are impossible to estimate in advance, and by setting such actions in motion the
members of a society are placed at the mercy of a fallible intellect. The inherent risk involved
with such an intellect stems from its propensity to oversimplify the inherent diversity of the
surrounding reality. Another danger emerges with actions of such magnitude, owing to the
close proximity of power with its underlying interests that tend to seek the implementation of
such plans to the point of dogmatism. In these circumstances, the temptation to resort to
violence at the slightest hint of ideological disagreement or social unrest would be difficult to
resist once the process of implementation had commenced.
Popper asserts that the aestheticism implied within such proposals is the cause of their
inherent irrationality, despite their claims to the opposite. Their appearance of rationality
stems solely from their superficial basis on the methods of science, and in reality, such
procedures are merely the materialisation of attempts at providing a simplified abstraction
describing the complexity of the social sphere. He maintains that this quest for simplified
paradigms must be tempered within the field of politics by controlling those ready to conceive
society as a kind of canvas which can be radically transformed by visions of abstract
perfection. The characteristics of this reality must be defined by a perpetual striving for
equality and founded upon sound principles of the importance of the individual, instead of
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some contrived abstraction claimed as perfection. According to this argument then, the
tradition of utopianism seeks to instil a hope in political miracles, but in reality, its images of
perfection can be materialised only by shedding the very reason and rationale claimed to be
their foundation.
His answer to such proposed setbacks revolves around the notion that any changes to the
social structure of a society should be made incrementally over an extended period of time.
This is due to the fact that any man-made system can only be truly efficient and workable over
a protracted period and this is especially the case when dealing with the infinitely complex
nature of the social sphere. The inspirations and visions of humanity must be supplemented by
the experienced gained through a method of experimentation based on trial and error. It is this
method that is truly related to the procedures of science and in such complex undertakings as
the reformation of social and political institutions, a necessary procedure. The inevitability of
mistakes in such a practice can only be overcome with a process of modest and cautious
adjustments. This 'piece-meal' procedure would allow the knowledge gained through multiple
smaller-scale experiments to be applied in a continuous process of reformation calibrated to the
immediate needs of those involved. This technique is better prepared to accommodate the
fluctuations of Man's social configurations due to its intrinsic readiness to learn from its
mistakes through the formulation of procedures that address problems as they arise. It is this
method and not the supposedly 'rational' method proposed by the misguided idealism of the
Utopians which contains the greatest chance of success within the complexity of the social and
political realm.
II. Utopianism and Millennial Thought
In assessing the impact of this criticism, several issues must be addressed and the
seriousness of the implications of their charges carefully measured. A central issue within this
critique revolves around his conception of the methodology of Utopia. The main thrust of his
argument is directed towards the procedure which is assumed a Utopian would seek to
undertake, rather than the actual content of his or her vision. There are several questions
which arise concerning this conception that seem to undermine this critique and these will
serve as a guide in our investigation of the validity of his argument. In the first instance, is
this methodological critique of Utopia based on the grounds of an inherent 'radical
aestheticism' valid in all cases? Further, Is such a notion applicable to a majority of the
endeavours involving Utopian speculation or is his description relevant to only a specific
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segment of this type of thought? And finally, if his description is too restricted, can a more
accurate description of the Utopian imagination be reconciled with his 'piece-meal' proposal for
social reform?
On a general level, it seems that Popper's perception of Utopia suffers from a similar
malady as the one he attributes to the Utopian: oversimplification. This criticism seems to be
directly applicable to two specific types of Utopian speculation; Utopian social engineering and
millennial thought. In the case of the latter, and more indirectly the former, the language and
premises utilised are more eschatological in their foundations. Such rhetoric calls upon a
certain conception of social justice to be materialised and differs from other forms of Utopian
thought because it draws much of its imagery from religious sources.4
The descriptions generally contained within its discourse transform the conception of the
absolute and impending "judgement day" held by many religious doctrines into a chiliastic call
from radical social and political transformation. Usually, such movements are described as if
there is an impending revolution and underlying their calls for change is the proposal of a more
extremist short term approach to social reform. Similarly, some types of Utopian socialism
make cognate calls for the 'clearing-away' of all the existing social institutions as well as
attempting to foster an almost religious belief in the power of reason. The central similitude
between the two methodologies is the adherence to dogmatic beliefs and a radical approach to
social reform.
Such a trend towards this type of a revolutionary millenialism can be found in many of the
modern political ideologies such as Communism and Fascism which led to the death and
hardship of vast numbers of individuals due to actions based on policies generated from the
intrinsic elements consistent to those found in many forms of medieval eschatology. One
element that connects millennial thought to these modern ideologies is the image of a 'New
Jerusalem' promised after a radical transformation to the existing social and political structures
at the time. The suffering endured by the often violent measures utilised to instigate these
radical changes is then justified by the promises of this end result.
Generally, such a call for revolution is coupled with a second element, which contrasts the
righteousness or purity of a group to the baseness of another group. This depiction provides
the moral grounds for the 'chosen' people to undertake heroic acts of extraordinary courage or
4Amitava Ray, Political Utopianism: Some Philosophical Problems. (India: Minerva Associates, 1978)
Pg. 30. Refer to chapter 2 of this text for a more detailed examination of the differences between
utopianism and millennial thought than the space and focus of the present study will allow. Included in
this chapter is an account of Norman Cohn's description of the classical forms of medieval millennial
prophecy and their relation to the modern ideologies of Communism and Fascism.
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bravery against these other 'darker' forces. When this race or nation reaches its potential, it
will reign supreme over the inferior races or nations by a form of divine right. A third and
final element habitually centres around the notion of a demagogue in the form of a human
saviour which is portrayed as larger than life. Such discourse claims that it is only this person
who can lead the people to the greatness heralded by this epic revolution. This cataclysmic
'cleansing' is frequently described as being contained within the context of the future, but it is
the virtues of the present generation which can fulfil this prophecy. All of these aspects were
prevalent features in the study of the Nazi's rise to power undertaken in the preceding chapter.
There are similar characteristics found within the more extreme forms of Utopian thought
described by Popper. The description of eugenic breeding in order to produce a 'pure' and
'noble' race of human habitually arises within this context. Likewise, the concept of freedom
may be regulated out of existence in the name of harmony and spiritual fulfilment. Such
measures are generally an open invitation to tyranny. These attributes mirror the chiliastic
ones surfacing within many forms of millennial thought and usually stem from the perception
involving the perpetual degradation of Mankind. However, the religious connotations are
replaced by the dogmas of science and 'rational' thought.
These radical, and often paranoid fantasies contained within many supposedly Utopian
doctrines are valid recipients of Popper's criticism. Such dialogues often rise in popularity
when there is a loss of faith concerning the values and ideals of the existing religious, or social
institutions. When such systems collapse, fear begins to grip the populace, unleashing the
potential for the accumulation of support for a certain group's fanatical visions. Such events
happened in Germany between the wars with the ideology of the Nazi party.5 These radical
images do carry certain connotations similar to other forms of Utopian speculation, but their
conceptions are more about the accumulation of power and resources, not their fair and just
distribution. Most forms of utopianism are concerned with the latter, so in reality, the only
similarity is that it calls for changes to an existing social structure. Therefore, though the
means of description seem similar, the extent and aims of these changes are radically different.
III. A Moderate Conception ofUtopia and Utopian Thought
There can be no doubt that a discourse containing rhetoric demanding the complete
transformation of the institutions of a society within a short temporal span is a dangerous
5See chapter 6, under the section heading; 'Nazi Germany: A Case Study in The Manipulation of The
Historical Consciousness', for a discussion concerning Hitler's utilisation of the historical consciousness
to mobilise diverse groups in support of his party's political intentions.
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proposition and more than likely only a cover for the consolidation of power. Such fanatical
discourse habitually ends in hardship and violence to the parties involved. Its imagery serves
as an avenue for an opportunistic individual or group to seize the power to dominate by force
and resisting such actions becomes difficult to stop if the general population has been
successfully immersed in the propaganda of such a movement. Given this, Popper's criticism
is correct in its condemnation of such discourse, but falls wide of the mark in its definition of
the whole of the Utopian discourse by such a methodology.
Though both Utopian and millennial thought criticise their surrounding social contexts with
the projection of images of alternative futures with the goal towards instigating social action,
there are still a great many differences between these forms of thought.6 Due to its
eschatological foundations, millennial thought demands a type of faith akin to those demanded
by many religions. Some forms of Utopian socialism also demand a similar faith in the power
and predictability of rational action. This kind of unquestioning faith requires answers and
provides consolation instead of information concerning the reality of its surroundings. It
habitually provides some form of messiah (either a person, an ideology, or both) a
predetermined historical scheme, (i.e. a belief in 'destiny' or necessary outcome) and
revolutionary measures that may be violent and apocalyptic in nature. It is these three
characteristics which Popper associates with all Utopian thought and therefore criticises its
potential to end in violence as it is a necessary outcome of any endeavour utilising such a
method.
The conception of Utopian thought which has been maintained throughout this study has the
potential to be more constructive due to its more neutral connotations. As envisioned within
the context of this study, Utopian thought sheds the burden of these apocalyptic notions with
their extreme moral righteousness and calls for tumultuous revolutionary change. Its images
are not necessarily indicating imperative objectives that must be implemented, even by violent
measures if opposition arises, nor does its method claim that such goals are inescapable
features of the course of history. This conception portrays the Utopian imagination as a
component of a dialectical process of criticism that is perpetual and contributes to the continual
cycle of reformation involving the predominant ideological system of a society.
Consequently, Utopian thought is an inherent part of the complex of ideals that
simultaneously orders a society and projects the possibilities guiding its transformation. This
conception does not envision Utopian thought as the antithesis of the existing order, but as an
intrinsic part of the socialising process. It provides critical suggestions indicating requisite
6Ray, Pg. 36.
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reforms for the maintenance of the entire cultural system. Therefore, because of its role in the
continual reformation of the social order, it is intrinsically linked to the division of power and
can serve as a foil to its potential excesses or abuses. Though in many cases its form, context,
and language, may be imaginative, the essential character of the changes it seeks to evoke
usually contain characteristics allowing for the possibility of their actual manifestation
somewhere within the future horizon.
IV. Utopian Thought As An Incremental Process ofSocial Change
The discussion of the preceding sections, sheds light on the issues raised by the first of our
three questions concerning Popper's argument. It seems that he is correct in his assumption
that there are certain forms of thought akin to utopianism that can be inherently dangerous to
the very society they seek to transform, but the validity of this argument wanes if it is asserted
that it applies to all Utopian thought. As was indicated earlier, certain depictions of the
betterment of the human condition have been utilised at various times in history in order to
disguise actions depriving individual freedom instead of increasing it, but such occurrences are
not a necessary outcome of such events.
Catastrophic conditions have materialised in experiments that were too extreme or of too
large a scale. It is because of events like the communist revolution in Russia that a prejudice
has developed against this form of thought. However, utopianism is latent in all social and
political machinations, so it cannot be discounted completely. Such conditions do not arise
from the method itself, but with the magnitude and underlying intentions behind the
reformation implemented. In light of the broader definition presented above, it would seem
possible to salvage the Utopian methodology as a valid form of speculation. What Popper
seems to be criticising is not the use of ideals as a guide towards realising the potential of a
society, but a dogmatic and unquestioning adherence to inflexible objectives realised at any
cost.7 Given the possible outcome of such actions, it would be hard for a 'rational' individual
to argue.
In grappling with the final question concerning the possible alignment of the proposed
'piece meal' approach to social reform and the Utopian methodology, such connections seem
not only possible but essential. In Popper's conception of a process of long-term experiments
within an incremental system of social reform, the Utopian propensity to ask what if?....,
seems to be a necessary component to such a practice. After all, most experiments in science
7Popper, Pg. 161.
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begin with a conjecture or hypothesis that then serves to guide the research procedure.
Generally, when new information is discovered, the original hypothesis is adjusted and more
experiments are undertaken to reinforce or test its validity. Any individual undertaking an
experiment understands the necessity for imaginative conjectures in solving problems arising at
various stages within the research procedure.
When transferring the methodology of science to the social and political context, the
imagery provided by the Utopian could serve as a form of conjecture pertaining to future
possibilities. It is difficult to solve a social problem without some conception of how the
segment of society where the problem exists could be transformed to alleviate it. This is
where the notion of an ideal plays an important part. For example, in addressing the problem
of unemployment, one must formulate some conception of what full employment would be like
as well as the virtues of its existence. It is only then that certain hypothesis can be made
defining possible solutions for the dilemma. This action is vital to the nature of overcoming
problems as well as gaining support for the potential solutions to solve them.
Given this, it would seem that the 'piece-meal' methodology that Popper proposes would
benefit from the insertion of an element of Utopian speculation. There will always he the
potential for abuse of the Utopian imagination owing to its inherent link to individual desires
which are easily manipulated or controlled. It is for this reason that the forces bent on gaining
power in an absolute form will seek to use its images as a disguise for certain actions. The
balance of power within a society is precarious during times of change or unrest, so social
actions within this context should be taken with a view to prudence. Thus, Popper's call for
careful and measured consideration before any social action is endeavoured upon seems
definitely warranted. However, this doesn't entail the jettisoning of ideals as a guide to
potential futures, but does imply the necessity for understanding their essential nature.
The Utilisation of Ideals, The Imagination, and The Concept of "Good"
All politics imply a certain idea ofman. - Paul Valery*
As discovered above, when one is describing a 'no place' that is not actually manifested in
the material sense, one is referring to a mental image that is not located in a tangible way (i.e.
8Quoted in the note of dedication in John Gunnell, Political Philosophy and Time. (Middletown,
Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1968).
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it cannot be experienced directly by the human senses) within the temporal and spatial context
of the present. Correspondingly, the act of creating a Utopia entails the projection of a mental
image of a community whereby the conception of its political structure and social conditions
are ideally situated to portray a certain standard of perfection. But, this standard may be
difficult or impossible to create in the material sense within the surroundings of its conception.
Given this, one must assume that by its intrinsic nature an object of the human imagination,
such as a Utopia, is probably not attainable in its entirety.
Therefore, the impetus for its creation does not exist entirely within the objective reality of
the material world, but also includes visions located within the human imagination. This inner
subjective world of the imagination inevitably influences humanity's perception of the external
reality through the construction of a system that relies on ideals or symbols as paradigms that
define Man's field of potential action. This network of the mental images, acts as an
interpretative apparatus for the translation of experiences within the material world while
simultaneously projecting images which allow the individual the means to transform this
reality. Hence, this conceptual framework gives an individual a unique 'point of reference'
which instils a sense of meaning and purpose to its existence.9
It is this sense of meaning that serves as the foundation for the ordering of the chaotic
perceptions of the surrounding environment. Such an order is a fundamental component of the
human ability to define its existence creatively by allowing its consciousness to exist within all
three temporal horizons simultaneously. Consequently, it is this conceptual framework that
envisions future possibilities within the present that are combined with the collective memories
of the past. In this way, the past and future tense bestows meaning upon ones existence within
the present and it is by analysing this system that the fundamental character of its role in
human existence can be brought to light. This process of interpretation grants the human
consciousness the ability to undertake creative action through the manipulation of the material
objects within the world. It is the attempts at the integration of these unique psychological
attributes which inevitably produces autonomous interpretations of reality as well as ideals
concerned with ones desired mode of existence.10
In illustrating such an intricately complex process, it is necessary to comprehend the
intrinsic characteristics of an ideal and its relation to the faculty of the imagination. Further,
the implications of this relationship must be addressed within the context of a common "good"
which is generally implicit to the Utopian endeavour. Three questions will be addressed in
9Gunnell, Pg. 4. See also Pg. 118 of this text.
10Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. (New York:
Macmillan, 1953), Pg. 226e. Op. cit.: Gunnell, Pg. 5.
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regards to the relationship of ideals and the imagination. What is the nature of ideals and their
implicit function in the formulation of the social structures of Man? What are the fundamental
parameters of the human imagination and how are they related to the notion of ideals? And
lastly, what influence do such issues bear on the conception of the "good" postulated by the
Utopian imagination?
I. The Intrinsic Nature ofIdeals
An intrinsic characteristic of human existence is the inherent sense of discontentment that
manifests itself as the longing to overcome the perceived obstacles blocking the avenue to
fulfilment. This sense of lack drives the essential being of Man to strive towards the
transformation of its surrounding environs in an effort to overcome this feeling. The mental
images of a desired state of perfection directing human actions are known as ideals. Such
notions generally differ from what is ordinarily conceived as an idea, because it pertains to the
"...answering to ones highest conception, visionary, or a state of perfection or one that is
supremely excellent."11 Thus, ideals serve as the ultimate objectives which constitute and
direct Man's subjective striving to transform the world. It is the projection of such
impressions that bestow upon humans the ability to think and act creatively. They guide the
perpetual quest of overcoming the resistance of the external world, and enables humanity to
rise above being totally controlled by, and at the mercy of, the eternal forces of such a reality.
Under the guidance of these visions, Mankind carves out its intrinsic freedom within the
temporal and spatial horizon of its habitation. This freedom is the fundamental defining factor
of humanity, so to deny it, is to deny the avenue to a creative life and the activity that shapes
our humanity.
Consequently, the action of formulating an ideal entails proposing something desirable, yet
unrealisable within the present conditions.12 However, though it may be unrealisable, to be
nR. E. Allen, ed. The Concise Oxford Dictionary. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) Pg. 585.
12Plato, The Republic, trans. H. D. P. Lee. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. 1955)
Pg. 232. Within this dialogue, Socrates describes the role of the ideal and distinguishes between it and
the real in the phrase; '"Then we were looking for an ideal when we tried to define justice and injustice,
and to describe what the perfectly just or perfectly unjust man would be like if he ever existed. By
looking at these perfect patterns and the measure of happiness or unhappiness they would enjoy, we force
ourselves to admit that the nearer we approximate to them the more nearly we share their lot. That was
our purpose, rather than to show that they could be realised in practice, was it not?' 'That, then, is
the truth of the matter. But if I'm to go on, to oblige you, and show how and under what conditions we
can get nearest our ideal, you must admit that the same principles apply.' 'What principles?'
'Does practice ever square with theory? Is it not in the nature of things that, whatever people think,
practice should fall short of the precision of theory? What do you think?'
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valid it must not be impossible.13 A unrealisable ideal serves as a valid objective because its
characteristics are intrinsically connected to the circumstances of the reality which spawn it.
Because such an ideal is essentially grounded within the present, the striving to fulfil its
potential contains the capacity to produce intermediate benefits throughout the process of
transformation it instigates. This potential surfaces when an ideal is in alignment with the
lives of the individuals that its visions seek to alter. When this circumstance arises, an ideal
serves as an objective with the possibility of producing beneficial results. Yet, if an ideal
contains little or no relation to the circumstances of its present context, the exertion spent to
realise it will not produce a measured and steady process of change which is in the best interest
of those involved, but may instigate extreme changes which can cause massive social and
political upheavals. Such turmoil will destroy the important equilibrium of forces that makes a
free society possible. The ideals often projected within millennial thought, are of this latter
type and have produced many occurrences of this nature throughout history.
Thus, the ideals with the potential to produce beneficial changes are those which are
possible because they correspond to the conditions of the present context. They do not
advocate elements that are logically impossible, but are only unrealisable within the context of
their conception. In other words, such ideals are aligned with the essential qualities of human
nature and their realisation doesn't involve any denial of the central values or characteristics of
the context of the individuals or communities seeking their manifestation.14 Such ideals must
be projected far enough into the future to remain as a valid objective for several generations.
If, however, an ideal is projected too far in advance or it is impossible to achieve, it fails to
produce the sense of purpose that underlies most creative acts. In this circumstance, it only
succeeds in disillusioning individuals because they are battling the external forces of reality in
a contradictory manner. They are not only struggling against the resistance of the outside
world, but the central characteristics of their humanity. Hence, an ideal's most important
quality is that it must be constructive so as to serve as an incentive, one which mirrors the
values and conditions of the society which formulated them. By this then, there are certain
conditions which have the possibility to be overcome by the industriousness of Man and others
which are impossible. Therefore, an essential element to a valuable and beneficial ideal is that
it must distinguish properly between these differing conditions and reflect the ones that are
related to man's intrinsic ability. Only an ideal such as this can induce a valid striving to reach
man's potentiality.
13Aldous Huxely, Proper Studies. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1927) Pg. 261.
14Huxely, Pg. 263.
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II. Ideals and The Imagination
The component of the human consciousness that creates the mental images of these ideals is
the faculty of the imagination. In short, ideals are imaginary constructs contained within the
human mind. According to the common conception of the imagination, such a mental faculty
is conceived as being counter to, or removed from, the reality of the external world. It is true
that the imagination contains the capacity to create highly inventive mental images, but it is
also involved in the most ordinary sensual perceptions and experiences of our surrounding
environment. At an essential level then, the imagination contains the capacity for the creation
of images which are mental by nature, (as opposed to what is commonly conceived as material)
and manifested in two possible ways. One is passive by nature, because of its involvement in
the interpretation of sensory impressions, while the other is actively creative, due to its
utilisation in the construction of unique fictions.15
In the case of the former, the imagination is concerned with the interpretation of the
disparate data perceived by the human senses. This component of the imagination is
fundamental to the understanding of the world, and is universal to everyone. Within the
context of Kant's terminology, it is the transcendental or a priori type of imagination. The
images produced by this component attempt to discover the connections within the disparate
information gathered by the senses in order to formulate a coherent understanding of the
totality of the external world. The latter, is located on the other extreme of the consciousness
and is considered to be the empirical component. This term describes the inherent power of
the human consciousness to create images that are fictitious, illusory, and may hold no
connection to the conditions of the external world. Unlike the portion of the imagination that
is connected to perception, such a capacity varies widely amongst individuals.16
Kant's conception of the faculty of the imagination places it as a separate and distinct
component from the rest of the faculty of human consciousness. It is located between our
intellectual knowledge of the world, which consists of thoughts involving the abstract nature of
elements and its perceptual imagery as compiled by the senses. According to this argument
then, without the intellectual component of the imagination, our perception of the surrounding
environment would be lacking in any notion of coherence while without the experience of the
senses, the images of the creative intellect would be void of any connection to the conditions of
the external world.17 In other words, Kant's theory of the imagination envisions a dual




function which enables Man to recognise objects within the world essential to obtaining an
intrinsic understanding of its fundamental character. It also provides the intellect with a
faculty for producing a uniquely creative mental imagery. In short, the imagination is
conceived as a mental power within the human consciousness that undertakes the dual role of
representing objects previously encountered in reality and creating novel mental images.18
Sartre takes a similar view to Kant concerning this subject in terms of its being the image-
making power involved in consciousness, but departs from this description in the area of
Kant's claims depicting it as a component that is over, above, or separate from the other
elements which comprise consciousness. By Sartre's conception, the imagination is an
inseparable constituent element in the process of the consciousness that discovers its nature by
exercising its intrinsic freedom. Like Kant, he asserts that perception of the elements of reality
is primarily involved in the act of interpretation with the eternal world being a concrete given
that surrounds the faculty of human consciousness. This consciousness is inherently free, in
that at every passing instant it contains the potential to produce a mental image that is abstract
and unreal. As a result, this image is produced outside of reality by a consciousness that is
grounded firmly within it. Because of this potential, the consciousness is able to negate the
given circumstances of the present and move beyond them.19 This roughly outlines the
meaning of Sartre's statement; "the imaginary makes its appearance on the foundation of the
world."20
With this assertion, Sartre clearly moves away from Kant's conception of the imagination
as an interpretative faculty located somewhere between sensual perception and the production
of abstract mental concepts. The former argument places greater emphasis on the unity of the
consciousness by depicting each act of comprehension concerning a 'real' element within the
world as an implicit surpassing of it towards the imaginary. Thus, the production of the
mental images of the consciousness described as imaginary, in the sense of being separate from
the 'real' of the world, actually utilises the constituent elements uncovered within this context
as a resource for their construction. In turn, all interpretation concerning this reality depends
upon this 'imaginative consciousness' to provide the meaning of a particular situation.
Therefore, the comprehension of the 'nothingness' of the mental image is reliant upon, and
develops incrementally, through a succession of actions concerned with the surrounding
18Ibid., Pg. 34.
19J. P. Sartre, The Psychology of Imagination, trans. Bernard Frechtman. (New York: Washington
Square Press Inc., 1966) Pg. 243
20Sartre, Pg. 245.
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concrete environment. Reciprocally, this same 'nothingness' of the mental image becomes the
foundation for the passage beyond the concrete world towards the imaginary.21
Therefore, the imagination, as depicted by this description is not merely considered as an
appendage to the consciousness, but is actually the 'essential and transcendental condition of
the conscious, and thus, inseparable from the unified totality of human consciousness. This
faculty is not a passive faculty, but an active one, for it is the inherent driving force in the
expression of human freedom. It is this act of consciousness, that enables man to surpass the
given of his surroundings, thereby allowing it to be considered as a power contributing to the
intellect. The exercise of such a faculty is fundamental to the existence of Mankind, for its
images are not a wasteful excess, but a fundamental expression of the freedom of the human
consciousness.
Ideals, The Imagination, andConceptions of the "Good"
Following from this, the conception of a Utopia can be considered an act of the imagination
in which an image of an alternative reality is separate from, but related to, the concrete one
surrounding its conception. Its projected images are potential avenues that can facilitate a
'moving beyond' these conditions. This is the important point that surfaces in Sartre's
discussion of the imagination which pertains to Utopia. For its inherent strength is its ability to
surpass the conditions of its present surroundings. It is by this action that the consciousness
expresses its intrinsic freedom. This notion of surpassing or overcoming the present is also an
important component of Nietzsche's description of the will to power and Bloch's anticipatory
consciousness. Hence, it is within Sartre's notion of the imagination that we are presented
with a unified conception of these arguments through the emphasis of the importance of the
mental image to the fundamental nature of Man's existence.
If, as Sartre asserts, the activity of the imagination is an essential manifestation of the
transcendental consciousness, then the formulation of the ideals as depicted in many Utopian
endeavours is an essential part of the expression of Man's essential nature as freedom. Such
ideal worlds are the embodiment of desires, and influence our perceptions and actions within
the external world. This relationship between the mental and material world is reciprocal
because the concrete nature of the world defines the limits which the mental image seeks to
surpass. Given this, it is the imagination which serves as the essential component in the
2'ibid., Pg. 246.
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construction of the ideal worlds of Utopia, and therefore, it is the intrinsic link between these
mental constructs and the concrete reality of the external world.
It is imperative to note that with such acts of the imagination, there is an implicit call for
the overcoming of the present that will result in an expression of a 'good'. The true Utopian
endeavour projects an imagery, rightly or wrongly, which the author feels will bring about
benevolent conditions. An important quest in the interpretation of any Utopian text is to
discern the fundamental implication of what such a notion of the "good" truly entails. If such
conditions could come about only at the repression of a large number of other individual's
quest for their "good", they become suspect and more related to the accumulation of power
than to the Utopian spirit.
In relation to the theories of the imagination and the nature of ideals then, an ideal
depicting a certain potential interpretation of existence can be formulated in one of two ways.22
In the first instance, an ideal can be expressed in relation to a Utopia as a depiction of the
"good life" in terms of undertaking measures that develop the essential qualities of communal
life to the highest degree possible. In the second, such ideals can be utilised as a guide for the
production of the "good human". What is meant by this expression is that such ideals serve as
directives for an individual to develop to their utmost potential within the finite span of a life.
An implicit feature of both of these methods is the notion of well-being and individual interest.
Something considered "good" for an individual increases the avenues for the pursuit of his/her
interests. Hence, an intrinsic quality of ideals is their relation to the subjective conscious of an
individual, but the Utopian methodology takes the notion of ideals into the realm of the
community. It is within the context of this transformation that its linkage to power occurs, and
it is imperative that the emphasis on the potential of the individual to define the parameters of
his/her well-being be maintained as far as possible. With this in mind, we can now turn our
focus towards outlining the role that power and Utopia play in realising such a potential.
—Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) Pg. 18.
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Chapter Mil:
On Power and Utopia
After uncovering the various effects of the interaction of the underlying forces of power
and Utopia, it is now possible to conclude this exploration by addressing the question put forth
at the beginning of this study: What are the fundamental characteristics of the connection
between the attributes of power and Utopia, and how do they affect the human condition? In
addressing this principal question, our study comes full circle. Within the preceding
discussions concerning the potential outcomes of the interrelationship of these forces, it has
emerged that this relationship is centrally influential to the human condition. The ideals of
Utopia and Utopian thought profoundly affect the perceptions and expectations involving this
condition and influences the definition of cultural institutions which inform and order the lives
of its individual members. Such imagery emerges within the minds of common men
speculating upon their immediate desires as well as world leaders with visions pertaining to the
potential ordering of huge societies. It is the values contained within these images that can
inspire the formation of collectives stimulating a co-operative spirit or directly influence the
facilitation of their disintegration.
Similarly, it has also emerged that such a collective spirit can be in unison with or take
action against, the ideology of the ruling elite within a given social context. This inherent
potential to affect the predominant ruling contingent within a society, intrinsically links the
imagery produced by the Utopian imagination to the ideology underlying an existing division of
power. It is this capacity to produce emotive imagery capable of instigating praxis at all levels
of existence, from fundamental notions of Being to the formulation of a collective psyche,
which intertwines and connects these forces.
Consequently, given their central position, the potential response to this overriding
question indicates that the essential connection between power and Utopia lies within the
context of the expression of Man's creative freedom. This response leads into one of the great
debates within the history of ideas, the controversy between the advocates of freewill and those
supporting determinism. The preceding explorations of notions such as power, Utopia, the
imagination, and the nature of ideals, all contain implications referencing this debate. It
concerns issues surrounding the possibility of Man containing the capacity to make non-
externally determined choices or whether such forces condition his actions completely. The
theories of Nietzsche, Bloch, and Sartre, all seem to imply that there is a certain area of human
existence which allows for the concept of freedom to be applied to the will. Contrary to this
position is the doctrine of historical determinism which asserts that Man's actions are
completely dependent on the casual chain of events that are determined by the external forces
unleashed within the sequence of the world's historical events.
Our preliminary response is seemingly committed to the former conception, but the extent
of Man's capacity for undetermined praxis remains to be resolved. Sartre's view on the
subject provides a substantial clue towards the attainment of a workable position rectifying
these opposing perspectives, but before exploring this view, it is imperative to outline and
clarify the respective arguments. It is within this context that the foundations for the discovery
of the role of power and Utopia in the expression of humanity's intrinsic freedom will emerge.
I. Determinism vs. Freewill
In undertaking this, we will begin with the determinist's position. The foundation for this
perspective rests on a conception of the world process where the arrangement of elements at a
particular instance in time causes or determines the ordering of the subsequent state of affairs
emerging within the next instance of time. There are two important implications arising from
such a conception. The first, implies that within this world, there exists an element of
predictability,1 and if there is sufficient factual knowledge of the preceding events available, an
'Allan M. Munn, Freewill& Determinism (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1960) Pg. 207.
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accurate prediction of subsequent events is possible. The second, stems directly from this, and
entails the assertion that all potential actions or movements of a particular element within a
specific circumstance are determined by the conditions that preceded it. In relation to Man's
existence, this implies that all his actions are actually conditioned solely by external forces and
have little to do with an inner subjective will which contains the ability to implement free acts
outside the influence of these conditions.
In the materialist argument of Marxism, historical and social events comprise a
superstructure of interrelations that determine the thoughts and actions of the individuals
contained within it. According to this doctrine, an important historical figure such as Joseph
Stalin rose to power, made certain decisions and took subsequent action with characteristics
dictated completely by his surroundings. Uniquely individual thoughts or qualities outside
these external conditions had no influence on the actions that were endeavoured upon within
the context of his lifetime. The superstructure of history determined the abstract universal
characteristics of Stalin's position and the individual known by that name assumed it. If it had
not been this exact individual, another individual with similar characteristics conditioned by
the movements of history would arise to fulfil this position. So, the superstructure determines
the composition of the necessary characteristics of the historical figure of a "Stalin" and an
individual rises to fulfil the position. If not Stalin, someone akin to him, so the historical
outcome would inevitably be the same.2
Contrary to this position is the belief that there is a small area of unpredictability within the
world that allows humans the capacity for undertaking externally non-compelled acts. Such a
notion allows for a measure of choice and leaves room for the influence of actions undertaken
by the volition of humans. This permits for the possibility that a certain individual contains
within its essential nature, an attribute of freewill that affords choices that are not directly
compelled by external forces. In short, there is the potential for a human being to undertake
an action which is not directly compelled or determined by the forces of the state of affairs
directly preceding it.3 Thus, owing to the fact that an individual has the power or freedom to
take such actions, a person must assume the responsibility for the consequences of it. By this,
one could assume that it was only the unique individual known as Joseph Stalin who could
have made the exact decisions or undertaken certain actions uniquely relating to his character.
In doing so, historically momentous events were determined during his lifetime. Thus, the
2J. P. Sartre, Search for a Method. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963) Pg. 83.
3Munn, Pg. 201.
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unique attributes of this individual, at least partly influenced the course of history, and
therefore he was responsible for the consequences brought about by his decisions and actions.
Accordingly, this view places great emphasis on the freedom of the individual to act in
harmony with its inner subjective nature and plays down, somewhat, the influence of external
conditions. Its critics assert that such a theory denies the connection of the human will and its
surrounding environment, and the extreme contra-causal notion of freewill does imply a
randomness to human actions and events influenced by an inner subjectivity exercising its
freewill. Such a critique seems to be inaccurate on certain counts because if all human acts are
random, then how is it possible that Man can develop any understanding of the world or
predict the likely outcome of actions which are the foundation for rational decision making?
Within such a context, the comprehension of actions or their potential consequences would be
completely impossible.
A position which could overcome these problems postulates the possibility of
simultaneously sustaining a belief in both freewill and determinism.4 Such a theory proposes
that there is the existence of a human potential to undertake a free act within the context of a
largely determinate world. This implies that past conditions and events determine the field of
possibilities in which free choices can be made. External conditions and behavioural patterns
may limit the range of possible choices, but as long as several options remain there must be
some notion of freewill that is reliant upon the unique characteristics of our inner subjective
nature. Sartre takes such a view in his attempt at producing a political theory which reconciles
many of the differences within the seemingly opposing views of Marxism and Existentialism.
His theory of the imagination described in the previous chapter is intrinsically connected to
this argument and consequently so are the attributes of power and Utopia. Within this premise,
many of the issues surfacing in the discussion of the views of Bloch and Nietzsche also
surface. It is here that the relation between the subjectivity of Man and the objectivity of the
external world can be uncovered.
II. The Relation ofMarxism and Existentialism
In undertaking such a reconciliation, Sartre begins by outlining a conception of human
freedom which can be understood in relation to the historically determined framework
proposed by Marxist theory. In doing this, he sets out to prove that the position held by the
4Munn, Pg. 202. See also, Section 8 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume
which exemplifies the classic conception of the compatablist argument.
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Marxists which stipulates that the socio-historical superstructure of the external reality defines
the 'abstract ideological character' of the individual is correct, but also the unique intentions
and choices made by such an individual reciprocally influences the characteristics of this
superstructure. Neither assumes an overwhelmingly predominant importance, for each is
influenced by and intrinsically connected to the characteristics of the other. It is this action
that serves as the vehicle for the expression of man's essential freedom. The embodiment of
the foundation for this view is found in Sartre's statement: Men themselves make history, but in
a given environment which conditions them.5
This statement depicts the complexity of the reality of the world in the material sense as a
unity of forms which only become apparent to Man through the activity of the consciousness.
Armed with the faculty of the imagination, his inner subjective nature ventures into this
external environment, which is presented in the form of a field of possibilities involving
potential action. The world then, to a certain extent, is utilised for Mankind's projects, but the
range of possibilities encountered within it is by no means unlimited. It contains considerable
latent pressures which resist and influence the decisions of an individual. However, the
inherent make-up of the human consciousness separates the characteristics of its Being from
other elements found within the world that are completely conditioned by these pressures.
Though Man may contain a materiality similar to these objects, the faculty of the
consciousness is the element that separates the qualities and potential of his existence from
them by affording a possibility for undertaking creative action. Therefore, within the
conditions imposed by the external forces of reality there is a limited area open for the exercise
of the creative faculty of the imagination. It is this consciousness which directs the actions that
enable an individual to express its essential freedom.6
Such action is defined and driven, in large part, by the sense of urgency caused by an
underlying besoin or need intrinsic to the existence of Man. By also emphasising this
necessity, instead of relying solely on the attribute of human desire to describe the latent
compulsive force behind Man's action, Sartre restrains the conception of the consciousness
traditionally related to the contra-causal argument. He replaces this interpretation of an
unlimited freedom driven only by an inner subjective volition with one that allows for the
influence of the external pressures of reality. This element of necessity intrinsic to existence
simultaneously stimulates and limits the actions of Man. In this way, the freedom essential to
human existence is regulated by the scarcity encountered within the objective world. These
5Sartre, Pg. 86.
6Hazel Barnes, located in the introduction to Search For a Method, Pg. xii.
190
pressures actually make such freedom compulsory, in that Man contains the capacity to make
free choices and take certain undetermined actions. As a result of this situation, he does not
have the freedom to forego this exercise. In other words, one of the intrinsic conditioning
pressures of existence is that Humanity must exercise its freedom of choice in order to survive.
Thus, through the notion of scarcity, which is inherent to its constitution, the world exhibits
itself as the field of possibility for human existence, but also as the criteria for its non¬
existence as well.7
Through this definition of the essential freedom of humanity being intricately connected to
the necessity of survival, Sartre reinforces his claim that the subjectivity of the inner nature
unique to each individual is conditioned to the extent necessary for its successful encounter
with the circumstances found within the world. His argument stresses the reciprocal nature of
this relationship between the Being of the world and that of Man. Mankind's striving to
surpass the given circumstances of the present involves a leap that simultaneously uncovers
and reinforces the conditions of the reality it seeks to overcome. In turn, this reality
perpetually resists every action or movement undertaken to surpass it. Thus, Man is "the
product of his product", owing to the fact that the socio-historical structures which his
subjective consciousness influences, in turn, define the range of possibilities presented from
the objective position where his actions commence. In short, the conditions of ones' existence
within reality delineates the range of possible actions an individual may take and it is this
potential which then directs the extent that such conditions can be surpassed. In light of this,
one can assume that the field of possibility of any individual is directly dependent upon their
position and the conditions of the surrounding social reality determined by the preceding
events of history as well as the intensity of their inner will in overcoming them.
Hence, society is not presented to each individual as an inert set of circumstances
determined by past events which completely dictates its actions, but serves as a ground for a
certain unique 'perspective for the future'. Such a perspective motivates action instead of
determining it. The material conditions of the present influence the character of Man, but it is
the striving to surpass this given that defines in a uniquely individual manner, the essential
freedom and choices made involving the potential of the future. Such exertion, both mentally
and physically, instils within existence its meaning and purpose. This is emphasised in
Sartre's statement: Man defines himselfby his project,8 Therefore, Mankind is created by the




Marxism and Existentialism is brought to light, and subsequently a tenable position advocating
a notion of freewill as well.
The Fundamental Interaction Between Power and Utopia
This discussion provides an insight into the intrinsic connection of the forces which have
been the focus of this study. The inference within Sartre's argument between the desires of
Man's inner nature and the pressures inflicted by the external world begins to indicate the
importance of the necessary roles of certain attributes of existence as expressed by Nietzsche's
concept of the Will To Power and Bloch's Anticipatory Consciousness. It is the equilibrium of
these drives which defines the human condition and focuses Mankind's innate capacity towards
avenues allowing it to overcome the resistance of its given present circumstance. In other
words, it is through this process that Man's specific field of possibility is defined. Thus, the
essential characteristics of its existence are defined through the dialogue between the creative
spirit of the subjective consciousness and its encounter with the external world. The elements
constituting this interrelation fluctuate and transform continually with each turn of this
formative process, so that no one element holds greater sway over the another, but all inform it
simultaneously.
Without vision, there is no power; without power, vision is impotent. This then, is our
response to the question concerning the connection between the attributes of power and Utopia.
Without one of these elements, the equilibrium of the formative process is broken, which
removes the potential for the full expression of man's essential freedom. Consequently, the
faculty of the imagination is therefore considered as a power (i.e., a capacity), owing to its
central role in the emergence of this freedom to endeavour upon creative action. Also, it is the
imagination that is at the root of the Utopian impulse and its manifest desire for the creation or
discovery of the 'new'. Thus, through his innate capacity and creative spirit, Man dominates
his surroundings. However, the creative drive underlying this impulse exerts itself over the
elements it uncovers within the external world as a matter of necessity, both in body and spirit.
This necessity stems from the resistance of these external elements that subsequently
dominate human action by limiting this potential to a specific field of possibility. This external
coercion contains a profound effect on the human condition due to the inherent scarcity of
resources. It is this situation that is being referenced when the balance of forces between the
creative expression of Man's being and the resistance of the world, is said to define the extent
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of its freedom. Thus, the interaction of these attributes form the perpetual state of Man's
Being as Becoming.
By re-visualising the traditional conception of Utopia as a process of critical discourse
instead of a mere static spatial depiction, the 'no-place' signified by men such as Thomas
More, becomes intrinsically connected to the temporality of Being. Therefore, when speaking
of Utopia in relation to the temporal being of humanity, one is not merely describing an ideal
set of possible conditions frozen in a specific historical circumstance, but an infinite temporal
process of speculation played out over a continuous series of finite individual life spans. The
transcendental impetus of Utopia's potential lies in its ability to continually provide ideals that
can focus Man's attempts to overcome the given of the present. It is only through this
interrelationship between ideals and action that his outermost potentiality can be reached. In
other words, the spiritual characteristics of Utopia have the capacity to instil a sense of purpose
or meaning to this existence. An individual will readily undertake great effort and perceive it
as fulfilling if there is a sense of purpose providing direction towards the manifestation of a
value or ideal. The effort put forth in attempting to achieve such an end is more a source of
fulfilment, than the realisation of the ultimate goal in itself. Since a singular event cannot lead
to fulfilment, it takes a sequence of events extended over time to achieve this. Hence, Utopia
must be considered in relation to the passage of time.
So, how is this conception of a temporally-based process of Utopia linked to the concept of
power? It is connected in two essential ways. The first is concerned with the utilisation of the
faculty of the imagination. The use of this propensity is inherent to the creation of Utopias and
the Utopian endeavour, and as stated above9, essentially a power in terms of its being a
capacity. The human consciousness surpasses the conditions of its existing circumstances
through the projection of mental images which interpret perceptions concerned with the
external world and then formulate objectives directing the actions taken within these
conditions. Thus, Utopia is connected to power because it focuses Man's strengths towards the
transformation of the surrounding environment. In short, this interrelationship of the forces of
power and Utopia allows the potential for creative action that can transform an existing
circumstance.
The drives underlying these attributes are manifested as influential characteristics of man's
nature and affect the gamut of contexts comprising the human condition (i.e. social, political,
& historical). The impulse underlying power compels men to strive for control over their
surroundings, while the Utopian imagination seeks to instigate creative changes to its
9See chapter II, Pg. 51-52, above.
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immediate environment. These characteristics translate to the social realm by influencing the
formation of the institutions and the general distribution of power and resources within a social
configuration. In general terms, there is an inherent socialisation process which disciplines
individual appetites by the regulation of desires in accordance to the accepted norms and
customs of the prevailing social structures. These structures seek to channel an individual's
energies towards actions which will reinforce the existing fabric of a society and the position
of the favoured functionaries within it.
On the other side, an individual will strive as much as possible to inscribe its unique will
upon such structures by seeking to instigate their transformation. Here, the central theme in
Plato's Republic comes to the forefront and is manifested as the fine line maintained within the
social realm of Man between co-operation bringing social stability, or free expression intrinsic
to creativity and innovation. It is the grey area between these impulses that serves as the point
of connection between the attributes of power and Utopia. If this interaction has reached and
maintains a healthy equilibrium, a condition conducive to undertaking a creative existence is
produced. So, for the creation of a state of affairs where individuals can reach their full
potential, it is imperative to create social structures that are sufficiently stable to provide the
security necessary for creativity, yet flexible enough to allow its inhabitants to surpass its
boundaries without destroying the essence of these institutions.
This perpetually evolving equilibrium is embodied within the development of a culture in
the tendency for the ruling body to regulate and control an ever widening sphere of the lives of
the individuals contained within its jurisdiction. At a certain point in a culture's history, the
regulation of the freer, more chaotic sections of society produces a sufficient amount of
security so that large amounts of wealth can be generated through the co-operative efforts of its
members. Within this context, the vigorous spirit of innovation is still strong due to the
feeling of independence is still fired within a large number of individuals. This spirit induces
great achievements which bring added benefits to the lives of those involved. When such
circumstances prevail, the balance between customs, norms, and laws interact with the spirit of
independent thought, that spawns the energetic drive for innovation. This spirit is usually
contained within the segments of society related to the arts and sciences, which can uncover
the tools and theories necessary for positive change.
Such a balanced mixture of stability and change is irretrievably damaged if a government
consolidates its control through the implementation of excessive constraints on such actions.
The spirit of innovation embodied within the Utopian imagination is then stifled and the society
begins to stagnate. The fictions responsible for the propagation of new values or ideals
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become flaccid and impotent to the point that a society no longer has the capacity to match the
achievements of its ancestors. History becomes a romantic activity involved in the recollection
of past glories. A culture caught in this cycle no longer looks to its future as the basis for its
identity, but relies on its past. When this disintegration of the future perspective takes place,
the decline of the culture is already well underway.
Therefore, for the intrinsic health of a society, it is imperative to maintain the creative
spirit of change as far as possible without damaging its internal stability. There must always
be outlets for the Utopian imagination amongst the structures of society and the aims of the
State apparatus must attempt to provide the necessary security needed in a just society so that
individuals may pursue activities facilitating their well-being. If a state pursues regulation in
the name of security too vigorously, it may be successful in providing its inhabitants with a
secure life, but at the price of its being tedious or monotonous. An overly secure existence
inevitably breeds a lethargic attitude which undermines the ability to live creatively.
The element of initiative provided by individuals outside the statistical norm of a society,
such as the Utopians, is therefore imperative in regards to its moral, artistic, and intellectual
development. It is the vision and activities of such persons which serve as harbingers of
change that can deliver the beneficial effects to the mass population. Though at the time of
their emergence, many innovative ideas may be considered unpopular or unnecessary by all but
a small minority, it is the perseverance of this spirit in the face of resistance, which inevitably
brings necessary changes to people's lives. A totalitarian regime can quite easily establish a
sense of security through its regulation of most of the factors involved in the lives of the
individuals under its sovereignty, but what such a regime cannot allow is the proposal of
changes which originate from outside its ruling elite. The inspiration for innovation is only
allowed to emerge from within the structure itself, and as history clearly illustrates, changes
contrary to the regimes immediate interests, no matter the potential, will never be tolerated.10
Thus, it is the interaction of the forces underlying power and Utopia, which simultaneously
create and maintain Man's social configurations, regardless of the specific ideologies or
systems of government they are founded upon. The former embodies stability, while the
latter, flexibility and creativity. The institutions of power exhibited as the manifestation of
authority seek to reinforce and extend their control over the existing social hierarchy by
sustaining the continuity of the historical traditions that legitimise their positions of authority.
However, all these ruling institutions are founded upon the creative spirit embodied within the
ideals, goals, and visions of the individuals comprising the social realm. Similarly, freedom in
10Bertrand Russell, Authority and The Individual. (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1949) Pg. 41.
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the form of an emergent creative expression, and the cultural attributes it spawns, are
dependent on power for their manifestation, just as power relies on the unique spirit of the
individuals to breath life into its constructs. In conclusion, it is the interaction between the
forces underlying power and Utopia which provides the framework of interdependence
allowing individuals to embark on the fulfilment of their potential, while the subsequent
actions of their creative spirit perpetuates such a framework. One instigates the activity of the
other, while simultaneously depending on this action for its ultimate expression. Hence, the
attributes of power and Utopia are intricately connected to the intrinsic being facilitating the
human condition and the social configurations emerging within it. Without a perpetual
equilibrium between these attributes, the total realisation of Man's creative potential, is
severely hindered, if not largely impossible.
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